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Zakoretsky Keystut

'Day-M - 2' or Why Stalin divided Korea

Keystut Zakoretsky

"DAY-M-2" or Why did Stalin divide Korea? The

proposed study on the history of the USSR in 1945-1953 was made under great impression and using the methodology and conclusions of Viktor Suvorov's books "Icebreaker" and "Den-M", which provide evidence that the leadership of the Soviet Union, led by Stalin, in the 30s years and until 06/22/1941, the main goal of its policy was the destabilization of the situation in Europe and the organization of the "liberation" war of the Red Army. However, the final stage of this plan ("liberation" campaign of the Red Army - the "Thunder" plan) was thwarted by the attack of the Nazi Wehrmacht. As a result, the USSR itself became a victim and suffered huge losses. And after 1945 (as official historians have long assured), the Soviet Union was forced to spend large amounts of money to counter the aggressive actions of the United States, which supposedly replaced Nazi Germany as a pretender to world domination. At the same time, it was assured that such a Soviet policy was the only correct one, and the Soviet Union was the most consistent fighter for peace (in the sense of "non-war").

However, a closer look at the events of those years leads to different conclusions. In particular, to the fact that it was precisely because of Stalin's actions that the world community found itself on the brink of a new world war at the end of 1950 (the Thunderstorm plan). But some unexpected technical unpreparedness to conduct hostilities directly on the territory of the United States forced him to postpone the start of the war to 1954 (Groza-2 plan), to which he was not destined to live. A few years after 03/05/1953 can be called a new "post-war" period. Contents: IRREVERSIBLE MIRACLE.

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TIME. CONCLUSION. IRREVERSIBLE MIRACLE (foreword by
Viktor Suvorov) The battle for the Imperial Chancellery was long and
stubborn. By that time, the Reichstag had already been taken. But the
Reichstag is only a symbol. Moreover, the symbol is empty. The
Reichstag is a parliament, and Hitler hated parliaments of all stripes.
He even began his rise to power by setting fire to the Reichstag. Then
the building was restored, but the parliament did not play any role in
Nazi Germany. This command of ours attached great importance to
the Reichstag, because its building is crowned with a dome. It is
important for us to set the red banner at a good height. The symbolic
dome of the Reichstag became the last height on which we hoisted
our flag. There were no other reasons to storm the Nazi parliament.
No secrets were to be found in it: decisions were not made here.
Decisions were made nearby - in the Imperial Chancellery, where
Hitler's office was. In purely spectator terms, the Imperial Chancellery was losing -

point, that pin, which could be crowned with a red banner. But the documents... It was assumed, of course,

that Hitler's office had been cleared long ago, the papers had been burned, the treasures had been taken away, but everyone knows that the devils are

jokers... A surprise was waiting for the Soviet infantry right in the lobby. When the German submachine gunners were knocked out of a huge marble hall with rectangular columns, when the dust settled a little, the eyes of the Soviet soldiers under the rubble of brick and a layer of lime dust appeared a transparent box of three-inch impenetrable glass, under the glass - an unknown weapon. A machine gun is not a machine gun, but something with a barrel, something obviously designed to shoot. The machine gun must have a machine on a tripod or on wheels. It wasn't. The machine gun must have some kind of trigger mechanism with a hook or trigger. This didn't happen either. If this is a light machine gun, then he does not need a machine gun, but there should be a butt and a bipod to keep the barrel horizontal to the ground. But this was not the case either. Beneath the strange weapon, a small, engraved tablet gleamed. What is written on that plate, the Soviet soldiers did not know, but the signature did not cause doubts. The signature was recognized at first sight: "Adolf Hitler".

The fight continued. Everything was seething around. Artillery worked, dust fell from the ceiling, ceilings collapsed, shells exploded, walls fell, everything that could burn, and even that which could not, burned. It was impossible to drag an interpreter into this hell, much less an armaments specialist. Where to get them during a grandiose assault, what ways to transport them through the burning city to the very first attacking chains of penal infantry? In the meantime, the news of the new weapons had already slipped through the headquarters of the battalion and the headquarters of the regiment and rushed higher and higher. Capturing a German machine gun is valor. Not everyone in the war had such a chance. Capturing a machine gun, a cannon, a motorcycle, a horse and cart is an honor, it is always important. The results achieved are judged by the captured trophies. The number of planes shot down, Germans killed, tanks destroyed can be exaggerated, even without malicious intent. Who knows if a hundred Germans have been exterminated or only ninety? And trophies are something that can be counted exactly, this is what you can feel with your hand: here is a captured tank, here is a cannon,

always valued in war. The capture of new types of weapons is the highest valor. Immediately, not only a new, previously unknown type of weapon was captured, but captured right at Hitler's headquarters. Moreover, Hitler himself had something to do with this sample, he noted it with his attention.

Therefore, from the very top to the very bottom, through the headquarters of the corps, division, regiment, battalion, there is a thunderous order to keep the hall in which they found an unusual weapon at any cost, not to give this hall back into the hands of the enemy, not to let the Germans get to this weapon. And one more thing: do not open the walls - this thing can be mined.

Only two days later, when the fighting subsided, when the artillery fell silent, when the last Nazis were smoked out of the cellars, translators and weapons experts were delivered to the Imperial Chancellery. And it turned out...

It turned out that this thing has a Russian name - ShKAS: Shpitalny, Komaritsky, aviation, rapid-fire. The machine gun was adopted by the Soviet aviation in 1932. In 1938, in Spain, the Germans removed ShKAS from a downed Soviet I-16 fighter and sent it to Berlin. Here ShKAS was subjected to comprehensive checks and tests, and then shown to Hitler. Hitler was furious: there was nothing like it in the arsenal of the German aviation. Even closer. Hitler ordered the creation of an aircraft machine gun that would be superior in performance or at least equal to the machine gun of Shpitalny and Komaritsky. In order to speed up the German designers, in order to shame the leaders of the German military industry, Hitler ordered the ShKAS to be displayed in the most prominent place in his official residence. Let the designers and bigwigs of the military industry blush to the very ears every time they visit Hitler's headquarters. The machine gun was supposed to be in the Imperial Chancellery until the moment when the German aviation received, if not the best, then at least an equal sample of weapons. This order of Hitler was stamped on the tablet. But the desired moment for the German designers did not come. What was adopted by the Soviet aviation in 1932, the German designers could not

create either by the beginning of the war, or during it, or at the very end. Even with a valid sample in front of them, they could not copy it.

It is clear that in 1945, Soviet submachine gunners could not identify a Soviet aircraft machine gun during the battle. How can the infantry know what a machine gun looks like hidden in the wing of a fighter? And who would have thought of meeting a product of Tula gunsmiths in the Hitlerite vestibule? Meanwhile, the news of the seizure of unusual weapons, and even next to Hitler's office, slipped through the headquarters of the army and the headquarters of the front and was reported to the very top. Comrade Stalin demanded to see him an unusual German contraption. I had to report that the contraption was not German at all ... When everything cleared up and it turned out, the participants in the battle in the vestibule of the Imperial Chancellery were awarded exactly as they reward participants in the capture of a really very important weapon. Shpitalny and Komaritsky were not forgotten either.

ShKAS was by no means the only model of Soviet weapons, which neither our enemies nor our allies had an equal. The IL-2 was not only the best attack aircraft in the world, but also the most massive combat aircraft in the history of aviation, the only aircraft in the world with an armored hull. And again: what our designers created before the war, no one in the world managed to either repeat or copy even by the time it ended. Our BM-13 installations, the famous Katyushas, were not only the best in the world, but also unique. This system of extremely simple and extremely effective weapons cannot be compared with anything because it did not fit into any framework, did not fit into any foreign classification. They just didn't have anything like that.

Soviet artillery outnumbered the artillery of all other countries of the world combined and had the best guns in the world. The guns and howitzers that the Red Army abandoned at the borders at the very beginning of the war were used by the Germans until its very end, and only in their best divisions. Now, many decades after the war, our cannons stand under the African sun in a museum near the Egyptian pyramids. The Germans armed Rommel's tank army with them, which in Africa tried to cut the Suez Canal, cut off oil supplies and thereby bring Britain to its knees. Hitler's Minister of Arms A. Speer considered and openly said: there is nothing better than the Soviet 76-mm gun in the world

No.

The T-34 tank was not only the best in the world, but also the most massive tank of the Second World War. What our designers created before the war, neither the Americans, nor the Japanese, nor the British could create or copy. So many hymns have been sung to this tank that it makes no sense to repeat them. I will add just one detail. During the grandiose tank battle on the Kursk Bulge, the best German SS Panzer Division "Reich" was armed with T-34 tanks, which the Red Army abandoned in 1941 during the border battles. Not "Panthers" and "Tigers" were the main striking force of the Wehrmacht near Kursk, but our unsurpassed tanks. On June 22,

1941, Germany dealt a heavy blow to the Soviet Union. The Red Army suffered defeats, but in those days a miracle happened. The Soviet Union almost instantly rebuilt on a military footing. Factories that only yesterday produced civilian products switched to the production of military products and produced them in huge quantities with the highest quality. Here is just one example: on June 23, 1941, a garment factory in Kalinin began producing raincoats for the army. Imagine: June 22 - Sunday, the war began suddenly, no one expected a military attack, but right the next day, on Monday, the garment factory begins to produce what is called military products. It's a miracle! In order to start the production of even such a simple thing as a cape, you need to bring the appropriate green material to the factory in advance. That was done. A lot of material is required. Let's estimate how much is needed at least for the production of a hundred tents. One tent, taking into account the bends, has a size of 2 m x 2 m, i.e. 4 sq. m. For a hundred tents - 400 sq. m. But they needed not a hundred, but thousands! And the material was found. In addition, green threads are needed. A lot of. We found threads! We need thin strong ropes, we found ropes. Raincoats have no buttons. Instead, they are short, strong wooden sticks with a groove in the middle. The thing is simple, but they need a lot and urgently. Found! These sticks must be painted in a protective color. Paint is needed. There is paint! Finally, you just need to know what a raincoat looks like, how to make it. It is not clear what is happening in the country, the enemy is bombing cities and airfields, the government has a vague idea of the situation, the general staff does not understand anything. Where and how, under such conditions, to get those requirements that

raincoat-tent should answer? All this was found, the workers were explained what was required of them, and the products immediately went
highest quality.

And all over the country, factories that yesterday produced pots began to produce automatic machines today. The shipbuilding plant in Gorky began to produce tanks. The Chelyabinsk and Stalingrad tractor plants also became tank plants, as did the car building plant in Nizhny Tagil. In the moment! But armored hulls are not raincoats. The tank is the most complex product. Yes, there is a tank! A furniture factory in Moscow began producing LaGG-3 fighters. Then this aircraft, gradually improving, turned into La-5. Our best flew on them
aces.

Soviet factories in a matter of days rebuilt production to the surprise of the world. Who's to say it's not a miracle? True,
he had one oddity. Here's what. The war is over, all over the world industry has switched mainly to the production of peaceful products. Factories that yesterday produced fighter planes and submarines began to produce civil aircraft and passenger ships. Germany was defeated and completely plundered, but gradually, little by little, its economy began to recover and produce the world-famous Volkswagen Beetles, and then Opel, BMW and Mercedes, sewing machines and televisions, and so on and so forth.

And in the Soviet Union, industry did not want to rebuild in a peaceful way. If it was rebuilt, then the quality of civilian products did not meet either world or European standards. Release the best tank in the world? No problem! What about a passenger car? There are problems. There are currently 88 types of passenger cars on the British market. In last place in all respects - the Russian "Lada". If there were 150 models on the market, it would be in 150th place. "Lada" is the subject of ridicule and evil anecdotes. But in the USSR they failed to create it. The plant is imported, entirely bought in Italy with all technological lines, with all the equipment and with the drawings of the car, which was developed by the Italians. It was only necessary to produce and improve someone else's model, trying to stay at least in the penultimate place. Does not exceed.

But what about Volga, Moskvich, Zaporozhets? They have more problems. These machines do not meet European standards and their sale in developed countries is prohibited. An amazing thing: almost half of the armed people of the world carry Kalashnikov assault rifles on their shoulders. But can those same factories produce a pot that someone in developed countries will buy? No, they can't. Sometimes they say that they are still bought. But this is not entirely true - they do not buy, but take it for free, as a gift. For money, no one needs such a product. We bought Soviet hammers and axes. It's for meltdown. The steel is good, it is cheap, if you melt it down, you can make a good thing. The Japanese bought Soviet televisions. They cost a penny on the foreign market: the Japanese threw the filling out of the TV, and made beautiful shelves from polished boards.

So it turns out that miracles in the USSR were somehow one-sided. From a peaceful rhythm to a military one, they switched instantly, but the reverse process dragged on for decades and there is no end in sight. A lot was said about the conversion, but they could not realize this idea. In the Soviet Union, the economic miracle turned out to be irreversible: it switched quickly in one direction, but in the other - continuous problems! And there is no need to recall here the achievements of Soviet cosmonautics, the launches of peaceful satellites and the flights of cosmonauts - this is a by-

product of the military development of strategic missile weapons. Therefore, is it not time to admit that there was simply no miracle in 1941? The entire Soviet industry was created as a military industry, counting on the mass production of weapons in

incredible quantities. This was the main goal. But you can see that peaceful products were still produced. Yes, they released. But firstly, it was contemptuously called "consumer goods" ("consumer products"). Secondly, the facilities for its production were usually located as auxiliary workshops at the same military factories. And dual-use products (both military and civilian) were immediately made so that, if necessary, they would get into the army with minimal alterations.

Everything was being prepared for the sake of quickly satisfying the combat needs of the army and with the aim of starting mass military production at any moment. Sewing factories placed orders and patterns

on overcoats and tunics. Materials, threads, wooden sticks instead of buttons, etc. were brought to their warehouses. Shipbuilding, locomotive, tractor, car-building plants kept in stock equipment for cutting and welding armor plates of unprecedented thickness and everything else necessary for the production of tanks. But the civilian "consumer goods" in the USSR has always been considered a second-class product. Moreover, in order to reduce worries about its production, many peaceful goods were simply purchased abroad. In the 1930s, I

wrote the book Den-M about the preparation of our industry for war. The topic turned out to be inexhaustible. I managed to show quite a bit, with only a few examples, of the absolutely incredible amount of work carried out on the eve of the war in the Soviet Union. This topic needs further study. I have to work on it for the rest of my life. I hope that other researchers will support me. But the deeper one plunges into the events of the pre-war period, the more obvious the idea becomes that even after 1945 Stalin's policy remained the same. Even after the war, he continued to do what he had done before. After the Second World War, he continued to prepare for the Third World War.

Confirmation of this is the incredible power of the Soviet Army against the backdrop of queues for sausages made of no one knows what. This is confirmed by rockets, satellites, astronauts against the background of guys and girls who near the Intourist hotels begged foreigners for torn pants.

Against the backdrop of grandiose achievements in the military industry in the Soviet Union, basic, vital skills were gradually lost. The country has forgotten how to grow bread. From a country selling it, the USSR turned into a buying country, having lost the ability to feed itself. The Soviet Union was the first in the world to create intercontinental ballistic missiles, the first to launch an artificial earth satellite. "We will bury you!" - Khrushchev shouted to the Americans ... and asked them for bread. If the Americans are buried, then who will feed them? Bread was paid for with gold, oil and gas. The Americans will grow new bread, and the given gold will not return back. Giant aircraft carriers were being built in

the USSR, but it did not have the means to provide a decent life for the disabled and

pensioners. We traveled through space, and our villages died out. We gave tanks, missiles, planes to countless "friends" without getting anything in return. We deployed eight tank armies in Europe at a time when there was not a single one in the whole world. We had eight airborne divisions, and there was only one in the entire NATO bloc. And all this against the backdrop of a regrettable fact - the Slavic population of the USSR ceased to reproduce itself: the death rate in peacetime exceeded the birth rate. Comparing these simple and well-known facts, we inevitably come to the conclusion: for the Soviet leaders, the destruction of the capitalists was a more important task than the preservation of their own

people. Having completed the Second World War, Stalin immediately set about preparing a new war. This topic is huge and interesting as a detective story. She always attracted me, but I knew that I couldn't pick her up. I just don't have enough time. I plunged once and for all into the year 1941, which ten lifetimes would not be enough to explore. And it was a pity: really no one will study Stalin's preparations for

a new world war? But one was found. He wrote a magnificent book "Day-M-2". In spirit and intent, this is like a continuation of my book, the development of the same idea, but on the other hand, it is a study of a problem that no one has dealt with before. We have a lot in common with him. He is a former officer, I am also a former. He studied in Moscow and served next to her, I also went through this. He served in the "court" division, and there is a similar line in my biography. I am glad that such a study was made not by a professor of history, but by our brother officer. The book "Day-M-2" undoubtedly deserves the most serious attention of both specialists and the general reading public. It opens another page of our past that no one has previously read. I wish the author success. I am sure that he will write many more good books, his talent as a researcher and writer was clearly

manifested already in the first work. Victor

Suvorov, June 1, 1997, Bristol, England.

METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC FALSIFICATION (Instead of introduction)

The proposed book is not accidentally called "Day-M-2". The impetus for working on it was Viktor Suvorov's book Den-M, dedicated to the events of 1939-1941 from the point of view of an intelligence analyst. The conclusions set out in it, to put it mildly, are very different from those that official historians have adhered to for many years, not only in the USSR, but also in other countries, incl. and until recently. This caused a sharp rejection of the works of V. Suvorov and attempts to refute him. Meanwhile, he only applied to one of the historical periods the rules that are taught to any intelligence officer in any intelligence school: first, the exact dates; secondly, taking into account small details (the smallest); thirdly, a comparison of different events and

etc.

A continuation of "Day-M" and a kind of response to some criticism was another work by V. Suvorov - "The Last Republic", in which he made an interesting scientific conclusion that official historians have two methods of research: along with "normal scientific" (close to the methods of intelligence) there is also the method of "sculpting" (in fact - "scientific falsification"). This happens because historians are obliged not only to describe events, but also to draw CONCLUSIONS, which can often concern political interests. Well, politics does not always allow pure science to act normally. In this regard, there is a bifurcation of scientific methods, the difference between which can be expressed as follows: in the "scientific" - conclusions and hypotheses are necessarily based on a detailed study of events, dates, facts. And in the "modeling" method, the main role is played by a believable fairy tale, which should be confirmed by a historical review. Accordingly, different methods of analyzing events are used in the "scientific" method and in the "modeling" method: either those that are studied in intelligence schools; or specific methods of "blinding" (their list is given below). I started work on Den-M-2 in the late spring of 1994. Moreover, at first I did not think about the book, I decided only to clarify my knowledge about 1946-1953, the "secrecy" of which

I felt as a child. Gradually it got me hooked. Processing the collected materials on a computer stimulated a new search. The result was a book. Its main conclusion is the same as in the works of V.

Suvorov dedicated to 1939-1941. That's why I chose the name "Day-M-2".
By the way, there is a

hint of Stalin's return to pre-war plans in the book "The Last Republic".
In it, the author briefly noticed that the construction of the "Palace of
Soviets" (DS) in Moscow was tried to be continued after the war. However,
he does not develop this thesis in depth. But how can one continue to
build a DS without any hope of reaching goals that would make DS
meaningful? So, there were some hopes (and plans). Only by the
mid-1950s had they decreased to such an extent that the construction of
the Palace of Soviets was stopped. In addition, to

confirm my feeling about the "closedness" of the recent past, I want
to give here a small excerpt from a little-known poem "By the Right of
Memory", written by the great Soviet poet Alexander Tvardovsky back in
the 60s (I graduated from school in 1975, but we had no idea about it). To
forget, to forget they say silently, They want to drown

Living reality in oblivion. And for
the waves to close over
her. Byl-forget! To forget the
faces of relatives and friends And
so many fates the way of the
cross All that be a long-standing
dream, Bad, wild fiction, So go and
forget it. They order to forget
and ask kindness Not
to remember - a memory under
seal, To inadvertently not to
embarrass the uninitiated with
that publicity. And by the way
- about the uninitiated, Where
can I get them? All are
dedicated. Everyone knows
everything: trouble with the
people! Not by that, so
they know by birth, Not by
marks

and scars, So in passing,
in passing, Not by myself, So through those who themselves ... And they think for

She does not value herself,
That the cassock of time will
drag out Any
true story, Any
pain. That this way and that - the
planet flies, Counting down
the years and days, And what
will not be exacted from the
poet, When behind the ghost of the
ban Will be silent about what burns the
soul. And who said that adults can't
read Other Pages? Or our valor
will decrease And honor will fade
in the world? Then it's not at all
surprising, That the voice of a
true memory Would tell us trouble
in the future: Whoever hides the
past jealously, He is unlikely to be
in harmony with the future ... What is now
big, what is small How to know,
but people are not grass: all of
them in bulk In some who do not
remember kinship. Let the
eyewitnesses of the generation
Go down quietly to the
bottom, Prosperous oblivion
is not given to our Nature.
Others simply asserted, That it was
as if we were talking about a
rainy day Not all of these
were at court, Throwing a
shadow at us. But everything
that was, is not forgotten, Not
sewn-covered in the world.
One untruth is
at a loss to us, And only the truth to the court! (1966 - 1969) (published in ZNAMYA magazine)

After a long period of study in 1946-1953, I can draw an unambiguous conclusion: Soviet historians turned to him with the wide use of the "modeling" method, in which three main methods can be distinguished. 1. If

it is impossible to keep silent about an event, and for some reason it is forbidden to indicate the exact date or details, then its description was given in comparison with others so that the course of events was implied differently. This method can be called "shuffling" (according to the card term "shuffle").

2. Some facts were generally kept silent, moreover, a lot. But if they could have a different interpretation, then this led to an effect known in radio electronics as "positive feedback" (when the amplified signal amplifies itself). That is, if an event is not definitely indicated anywhere, then historians were free to interpret it as they please, incl. wrong. And then use the wrong conclusion in further reasoning. The "sculpting" method strengthened itself! A special case of omissions is the "ejection" of some

years from the biography of famous people. For example, they write: until 1946, a person held one position, from 1948 - another. And between? It is hinted that this is unimportant for history. 3. In some cases, obvious falsification was used.

For example, in a little-known highly specialized publication, the date is indicated: 04/17/1954. And in a very massive one, it turns into 04/17/1951. Or in a popular publication many years later they write about a person that he was arrested, spent many years in prison, and according to his official biography, at that time he "occupied responsible positions." However, as it was already noted in the description of the second method, falsification is also possible due to defaults. But the "molding" method has a strong drawback: different

people cannot "sculpt" in the same way, provided that they have different degrees of accuracy and respect for connections with other events, especially if they are also "blinded". The truth is said that a lie is on one leg. But why has it been possible to "sculpt" quite successfully for so many years? The fact is that history must be considered simultaneously in two directions: to investigate small details on one topic in different periods of time (vertical slice) and many different events in one period (vertical slice).

horizontal), which is difficult. I also faced this problem. In the end, I ended up with the main chapters written in the "vertical slice" way. "Horizontal cut" was planned chapter "Post-war period". But then the idea arose to start with a "horizontal cut" in the form of a small "digest" of the topics discussed further. Including as evidence that the period after 1945 is well worth a detailed study. But before turning to the specific facts of those years, here, in the introduction, I propose to clarify the questions: were those years somehow distinguished by official historians? Were there special names applied to them? And how should

they be called, taking into account the newly discovered circumstances? And although new circumstances are still ahead of us, the proposed discussion will not only allow us to understand the situation more correctly, but will also be an incentive, a "guiding star" in carrying out everything

research.

As noted above, the focus of the book will be on the period 1946-1953. Let us briefly touch on some events after 03/05/1953, as well as before 1946. As for their names, not everything is clearly defined in official historiography. The time after 03/05/1953 is usually called "post-Stalin". But it doesn't say much. On the contrary, it requires additional clarifications. The period up to 03/05/1953 does not have any single name at all. Sometimes the term "post-war period" is applied to it. But this can be understood only a few years after the war. I propose to emphasize the period between 1946 and 1953. To call them all "post-war" is not entirely correct. Moreover, in the USSR, it is believed that the restoration of the destroyed part of the economy was completed by 1950. A more appropriate name would be the widely used term "Cold War". But with him there was some confusion about the meaning and timing of the beginning and end. Recently, especially in the West, the end of the Cold War has been associated with the collapse

of the socialist camp in the late 1980s. But the attempted military coup in August 1991 in Moscow summed up not 45 years. Here it is quite logical to take the year 1917 as the beginning (remembering the 73 years and 7 months predicted by Nostradamus).

As for the start of the Cold War, not everything is clear here either. Most official historians, especially in Soviet times, attributed it to 03/05/1946 - to the famous speech of the retired British politician W. Churchill in the American city of Fulton. However, the cooperation of the future opponents of that war in March 1946 did not stop. Real "battles" began to occur later. Therefore, it is logical to shift its beginning to a later date. But this can be done if its meaning is left in its former sense, which meant a set of measures by Western countries against the USSR and its allies. And at the same time, the question of the responsibility of the Soviet Union itself in the matter of expanding the confrontation was practically not raised. For many years it was assured that the USSR has always pursued only a constructive, peaceful foreign policy, especially since 1946 after such a devastating war. Therefore, with the term "Cold War" they tried to associate only the foreign policy situation, while the intra-union was called differently, for example, "post-war period" or "post-war restoration of the national economy."

And to reinforce this explanation, Soviet historians stubbornly pushed back the beginning of the Cold War until 03/05/1946 or even earlier. And besides, it was linked with another term - "the psychological war of a bloc of countries led by the United States against the countries of socialism." But this linkage has not received a unified interpretation. Judging by the "BRIEF POLITICAL DICTIONARY" (Moscow, 1988, 5th edition), "psychological warfare" is one of the elements of the "Cold War" that arose in the late 1940s and continued in subsequent decades. And the "Cold War" existed for a shorter time and was replaced by "thaws", "detentes" and attempts to return to increased tension. But specific dates are not specified. However, there is another option for linking these terms, shown in the book by Chernyak E.B. "CHIMERAS OF THE OLD WORLD.

From the history of psychological warfare" (M., "Young Guard", 1970). In it, the author distinguishes two stages of "psychological warfare", referring to the first about a decade after 1945, which he calls "the time of the" cold war ". And the second stage, in his opinion, began "from the second half of the 50s.. His initial milestones are chronologically

coincided with outstanding economic and technical

the achievements of the USSR, which received a visual expression for the whole world in the deployment of the Soviet program for the exploration of outer space ...

"As it will be clear from the following text, there is shuffling and silence in this conclusion, but the idea is interesting: by "Cold War" we mean only about 10 years after 1945. Not wanting to specify in detail the reasons for dividing the "psychological war" into stages, E. B. Chernyak nevertheless emphasizes the first 10 post-war years. But he writes the Cold War with a small letter (however, it is not only he who was accepted). As if the USSR had nothing to do with its development. Say, all these are the problems of the American bosses who were plotting something there. And the Soviet Union was only forced to take into account their plans and allocate certain funds to counteract. But then we will see that the role of the USSR in

that "war" was not third-party-reciprocal, as historians have tried to prove for many decades, but actively interested. Therefore, under the "Cold War" I propose to name only the period 1946 - 1953, write this name with a big letters, thus emphasizing the presence of TWO actively opposing sides (as in any other war). And meanwhile mean not only the foreign policy, but also the internal situation in the participating countries. Moreover, as in any other war, "Cold" had its own "post-war period." Here, its duration has no clear boundaries, since the rejection of its main causes stretched right up to 1991 and has not yet completely ended, although the main "post-war" measures were carried out over several years, starting from March 1953. But on the other hand, all 38 years that passed from March 5, 1953 to the August putsch of 1991 in Moscow cannot be attributed to the "post-war" years. It is difficult to say now what to call

them briefly; this requires additional analysis. From the point of view of specialists from Western countries, all these are varieties of the Cold War, and in their own way they are right. But the policy of the Soviet Union in 1946-1953 still had fundamental differences from the subsequent period, in which, although the confrontation of the superpowers continued, it was no longer as irreconcilable as before 03/05/1953. As time goes by it gets more and more

took the features of "normal" competition based on commodity-money relations. And it is quite obvious that such a "rebirth" had to come into conflict with the intra-union economic system, which could not continue for a long time. And it is quite natural that it ended with the rejection of the planned economy on the basis of total state ownership. But that's a topic for another discussion. As for the period 1946-1953, one of the words of its name

should be the word "war". But why invent some new terms, if there is already a well-known one - "Cold War". I propose only to clarify its meaning and shift the accepted date for its start by almost a month earlier (the reason will be discussed in a special chapter). However, such a hypothesis allows us to notice that in this case the book could be called more

briefly: "History of the Cold War". But under this title it is logical to discuss the actions of both opposing sides, and I am considering in detail the actions of only one side - the leadership of the Soviet Union, headed by Stalin, which historians did not pay enough attention to. The actions of the other side (the US and its allies) are known in more detail. Therefore, in the title, I decided to reflect the main goal of only the Soviet Union: the destabilization of the international situation with the prospect of a new (third) world war, in the event of which a new mobilization would be announced in the USSR - a new "Day-M". And as an addition, one of the most important proofs of the true intentions of the Soviet leadership in those years is indicated: the division of Korea, carried out in full view of the whole world. The first chapter to substantiate this approach will be a brief overview of the various events of those years (a kind of "digest"), which will also serve as an introduction to the detailed chapters.

They, in turn, will end with a generalizing conclusion, in which the main hypothesis will appear in a new, more detailed form. And in conclusion of the "introduction" I propose a few organizational and technical remarks. 1. A good method for proving unusual ideas (which today can be attributed to the aggressiveness hypothesis

Soviet Union after 1945) is the use of primarily "open", i.e. enough available sources. And almost all of my book is based on them. I hardly felt the need to visit any "special" archives. There are a lot of "open" materials. But in this regard, a fair question may arise: why did other authors not interpret them the way I

do? Does everything that is already known allow for some other interpretation?

As it turns out, it does. For example, in the Moscow journal "VOprosy istorii", No. 1 for 1993, secret protocols to the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 (previously categorically denied, called fakes) were finally published, as well as documents on the fate of Polish prisoners of war, 21,857 people of which were shot by the NKVD in early 1940. The author of the introductory article, M. I. Smiryaga, drew the following conclusion: "The published documents once again remind of the need for a serious revision of the concept of the history of Soviet society, the coverage of which was especially strongly falsified by official historiography." And here is another opinion, already about the post-war events. It is presented in the article by S.

Volovets "The FORBIDDEN WAR" (in the journal "RODINA", No 5, 1990). First, I draw attention to how its author called the war in Korea. By the number of victims, he classifies it as the third bloodiest war of the 20th century. After presenting a number of previously unknown facts, the author writes: "We have lifted the veil of secrecy and disinformation over our history, although there is still a lot of work left to do. Was he post-Yalta Europe a "final solution", or did he have plans to spread popular democracies further to the West? Judging by the rather hasty creation of the North Atlantic Alliance in April 1949, our former allies in the world war were acutely threatened.... [and more:] It would be wrong to think that Stalin simply agreed with Kim Il Sung's initiative [for the war]. The degree of support given to him shows that he [Stalin] pursued his own and, apparently, significant interests. What?..."

But a serious revision of the concept of Soviet history is a complex matter and, as the work on this book has shown, it is indeed a "no end" of work. In particular, information about the events in the USSR in 1946-1953 is "scattered" into "thousands of fragments", and good and correct conclusions can only be drawn on the basis of a complete picture, for which it must first be "glued together". And practically nobody did it. I believe that in three years of searching I managed to collect a "picture" in the first approximation. Its actual dimensions must be much larger. And who knows what other "wild stories" and unrecognized feats are waiting in the

wings. 2. Quotes I use, as a rule, I highlight in the text in italics, and I enclose the explanatory text in square brackets ([]). I quote the names of the sources in the course of the presentation, which is much more convenient than placing them in footnotes. In addition, I give data on sources in a shorter form than is customary in the preparation of scientific papers. But my book is not a dissertation. I cared more about readability.

3. In the first original of the manuscript, illustrations were widely used, however, in the matter of its distribution, the text "with pictures" in some cases turns out to be inconvenient. Therefore, I had to abandon the illustrations with the hope of placing them on the "www" - or "ftp" - servers

in the "Internet". DIA-

M-2 DIGEST As it was already noted in the introduction, the secrecy of the post-war period interested me even in my childhood, which I spent in the city of Volgograd. In the spring of 1968, we were accepted as pioneers opposite the house named after Sergeant Pavlov (which held its defenses during the war for 58 days). The memory of that war was still very fresh then. Father said something. In particular, he sometimes recalled how he led the "flirting" IS-2 tank into the attack. Almost all tanks in their battalion were T-34s or American Shermans and only one heavy IS-2. And there were cases when all the tanks went around, and the IS-2 was sent directly at the enemy to "make noise." And the Germans tried to get into the back of the tower, where 27 shells were stored. Then she, weighing 11 tons, took off into the air. My father also said that the tankers called the place under the barrel of the "IS-2" a "shell catcher" and when tank command

weld on this place additional armor. But the IS-3's turret design turned out to be much better. But besides the

memories of the war, my father recalled something else important from his point of view, but which was practically not explained by professional historians and to which I also did not attach any importance before: he occasionally, either proudly or sadly, declared that he had served military service 6 years. "So what," I thought, and I didn't even know how to react. But when he himself served 2 years in the guards tank regiment of the Kantemirovskaya division as a platoon commander and company commander, he began to think: how is it - 6 years of urgent service? "And what was the TERM?" - once asked his father. "But none!" he answered and added: "Many were indignant, they said that we need to study, start a family, and in response the bosses said: 'Serve and that's it!... You don't understand!!!... The situation!!!...' "It's strange, any soldier knows what his term of service is in peacetime. Any terms beyond the term are drawn up by a separate agreement and BY PERSONAL CONSENT. Nobody has the right to force to serve beyond the term UNDER THE LAW!"

In short, as he explained, it was like this: guys born in 1925 were drafted in 1942 (except for "older" ages), 1926 - in 1943, 1927 (my father was born in April 1927) - in 1944. And they were all fired from the spring to the autumn of 1951. Moreover, from 1945 to 1949 there were no mass conscriptions. If we take into account that 19-year-olds were supposed to be called up, it turns out that when the call was resumed, two or three draft years should have

been called at once. Once, while looking through the issues of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in issue 168 of July 25, 1996, on page 3, I found the editors' answer to the reader's question: "I wonder if the participants of the Great Patriotic War are serving in the Russian army today?" The answer began with the words: "Unfortunately, time is inexorable, and today the youngest participant in that war, given that the last military conscription was people born in

1926, is at least 70 years old ..." "Sorry," I shouted to myself, "What about my father?" Shuffling again? Or a typo? Maybe the editors calculated the year 1926 as follows: the war ended in 1945, according to the law they had to call up 19-year-olds, from where it turns out: $1945 - 19 = 1926$

the first, they were drafted into the war, starting at the age of 17. Secondly, the last mass military conscription was in 1944. It turns out: $1944 - 17 = 1927$. During

the period of work on the book, one day my wife and I went to the grave of her father, whom I had never seen (he died about six months before our first meeting with her). I stand in front of the monument and read the date of birth: "29.V.1927". Remembering that his childhood was somehow connected with Sevastopol, I asked my wife, "Where was he in 1945?" "Jungoi in the Navy," she replied (but it must be taken into account that she is not interested in military ranks, although she is a lieutenant of the reserve medical service). And she added: "And then he was there for a long time ... Well, how is your father! ... They are the same age!" Here is another one of my meetings from 1927. I had several of them

got distracted.

Over the years, the sense of secrecy of the post-war period has not weakened (in fact, as well as the pre-war one). And after reading the book "Day-M" in the spring of 1994, I somehow spontaneously had a hobby - to collect information about 1946-1953. Moreover, as evidence of a hypothesis that I formulated for myself in the same form in which it is present in the books "Icebreaker" and "Den-M". And using the same technique.

To my surprise, the material flowed, which led to the creation of this book.

Turning to a specific conversation, I can admit that the media sometimes did turn to a general solution to the problems of that period. However, for the most part, to prove an already existing opinion. For example, in August-December 1989, the Pravda newspaper held an international discussion on the topic: "WHO STARTED THE COLD WAR?"

prepared by Soviet historians, cited many AMERICAN documents declassified in the 70s. An American historian remarked to this that it would be nice to do the same on the Soviet side. Soviet historians, in turn, cited deadly logic: yes, they admitted that the post-war period was studied "poorly", and immediately proceeded to the statements: "We weren't in the alley! We weren't! We weren't!" ... Logic "iron". And why not first study the period "strongly", and then draw conclusions? Who interferes? I found this thought ("weak" study)

also in the magazine "Tekhnika-Molodezhi", N: 4, 1993 in the article by Vadim Orlov "HEROES? PIRATES? OR ... "KRUZHKOVTS"?" He writes: "You can't erase a word from a song: in our history there is a period [post-war?], when the production of "solid" [i.e. wholly copied] structures was elevated almost to the level of state policy. It was a deliberately launched campaign, but on its occasion, they did not beat the propaganda drums, but did everything quietly, to the mute. And he gives several examples. And he also tries to explain, but the explanation is limited only by the need for "short deadlines" (and why?) And remarks that "looking for an answer, historians have not yet come to a consensus" and that "for historians of technology, the post-war period is a solid palisade of questions ". It's strange - there are whole institutions of historians, witnesses are still alive. And lots of questions! But excuse me, where did the "iron"

conclusions come from then? One of two things: either history and conclusions, or no history, but no conclusions either. What was the country really doing in those years?

Here, for example, is the parade on November 7, 1950. Should the head of state (i.e., Stalin) be present? Must! But it wasn't! (From the photographs of the leaders of the party and government, who stood on Lenin's mausoleum in Moscow, it is clear that V. Molotov was exactly in the center of this group). The parade was commanded by the commander of the Moscow Military District, and the parade was hosted by the commander of the cavalry and (at the same time) the deputy minister of agriculture for horse breeding, Marshal Budyonny. (I wonder how many of those cavalry were in the Soviet Army that year - one division or one regiment? And they have an honorary commander? Well, at least not the Commander-in-Chief!). Maybe the USSR had disarmed so much by that time that there was no defense minister? There were even two (from February 25, 1950 - land and sea, only the word "defense" was not in the name of these ministries, they were called: "War Ministry" and "Naval"). And there were two general staffs (by the way, just like in 1938-1946!). And in the Far East there was even a branch of the land ministry - the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East (Marshal Malinovsky).

If you open the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (hereinafter - "SVE"), then it says that the Commander-in-Chief can either be on the theater of operations (in

time of war) (hereinafter TVD - "theater of military operations"), or by type of troops (in peacetime). And it is written that in the Far East he was Commander-in-Chief of Troops in 1945 (Marshal Vasilevsky), but for some reason not a word about the variant of 1947-1953! In general, confusion or understatement periodically comes across in "SVE". For example, in the section on Polikarpov it is said that he participated in the competition for the creation of the Ivanov aircraft, but in the section on Sukhoi there is no

mention of who became its winner. In addition, the fleets were also divided. Baltic - to the 4th and 8th Navy (February 1946 - December 1955) and Pacific - to the 5th and 7th Navy (January 1947 - April 1953). The numbers remained unused: 1, 2, 3 and 6. Exactly for the division of the Northern and Black Sea fleets. Question: why? Answer: for some dark deeds. If it were for the bright, then they would not make secrets out of it. Well, not entirely secrets (in "SVE" this is mentioned), but, at least, in the "ordinary" information, information about the division of the fleets is, as it were, "lost". For example, one day I saw a book about the Baltic Fleet and leafed through it. Much has been written about the war. But I was looking for a section on the post-war years. Found. Whole paragraph. It said that by 1955 the Baltic Fleet had completed mine clearing of certain parts of the sea. And that's it. But what about the service at the Finnish base Porkkala-Ud? Yes, clearance is a tricky business. Didn't any of the

commanders of the 4th or 8th Navy distinguish themselves? Another example of the explicit concealment of the division of the fleets is the biography of Admiral Kuznetsov. It is clearly written in "SVE" - from February 1950 to July 1951 he was the commander of the 5th Navy. How is this shown in other publications? But no way! They write something like this: "was sent to the Far East" or "commanded the Pacific Fleet." So, is there something

And what can be hidden if the division of fleets makes sense only when the country has many ships, many naval bases. And this is possible if the economy is strong and there are some interests. The "Last Republic" refers to one aft turret of one Japanese battleship, that it weighed 2.5 thousand tons without shells and people. How much metal is needed for many fleets? What was the state of the Soviet Union? - healed wounds after a brutal war. The village generally "lyed", crushed by brutal taxes and

death of men. And here - almost a dozen ocean fleets, not counting any fleets. For what?

And what is the point of dividing the Black Sea Fleet if the exit through the straits is controlled by Turkey? The problem is serious. Stalin began to solve it as early as the beginning of 1945, breaking the friendship treaty with Turkey and putting forward a number of claims against it. The Turks turned to Churchill for help, who, at the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, did not help Stalin in this matter. But in 1946, Stalin tried to solve the problem with the straits simply and brilliantly. That year, peace talks were held in Paris with Germany's allies, incl. with Italy. Soviet historians, as a rule, do not want to discuss in detail the problems that were solved in them. The following scheme is more often proposed: the USSR firmly defended the interests of allies peace, while the United States "grinding their teeth" pursued imperialist goals. For the longest time, the USSR fought under an agreement with Italy. And I rarely remember why. In particular, because of Stalin's desire to divide the Italian colonies in Africa. Now, if he managed to get at least a small plot of Libya and place his naval base there, then Soviet troops on the Dardanelles could appear by virtue of international rules: to ensure transport supply routes. Under this pretext, Soviet troops remained in Hungary and Poland (to provide transport routes for Soviet troops in Austria and Germany). With Italy, this "trick" failed. And Türkiye in subsequent years fell into the category of "vile accomplices of imperialism." There were also territorial claims. Later, they also didn't like to remember this and argued that "we don't need the Turkish coast and we don't need Africa"! And they were outraged why US military bases appeared in Turkey!?

And why divide the Northern Fleet? He generally has only one way - to the southwest between Norway and Svalbard. The rest of the Barents Sea is covered by floating ice. It is possible, however, to deviate to the right, to Greenland and to the northeast coast of North America. (After only a few years after the most brutal war on its territory?) As for the ships, they apparently gathered from everywhere. In particular, the return of those received under Lend-Lease was delayed. Trucks seemed to be given away. My father once told me how

he participated in the preparation of the Studebaker echelon for the transfer. And regarding the return of the ships in the diplomatic documents of those years, there are persistent appeals from the United States with demands for acceleration this case.

But ships are ships, and the main striking force is the ground forces. What was the situation in them? On the one hand, after 1945 they were reduced, but for some reason only the "older" conscription ages and none of the historians ever touched on the fate of the "younger ones" (forbidden?). By the way, as my father told me, the guys born in 1925 had the worst of all. They served "urgent" service for 9 years, three of which fell on the war (in which one still had to survive). In general, how cruelly the Motherland treated them! Those of them who survived have already served the then 3 years prescribed by LAW! Moreover, during the war! And they were FORCED to serve two more such terms! As a reward?

There was also a withdrawal of troops from other countries. For example, from China (Manchuria), but for some reason all the weapons of the Kwantung Army remained with the Chinese Communists. There was also a withdrawal from Iran. But they deduced that Iran was divided for some time.

On the territory of the USSR itself, it is strange that in 1945 there were 33 military districts (hereinafter - VO) in the country, at the end of 1946 there were 21 of them. Sometimes this is cited as proof of the "peacefulness" of the USSR. But, firstly, before the war there were 17 of them (taking into account a separate front in the Far East). And secondly, by 1950 there were 24 of them (some districts of the so-called "second" formation reappeared). And how is this to be assessed? How is the "aggressiveness" of the USSR? Moreover, 33, and 21, and 24 are more than both the pre-war 17 and 16 military units of the "stagnation" period. For clarity, below is a table of the dynamics of the number of military districts in the USSR from 1934 to 1963. Table 1. The number of military districts in the USSR from 1934 to 1963

And if we touch on their history, then the great dynamics in the period 1945-1953 are very striking. For example, the situation in the northwest of the USSR:

March 1940 - Arkhangelsk Military District was created with administration in Arkhangelsk.

12/15/1944 - It was renamed Belomorsky with the management moving to Kem.

February 1946 - The Arkhangelsk Military District was re-created by separating a part from

the White Sea Military District. March 1946 - The Office of the White Sea

Military District moves to Petrozavodsk. July 1951 - Belomorsky VO was renamed into Northern VO,

and Arkhangelsk VO - into Belomorsky VO. Subsequently, these districts were disbanded, and their territories were transferred to the Ural and Leningrad Military Districts. Since 1949, they were commanded by Marshal Meretskov (former commander of the Karelian Front) and his former deputy, General Frolov. Their neighbors from the southeast were: former front commander Marshal Zhukov (Ural Military

District) and former front commander General Eremenko (West Siberian Military District). Greater dynamics was also observed with other districts. By the way, personally, I would

not categorically call the direction of Marshal Zhukov to the Ural Military District as an unworthy "link". Question: with the natural and climatic conditions of which countries are the natural and climatic conditions of the above districts similar? Answer: for example, with Canada and

adjacent island territories. Question: where are they located? Answer: on the contrary, through the North Pole. I feel, I feel how the right hand of the reader of these lines is trying to rise to the area of \u200b\u200bthe right

temple in order to twist his finger there. And I hear the question: "What are you

hinting at? To the 1st Arctic Front, or what?" I answer: firstly, it is possible that on him. Secondly, let's look at the facts. Fact 1. From the book, ed. Novozhilova ("FROM THE HISTORY OF SOVIET AVIATION: Aircraft Design Bureau named after S. V. Ilyushin", M., "Mashinostroenie", 1990, p. 307): "... In March-April 1950, two Il-12D aircraft (airborne transport) with towed cargo gliders designed by Tsybin Ts-25, having risen from one of the airfields near Moscow, made a unique

Arctic landing on gliders, and then successfully completed a return long non-stop flight to Krasnoyarsk.

It's strange - where did the "non-stop" come from, if the Il-12D had a flight range of 1200 km! Do not believe your eyes? Or did they land at secret airfields? For reference: landing on the polar ice in gliders is a mortal risk. The plane can still take off if the ice is thin. In particular, experienced polar pilots landed on an ice floe "with a check": before "switching off" the engines, they looked at the moisture content of the ski track, if the track turned out to be with water, then the landing was stopped and, after adding gas, they took off. But the glider cannot take off. Therefore, the risk of landing on a glider in the Arctic is much higher than on an airplane, but such a "technology" was worked out after the war. For what? Did you prepare something?

By the way, in the anniversary illustrated album "SOVIET AVIATION TECHNIQUE" (M., "Mashinostroenie", 1970), two low-quality photographs of Il-12D (No 157) and a landing glider (No 158) are given on page 67. The explanatory text for them is as follows: The planes created in the Design

Bureau of S. V. Ilyushin are known to the whole world. One of them Il-12D (157) is specially equipped for the transportation of cargo and paratroopers. For landing operations, a large cargo glider (158) is designed, lifting over 7 tons. [According to other sources - IL-32].

Note: it is recognized all over the world that landing troops (especially landing gliders!) are needed only during an offensive. So what did the Soviet leadership think about after the war, ordering such equipment? Arctic landing gliders could only be used within the "Arctic Front" with any numbering. Other transport was used for peaceful purposes: ships, ice drifts, planes, dog teams, skis, finally. But not gliders. Fact 2. (From the same book). Il-12D was mass-produced in 1948-1949. For a number of years,

he was the main airborne transport aircraft in the country's Air Force. IL-12 was twin-engine. But at the same time, the Ilyushin Design Bureau was also developing a four-engine model of the Il-18. However, she did not go into the series then, since the Tu-4 (the Soviet version of the Boeing-29) was launched into the series.

Fact 3. According to Z. Kanevskiy's article "TOP-SECRET ARCTIC" (Journal "KNOWLEDGE-POWER", No 9, 1993), immediately after 1945, one after another, powerful complex air expeditions took place in high latitudes. Aircraft flew to the North Pole and back, landed teams of various researchers at various points in the Arctic Ocean, incl. purely military. From April 1950 to April 1951, a top-secret drift of the SP-2 station took place. It was created and worked in an atmosphere of not just strict but insane secrecy. For this drift, the head of the station, Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov, received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the rest received the Order of Lenin.

Airfields were built on the permafrost, which the enemy should not know about, strategic roads were laid in it. At the Faculty of Geography of Moscow State University there was a specialization - "Geography of the Northern Polar Countries". From the second year and closer to the end, the word "special course" appeared more and more often in the class schedule.

Fact 4. Soviet coal miners worked on the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard in the Barents Sea. In 1946, special money was even minted for them. And perhaps they all had mobilization orders. Fact 5. Nowhere can I find information about what Rear Admiral

Papanin did from 1946 to 1948. The biographies stubbornly point out: in 1946 it was something, since 1948 it was something, but in between?

Fact 6. I will not dwell much on the history of aerosleigh technology. Here is a quote from the article "THROUGH THE FIRE AND A BURZZLE" (magazine "MODELIST-KONSTRUKTOR", No 2, 1988, pp. 6-8): Hundreds of combat and transport operations were carried out during the years of the war by airborne battalions ... The design of new models continued. In the winter of 1943/1944, the ASD-400 large landing snowmobile was successfully tested. After the Great Patriotic War, combat snowmobiles continued to carry out military service - mainly in the border troops. The remark "mostly" is

interesting. Were there any other airborne units? Fact 7. An article in the MILITARY HISTORICAL

JOURNAL (hereinafter its name will be abbreviated as VIZH), No 10, 1992 "ARMADA THAT DID NOT FLOW". Its author is a candidate of historical sciences, retired lieutenant general N. N. Ostroumov.

In the spring of 1952, unexpectedly for the top military aviation leadership, Stalin decided to urgently form one hundred divisions of front-line aviation jet bombers ... The geography of the search for air divisions' bases expanded every day. Increasingly, operational groups of specialists flew to areas of future deployment, incl. and to the northern coast, Chukotka, Kamchatka. The goal is to study the possibilities of deploying aviation, preparing ice and stationary airfields, creating reliable bases ... (You can see - in addition to the already existing ones. My father told me that when he arrived in Khabarovsk in January 1951, then teams were recruited for the construction airfields to Kamchatka and Chukotka). Reference: The Il-28 front-line jet bomber began to enter the troops from March 1950. Two engines. Speed -

915 km / h. Range - 2400 km. Normal bomb load at maximum range - 1 ton. On page 66 of the aforementioned album there is a photograph of this aircraft with the text:

The Il-28 front-line bomber built in the 1940s and its modification Il-28R, equipped with photography equipment and a large supply of lighting bombs, gained great fame. [By the way, it is very useful during the winter offensive in the arctic and subarctic latitudes]. The question is logical: whom were they going to bomb

with front-line bombers from floating ice? Polar bears? And what about the name of the front on floating ice - "...th Arctic"? "Greenlandic"? "Alaskan"?

When I came to these thoughts, I decided to clarify the data on Svalbard and decided to look through the cards of the "Geography" section in the card index of one of the central Kyiv libraries. Surprisingly, the following were found among

them: Ilyinsky Ya. "Finland" M., Military Publishing, 1947 (To help teacher of the divisional school of party activists).

Volkov A. "Countries of Central America and Westindia" M., Military Publishing, 1947 (To help the teacher of the divisional school of party activists). Alexandrov

B. "Oceania" M., Military Publishing, 1947

Stavnitser M. "Russians on Svalbard" M., 1948. (When I tried to clarify the code, I was told that the book had been written off. Maybe because of dilapidation?).

Danzig B. "Turkey" M., Military Publishing, 1949 Matkovsky N. "Great Britain" M., Military Publishing, 1950 Agranat G. "Greenland" M., 1951 (At the map of the world). Ziman L. "Hawaiian Islands" M., 1952 (At the map of the world) Kovalevsky V. "Alaska" M., 1952 (At the map of the world) Markov S.

"Russians in Alaska" M., Military Publishing, 1946 (Library of an officer of the Navy) . When I found a card for the book "Russians in Alaska" in the military library, I could not believe my eyes and decided to find the

book itself and make a copy of its title page. It succeeded. Its appearance is as follows: As I understand it, if it were released by some children's publishing house, then it would be possible not to pay special attention to it. The book is historically written and quite interesting.

But why did the military department become interested in this topic? Yes, even in 1946? This is how the history of geography turned out. It is interesting to note that after 1953 some of the above books underwent metamorphoses. For example, the book "Russians in Spitsbergen" was renamed "On Spitsbergen". S. Markov became interested in reprinting his novel "The Yukon Raven" in peaceful publishing houses. And from the book about

Central America (Mexico, etc.) they removed information about fascist organizations. And once again about the North. When I started looking for an opportunity to get illustrations for my work, I accidentally stumbled upon a book by honored pilots A. Lebedev and I. Mazuruk "OVER THE ARCTIC AND ANTARCTIC" (M., "Thought", 1991). It not only has some interesting photos, but also turned out to be a lot of interesting things in the text. In particular, a lot of space is devoted to studies of the remains of the ice airfield and the camp of the SP-2 station found in 1954, which drifted in the eastern sector of the Arctic (it was about 1000 km from Alaska). The flag-navigator of polar aviation V. I. Akku

For what tasks did polar explorers prepare at SP-2? There are no exact instructions. But there is an explanation for the landing of the SP-1 station in 1937. The aforementioned aviation history album on page 32 says:

The work of design bureaus required continuous testing in the air. Hence - the abundance of various kinds of record flights. In the thirties, they were carried out on machines of almost all classes. These records played a big role... A special place among them is occupied by the distance records set on the TsAGI ANT-25 aircraft by the crews of M. M. Gromov and V. P. Chkalov. The flights of these crews took place in extremely difficult conditions. In order to organize them, a gigantic preparatory work had to be done, which greatly contributed to the expansion of aviation research in the Arctic. To understand the secrets of the "kitchen of the weather", troops were landed

on the pole. This operation, which preceded the flights of V.P. Chkalov and M.M. Gromov, was carried out on May 21, 1937 by an expedition led by Academician O. Yu. Schmidt. The material part of the expedition consisted of ANT-6 and ANT-7 aircraft. Their pilots are M. Vodopyanov, V. Molokov, A. Alekseev, I. Mazuruk and others. Flag navigator - I. Spirin. The glorious four - I. Papanin, E. Fedorov, P. Shirshov and E. Krenkel - began their nine-month shift on the ice floe, which contributed a lot to transarctic flights ...

I wonder what kind of aircraft flights were planned to be provided from the SP-2 station? To Alaska - about 1000 km - quite within the range of a front-line bomber (not counting the heavier ones).

In the book by A. Lebedev and I. Mazuruk there is a photograph of the aircraft on which I.P. Mazuruk flew in the Arctic before the war. The photo shows a four-engine aircraft on skis and the caption: "High-latitude expedition 1941. Aircraft "USSR N-169" on an ice floe." The number "H-169" is a tail number (similar to the registration number on a car). And the brand of the aircraft is ANT-6, aka TB-3 (heavy bomber ... on skis). First flight - 12/22/1930. Payload - up to 19 tons, speed - 288 km / h.

Note that the picture is dedicated to the 1941 expedition. What did she do? Studied the "kitchen of the weather"? What for? Incidentally, almost every page of Lebedev and Mazuruk's book says that the weather in the Arctic can change "before our eyes." Very

impressive creepy examples. They even used the phrase "it changes like the weather in the Arctic." But excuse me, specific knowledge of the weather at some point in the North (which will completely change in an hour) is very necessary first of all for work there - in the North itself, especially for air flights. And where were you going to fly? And on what? Returning to the

biography of General I.P. Mazuruk, you can see that it turned out to be very interesting. One of the regiments of the one of a kind division, which he commanded during the war, was stationed in Fairbanks (Central Alaska, USA). Can you imagine?: Soviet combat pilots take "secret" maps of Alaska, get into planes and quite calmly fly them to the USSR! Moreover, the knowledge and ability to fly over Alaska was a "regular" duty for them! Mazuruk himself made an air trip around the world in 1944, having received Catalina seaplanes in the USA (which later ended up in the Soviet North). And during flights in the Arctic, he made 254 landings on floating ice (it is noted that this "pulls" for a world record). And with all this, he did not earn a place in the military encyclopedia! Well, "forgotten", which does not happen! And who is interested?

By the way, the fate of the TB-3 in 1941 turned out to be very similar to the fate of the "Superflying Fortresses" B-29 from December 1950 in Korea. In both cases, the speed of the enemy fighters was twice as high. Because of what, these aircraft are sharply outdated from a military point of view. The fate of the TB-3 was decided by the German Messerschmites, the fate of the American B-29s (which were produced in the USSR under the brand name Tu-4) - by the famous Soviet MiG-15s. What did the Soviet MiG-15s do in Korea? ABOUT! This is a large separate conversation, which is presented in this book in two chapters - in the chapter on aircraft and in the chapter on the events in Korea in 1945-1953. The official version on these occasions is full of "shuffles" and "defaults".

For example, the beginning of the war in Korea itself, to put it mildly, is "shrouded in darkness." In the USSR, it was officially believed that the South Koreans started the war with an attack on North Korea on 06/25/1950. The rest of the world is sure that the DPRK army was the first to attack South Korea. But words are words, and as for hostilities, certain information can only be obtained by studying

combat maps. For the Korean War, such maps are in "SVE", vol. 4, on the insert to pages 320-321. And their detailed study leads to unexpected conclusions.

There are several periods in the Korean War. And it is quite natural that each of them should be displayed on separate maps. Otherwise, the meaning of representation changes dramatically. For example, the process of the German advance from Minsk to Moscow in 1941 is usually shown on one map, and the reverse retreat on another. And I, for example, never had to see a map on which such two processes would be displayed simultaneously, until I saw a map of the first two periods of the Korean War, which simultaneously shows the arrows of enemy movements in different (opposite) directions. On the one hand, it was funny to see this. But on the other hand, such facts are suggestive. It is hard to believe that the editors of the encyclopedia decided to save paper. The reason, rather, is something else - in an attempt to hide something using the typical "shuffling" method. In particular, the text says that South Korea has prepared 8

infantry divisions (PD), and North Korea - 10 rifle divisions (SD). However, if we calculate the number of "pd", the number of "sd" on the map and compare them with serial numbers, then again questions arise. Let's say why the numbers of the South Korean divisions really do not go beyond the number "8", but from the side of the "northerners" divisions with numbers greater than "10" went into battle, for example, the "15th SD". So how many divisions have the "northerners" prepared? Experts may, apparently, object - "So they were not fully staffed!" Only 10 divisions were fully equipped, among which was the 15th! Logically! But ... it reminds me of something painfully familiar ... For some reason, "June 22, Sunday, exactly 4 am" is known to many, but how do you ask about "June 25, Sunday, exactly 4 am", they just shrug their shoulders. President Clinton in the United States on the day of the 50th anniversary of this event remembered, laid wreaths at the memorial, but in the USSR there was no interest in that war at all. And it passed to his heirs. Indeed, the "Forbidden War". And why? They say that asking the right question is half the solution. As for the Korean

War, one question is indispensable here. Some have already been discussed above, but this is not a problem.

closes. In particular, in the description of the beginning of the war, it is said that the South Koreans trained for a whole year with the help of American instructors. And early in the morning of 06/25/1950 they invaded the DPRK and were able to go 1-2 km. The North Koreans (having learned the plan of attack in a month) stopped the "southerners" and put them to flight at an average speed of about 10 km per day. On June 29, Seoul was lost by the "southerners". On the map, thin arrows up from the "pd" are visible, which are wrapped back with dotted retreat arrows. And it was necessary to prepare like that? And not a single American instructor put a bullet in his forehead, signing for complete professional unsuitability? And nobody asked to resign? However, it should be noted that G. Truman nevertheless removed General MacArthur. But he did it after many months of fierce fighting. Already after MacArthur recaptured the lost territories and brought his troops almost to the borders with China and the USSR, and then rolled back to the 38th parallel under the blows of Chinese divisions.

Moreover, according to the normal laws of a "normal" war, at the most critical moment for the North Koreans, General D. MacArthur had to strike at their rear, which then turned out to be Chinese Manchuria and the Soviet Far East. What stopped him? Understanding that this war is "abnormal"? Or Truman's disagreement? The facts show that MacArthur really wanted to view the Korean War as quite "normal" and sought President Truman's consent to the transfer of hostilities to China. However, Truman refused, realizing that in this case a world war would inevitably arise with the participation of the USSR.

But all this happened thousands of kilometers from America, and Harry Truman in December 1950 for some reason tried to introduce a state of emergency in the United States itself! Who threatened them at this time? Little North Korea? Soviet historians usually tried to attribute paranoid qualities to the American leaders of those years. Say, something constantly seemed to them, which actually, supposedly, did not exist! This is in the presence of the best education system in the world, the best organization of labor in the world - the leadership is completely paranoid!? Somehow it doesn't fit. And what

do they think about the beginning of that war in the West? For example, here is the opinion of the authors of the British encyclopedia "THE NEW

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA", Volum 6, 15TH EDITION, (1986), p. 962:

On June 25, 1950, the North Koreans, on the prompting of the Soviet Union, unleashed a carefully planned attack across the 38th parallel.... 38th parallel...) So who attacked whom? Even if the North Koreans are in the South, then there seems to be a logic - if they wanted to unite the

country. But why unite it, if the United States in the summer of 1945 gave all of Korea (then occupied by Japan) to the zone of action of Soviet troops!? By the way, this fact was carefully concealed. But the mystery turned out to be "cracked"... Where then is the logic at all? An overview of this problem in the book is given in the chapter on the events in Korea.

The following examples of "shuffled" and "silent" facts are gas-generating diesel locomotives, encrypted international communications for Stalin, the fate of the Tu-95 aircraft. Etc. Etc.

Etc. Moreover, the post-war history of technical development is subject to silence not only in the USSR, but also in other countries, especially in the USA. For example, I was surprised to learn that in the United States, as early as 1947, household microwave ovens went on sale - a home appliance that the Soviet Union could not mass-produce. And I was also surprised to learn that after the war in the United States a lot of achievements of military laboratories were declassified - I could not agree with this for a long time, since for many years we were taught that American leaders after the war only thought how to organize a new world war. Who is preparing a war like that? And the British generally sold Stalin a license for the production of the latest jet engine, on the basis of which the MiG-15 and Il-28 were then developed - the basic aircraft for the upcoming new world war. And the question is not only that such facts do not quite fit into the generally

accepted description of the history of the past decades. Ignoring them does not allow you to see the real reasons for what was happening. And in conditions when many documents are still classified as classified, it is very difficult to draw the right conclusions, especially on local events. For example, in good faith

considering only the military preparations for the Korean War, the well-known historian and general Dmitry Volkogonov in the past was unable to deeply analyze the true causes of its occurrence. And many other historians, trying to logically consider the events of the 1940s and 1950s, cannot reach the final explanations, being under the pressure of the ideological stamp about the USSR as the most peaceful country. It is very difficult to admit a completely opposite fact - that the Soviet Union, on the contrary, for many decades was a source of destabilization of world politics, moreover, being guided in the domestic economy by an artificial theory that led the country to an economic dead end. But only by recognizing this particular idea, almost all incomprehensible events become logically correct. And not only in the period of the 40s - 50s. As the development of the theoretical substantiation of some phenomena (chapter on the theory and practice of provocations) showed, the day of June 22, 1941, a day about which disputes have not subsided, has become much clearer. And the tragic time of the

second half of that year and the subsequent 1942, the attitude towards which historians suffer from inconsistency and understatement, can become clearer. And this does not allow us to fully appreciate that superheroic feat, the incredible price that the Soviet people had to pay for the implementation of the plans of their own leadership. But the topic of 1941 - 1942 requires a separate discussion, and this study is devoted to the years after 1945, in which the United States turned out to be the other main party in world politics. But their leaders could not remain outside observers. They had to draw conclusions and somehow respond in a timely manner. What did they see? How did they react? For example, US President G. Truman in December 1950 tried to introduce a state of emergency in the country. ^{Also}

But it is not so easy to introduce it in a market economy. We need hard evidence. Here is a quote from an article by V. Kobyshev "MEETING IN VIENNA" (magazine "NOVIY MIR", No. 9, 1979, pp. 192-193): A peace that has come through hardship, paid for at a high price - and it was as if it did not exist. We had not yet bandaged all the wounds,

millions continued to live in dugouts, the echo of war was heard under every roof. And in January 1950, G. Truman gave the order ... to prepare a secret

report on the US military potential and the situation in the world. A report resembling the Apocalypse has been prepared. "It is quite clear that the Kremlin seeks to place the free world under its domination ... It wants to impose its absolute power on the whole world," it said. [It is a pity that the quotation from the report is very short. Read the rationale! Or were their "paranoids" made up? And there's nothing to read there?] Here's another

quote (VIZH, No. 2, 1996, p. 74): Washington's policy toward Korea changed a few months after the State Department and the Pentagon presented it to President Truman in December 1949. secret report. It was also approved by the National Security Council. It provided for the activation of the US military policy, replacing the tactics of containing "Soviet expansion" with an offensive military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Note - "in a few months ... from December 1949." And the preceding paragraph refers to the time after January 1950. That is. the date turns out - approximately March-April 1950. What happened by this date? The division of the military ministries of the USSR in February 1950 has already been mentioned. The fleets were divided earlier. New military districts emerged. The Soviet representative left the UN Security Council. And not only from there. Representatives of the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia at the beginning of 1950 "flowed" out of various international organizations. The top-secret polar station SP-2 was landed. In March 1950, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin agreed with Kim Il Sung's decision to start a war for the unification of the country. The USSR has atomic weapons. The troops received the first serial Il-28 front-line bombers.

And many other things... And all this refers to "peace-loving initiatives"? Of course, you can explain anything and how you want to your population. But in the international arena, saying one thing and doing another is dangerous. Balancing on the brink of war is very risky. This was clearly shown in 1941. And as proof of just such an orientation of the post-war Soviet foreign policy, I can cite someone else's thought (G. Alimurzaev "SHIELD OR SWORD? On the history of the Soviet military

Doctrine", the journal "INTERNATIONAL LIFE", No 4, 1989, pp. 112-122):
During

the second period of the Great Patriotic War, the apparatus of the strategic offensive is being finalized. It undergoes its final testing in the process of hostilities outside the USSR. the end of the Second World War and for many years to come, we begin to consider the creation of a situation of maximum military threat to the territories and populations of those countries that we consider to be our opponents the best means of ensuring our own security.[Emphasis in the text by the author of the article]. what, they weren't really preparing to fight?

wanted to joke? And who is "we"? Those who huddled in dugouts?

Let us listen to one of the leaders of the USSR of that period: "It is not for us, but for the imperialists and aggressors, that we should be afraid of war... Can there be any doubt that if the imperialists unleash a third world war, then this war will not be the grave for individual capitalist states, but for the whole world capitalism" (Malenkov G.M., 32nd ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, M., 1949, p. 21-22). even very useful. And this is said by one of the leaders of the most peaceful country? And now I propose to compare excerpts from two biographies: Colonel General (1948)

Malandin GK 1943-1945 - Chief of Staff of the 13th Army.
Headquarters - Deputy Commander-in-
Chief of the Ground Forces 1948-1952
- Deputy Chief of the General Staff 1952-1953 - Chief of Staff of
the
Carpathian Military District - 1st Deputy.

district commander. 1953-1955

- deputy. Chief of the General Staff. 1955-1956
- Head of Ch. headquarters - deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.
since

1956 - head of the department of the Military Academy of the General
Staff. Army General (1962) Epishev A.A.

1943-1946 - Member of the Military Council of the 38th Army.

1946-1950 - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of Ukraine for personnel. 1950-1951 - 1st Secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee of the Communist Party. 1951-1953 - Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR.

1953-1955 - 1st Secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee of the Communist Party. "... 1953 went down in the history of international relations of the post-war period as a year of easing

international tension ..." (Khaitzman V. "USSR AND THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. 1945-19 History of international negotiations", M., "Nauka", 1970, p. 161).

And what happened? The US has always been and still is. On the contrary, still steeper twisted the arms race. Has something changed in the USSR?

On March 5, 1953, one person died - I.V. STALIN. As it was written then, "humanity has suffered a heavy loss." Judging by the data that is being revealed, it is still a question of what loss humanity would have suffered if this one person had lived for a few more years. There were people who artistically presented such a situation - the Strugatsky brothers. In their fantastic story "INHABITED ISLAND" they, in particular, clearly showed how, since 1949, Soviet generals planned to break through the enemy's defenses in an atomic war and at what cost. But could the death of ONE person really change the situation? Couldn't those who replaced him

continue? Actually, they could. But due to a number of reasons and circumstances, the policy of the USSR in 1953 underwent strong changes. In addition, it seems that on March 5, 1953, some very important link fell out, which could not be quickly replaced. Reflections on this subject are devoted to a separate chapter in the book.

And so the "post-war time" came (from 03/14/1953). The new leaders of the USSR could no longer continue the same program at the same pace. Time was running out for her. The arms race has unfolded. I had to "turn the shafts". And, apparently, a command went to historians: "shuffle", "keep quiet" and "falsify". But what can such a "blinded" history teach?

Moreover, the result was a very "uninteresting" period. Like nothing special happened. It was not interesting to remember that the war in Korea alone, according to some estimates, claimed over 10,000,000 people. Plus the civil war in China.

Plus losses from terror in the USSR. Plus, the emergence of terror in Eastern European countries. Plus an arms race. And write it all off? As a last resort, blame only one side?

It should be noted that some truth nevertheless made its way into official history. For example, in the image of the last temporary textbook in the Soviet Union for grade 11 ("HISTORY OF THE USSR": (ed. by V.P. Ostrovsky), M., "Prosveshchenie", 1990). It was planned to be revised "taking into account the feedback received, as well as new publications of a scientific and socio-political nature."

However, the authors of this textbook did not delve deeply into the post-war years. For example, they devoted only one paragraph to the events in Korea in 1945-1953. Absolutely nothing is said about the life of the army and the navy (except for the creation of the atomic bomb). Accordingly, no deep conclusions about that time have been made. And the general hint is that the Soviet Union was not developing quite correctly at that time, contradictory, by 1953 many problems had accumulated, which began to be gradually resolved from it.

What if we go into details? Was it all so incomprehensible and inconsistent? It is best to study small details in "vertical slices". The first one in this work is devoted to aviation.

1. WINGS OF THE

MOTHERLAND Let's start the aviation "vertical cut" with the recollection of retired lieutenant general, candidate of historical sciences N. N. Ostroumov, already mentioned in the "DIGEST" ("VIZH", No 10, 1992)

Its preface says that in the spring of 1952, JV Stalin, unexpectedly for the top military aviation leadership, decided to urgently form one hundred front-line aviation jet bomber divisions. General Ostroumov writes that Stalin handed this order to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal P.F. Zhigarev, who brought him to the heads of the leading departments and their deputies at an urgent meeting. But Marshal Zhigarev questioned the need for precisely one hundred divisions. He said:

Where this figure came from, no one knows. In the General Staff they only make a helpless gesture. They cannot explain on the basis of what calculations, considerations it is necessary to form such an armada. Yes, and with us

no one consulted, no one was interested in whether the Air Force is capable of solving the

assigned task ... - Understand why exactly one hundred divisions? he ordered. Why do we need so many? Today, after all, every air army has up to three formations of bombers. In general, calculate in all respects. Including in case of war, taking into account the actions of bomber aircraft in all aviation directions.

[Here one can express the idea that Stalin liked "round" numbers. For example, in 1943, when it was decided to launch work on the Soviet "uranium project", its leadership was given one hundred Moscow residence permits for attracted specialists. (Yorysh A.I., "WHAT THE BELL RINGS ABOUT", M., Politizdat, 1991). You can also remember that until the end of the 30s in the Red Army for a long time the largest number of infantry divisions was 100, and then their number began to increase by 100 as well. Having received the task of the marshal, calculations

were made at the headquarters of aviation, which showed that in case of war, no more than 60 aviation bomber divisions (and, taking into account the available ones) may be required. The fact is that others followed this figure, since front-line bombers require cover by fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft are also needed to effectively search for targets. And if one hundred new bomber air divisions are formed (in addition to the existing ones), then at the same time, to ensure their operations, it is also necessary to create about 30 aviation fighter divisions, as well as up to about 10 aviation reconnaissance regiments. But Stalin demanded the formation of only aviation bomber divisions. Without any auxiliary and supporting parts.

Therefore, Marshal Zhigarev decided to consult with the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. But it turned out that he knew about this decision and replied: "This is the order of Comrade Stalin himself - follow it!"

And to confirm it, a directive was received from the General Staff, which ordered the leaders of military aviation to urgently prepare various options for the future basing of new air divisions, and

also relevant proposals for the staff schedule. After that, doubts gave way to practical work on the implementation of this grandiose task.

Ostroumov writes that "the

multifaceted, large-

scale work was rapidly gaining momentum. It was led by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and the department created for this purpose. This most important section was headed by Colonel-General of Aviation I. M. Sokolov. A truly titanic work

was to be done to deploy military educational institutions. In the shortest possible time, it was required not only to create a solid educational and material base, but also to train at least ten thousand pilots, the same number of navigators, as well as gunners-radio operators, not to mention the large army of engineering and technical staff, other service personnel, and communications specialists, rear. And where was it possible to get staff workers? How to solve a lot of other tasks of an organizational nature? They worked on these issues at the General Staff of the Air Force - the main executor of the instructions of I.V. Stalin. "

But in addition to organizational and technical problems, it was necessary to solve the problem of finding and arranging the bases of the formed divisions. Airplanes are not tanks, they need airfields. Therefore, operational groups began to be sent to the areas of future deployment. Their task was to study the possibilities of deploying aircraft and creating reliable bases. It's clear. But General Ostroumov emphasizes the following locations for the future location of airfields: the northern coast, Chukotka, Kamchatka, floating ice. And here it already makes think. If an extra airfield somewhere in Ukraine can still be explained by concern for defense against attack, then why are front-line bombers on the floating ice of the Arctic? Who was supposed to be bombed? Polar bears? And it's not a joke. Ostroumov emphasizes that at that time a difficult time

had come for the aviation industry, which had to produce more than ten thousand bombers in excess of the plan. Moreover, in the shortest possible time (which could only be achieved when working in wartime mode).

Naturally, the executors of such a task thought about its causes and came to the conclusion that the most active preparations for a new war were unfolding on the part of the USSR.

Ostroumov recalls that "in those years, newspapers increasingly began to publish publications that "transparently" hinted that the sale of Alaska to the Americans would soon expire, that Turkey had illegally seized some of our southern regions of Transcaucasia in the recent past. In a word, the public consciousness, the country was purposefully preparing for the coming trials, or rather, for the war. In any case, this is how we assessed the situation, working on the implementation of Stalin's order. "

However, it was never implemented. After March 1953, all activities to create a giant armada of bombers began to curtail and soon stopped altogether. Here is a memory "made its way" in

1992 on the pages of the press. It's worth a lot. However, some of his conclusions are incorrect. For a better understanding, a broader study is needed.

N. N. Ostroumov writes: "Jet bombers that had just appeared in our country were still far from perfect as aircraft carrying nuclear weapons." But for such a statement, one must know not only the characteristics of front-line bombers, but also the characteristics of the types of nuclear weapons and the tactics of using both different types of aviation and the atomic weapon itself. Firstly, by 1953 there were very few nuclear

weapons so that front-line aviation could massively use them (more on this in the next chapter). Secondly, the first samples of atomic bombs were heavy - several tons. And by 1953, the twin-engine three-seater Il-28 ("DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE USSR", Moscow, "Nauka", 1980) became the main front-line jet bomber of the Soviet Air Force. Its technical characteristics: year of release - 1948; maximum speed - 915 km / h; flight range - 2400 km (with a load of 1 ton);

the number of
bombs - 1-3 tons.

Such an aircraft at that time could not be a carrier of nuclear weapons, and when designing it, it was not even taken into account that atomic bombs could be in its arsenal (this happened later in connection with the improvement of atomic weapons). The meaning of the use of front-line bombers in the late 40s and early 50s remained the same as in the war: at the very beginning of hostilities, to ensure "clear skies", then to support ground troops. In short, this was as follows: front-line bombers should be concentrated before a SURPRISE ATTACK on airfields arranged at the very front line of the future front. On the day of the ATTACK, all of them must take off and bombard the reconnoitered airfields of the enemy in order to destroy as much of his aircraft as possible while still on the ground. That is, to do what the Nazi planes did on June 22, 1941. And having won air supremacy, in the future to carry out fire support for the advancing troops. But in its pure form, the task of gaining air supremacy in the early 50s could not be solved only by front-line bombers. And secondly, they are also

entrusted with the responsible task of air support for the battlefield. But these conditions are fraught with great losses, which, apparently, led Stalin to the decision to create a large armada of only such aircraft. On the other hand, in vain, General N. N. Ostroumov speaks badly of the then type of front-line bomber - the Il-28. For his tasks, he was very successful. Aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev in

the book "SOVIET PLANES" (Moscow, "Nauka", 1975) wrote (p. 136): [Il-28] "differed in a simple technological layout and was easy to pilot. [He] was a worthy successor Pe-2 and Tu-2 piston bombers and became the main front-line bomber of the Soviet Air Force. It can be added that it remained so until the end of the 50s ("DEVELOPMENT OF AVIATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE USSR", Moscow, "Nauka", 1980).

Moreover, the Il-28 was created in competition with the Tupolev Design Bureau, which was also instructed to create a front-line jet bomber. In mid-May 1949, the decision to launch the Il-28 into large-scale production was made at a meeting with Stalin. Apparently, the main role in this was played by a simple

and a high-tech design, the labor intensity of which was close to that of a single-seat front-line fighter. In general, the IL-28 turned out to be one of the most

successful aircraft of its time. This has been emphasized by various aviation history authors. In particular, the material about him, posted on half of the Kiev magazine "AVIATION AND TIME" (No 1 for 1997), is called: "A successful plane that was unlucky" This plane was unlucky, according to the authors of the magazine, because

" high combat potential, the capabilities of the IL-28 were not fully in demand And although the fate of the IL-28 did not indulge, and the aircraft did not receive such loud military glory as its peers MiG-15 and MiG-17 or the British Canberra ", he, of course, takes a place in the honorary row of the most successful aircraft in the world" (p. 20 of the magazine).

In other words, it is a pity that there was no good world war for the IL-28. But I think that the surviving pilots and the rest of "progressive" humanity can rejoice.

And the materials of the journal, by the way, show that the preparations for a new world war were being intensively carried out. For example, serial production of the IL-28 was started at three major aircraft factories at once. On one of them (No. 30 in Moscow) in 1949-1955, more than 100 aircraft per month were produced in certain periods.

In the list of high combat qualities of this bomber, there was also great survivability, which was also explained by the fact that it had radio altimeters of high and low altitudes, which made it possible to fly confidently at WMA (extremely low altitudes) (isn't it from the American "Catalina"?).

The plans for its use can be guessed from the following elements of training in those years: flights in any weather conditions, day and night. Training to fly in tight battle formations with a distance between aircraft up to 40 m. Training to operate outside their bases and in unfamiliar territories (with the help of global trans-union multi-day raids, for example, along the Carpathian-Central Asia route). And after the

creation of small atomic bombs, the IL-28 turned into a tactical nuclear weapon, but before the main industrial areas of the enemy (primarily the United States) nuclear and conventional

ammunition was supposed to be delivered by long-range aircraft. And this is another topic. And it should be noted that by 1945 it was very bad with long-range bombers in the USSR.

By that time in the Soviet Union, the piston four-engine Pe-8, created back in 1939 (which had one more (fifth) engine in the role of a high-altitude compressor), was suitable for the category of "strategic bomber". Its characteristics: maximum speed

- 450 km / h;

- flight range -

- 4700 km (with AM-35A motors) -

- 6000 km (with ASh-82FN engine); the number of

- bombs - 2 tons. But only 79 of them were built. (Hereinafter, the characteristics of the aircraft are taken from the book of the aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev "SOVIET AIRCRAFT" (Moscow, "Nauka", 1975)).

For comparison, it is necessary to assess the situation with analogues in the British

- and US Air Forces: "Boeing" - B-17G "Fortress III" ("Flying

- Fortress"): year of manufacture -

- 1935; maximum speed -

- 481 km / h; flight range -

- 2736 km; the number of

- bombs - 2.7 tons;

- manufactured -

- 12726 pieces. Avro 683 "Lancaster

- I": year of manufacture -

- 1939; maximum speed - 440

- km / h; flight range - 4040

- km; the number of bombs - up to 2

- tons; manufactured

- 7374 pieces. Consolidated B-24

- "Liberator": year of

- manufacture - 1939;

- maximum speed - 483

- km / h; flight range - 4023 km; the number of bombs - 1.4 tons;

manufactured - 19000 pieces. And in 1942, the Boeing company manufactured and

("Superfortress"). His data:

maximum speed - 598 km / h; flight

range - 5300 km; the number

of bombs - 4 tons;

manufactured - 4547

pieces. In the event of a war with Germany, the Soviet high command considered it inexpedient to carry out mass bombing of its industrial centers in connection with the hope of capturing them and using them for their own purposes. Therefore, the USSR did not begin to spend large amounts of money on the creation of strategic aviation. Although, long-range aviation was. It was armed with aircraft: Il-4, DB-240 and the same Pe-8. But the Pe-8 was not enough, and the rest of the models could be attributed more to just long-range bombers than to long-range strategic ones, and even more so - to intercontinental ones. But they were relatively few. Moreover, in the initial period of the war, long-range aviation suffered very heavy losses, primarily due to the combat missions of attacking enemy

columns during the day and at low altitudes.

There was also a separate command of long-range aviation. From February 1942 to December 1944 it was commanded by Air Chief Marshal (1944) Golovanov A.E. But in December 1944 it was transformed into the 18th Air Army. And only in 1946 long-range aviation was re-formed. Golovanov A.E. continued to command her. And his deputy was a well-known polar pilot from the 30s, Colonel General of Aviation (since 1944) Gromov M. M. (An interesting point is that the deputy commander of long-range aviation is a specialist in flights in the Arctic! An accident?).

The re-creation of this type of air force in the USSR in 1946 was natural, because. in the case of the United States, the situation has changed. Before the continental industrial regions of the United States could be reached, thousands of kilometers of territory had to be captured, incl. Canada (or carry out an amphibious assault through the same thousands of kilometers of the Pacific Ocean, which is completely unrealistic).

Under these conditions, it may become necessary to carry out raids on individual American industrial centers, as well as on sea lanes. Until the end of the 1950s it was possible

to do only with the help of strategic aviation, which, as mentioned above, by 1945 the USSR practically did not have.

However, by the end of the war, four copies of B-29 aircraft damaged by Japanese air defense systems appeared in the Soviet Union (magazine "TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI", N: 10, 1992, P. Kolesnikov "Make it the same!"). Since 1944, US Air Force pilots on these aircraft carried out massive raids on Japan and Japanese-occupied Chinese territory. Incl. and atomic bombs were dropped from B-29s. If the aircraft was damaged by air

defense systems, its crew was allowed to land at the nearest Soviet airfield. So in the Far East there were four newest American bombers at that time. Naturally, Stalin found out about this. He was well aware of the poor state of Soviet strategic aviation, so he ordered Soviet industry to master the American bomber. And he only gave it two years. Tupolev was instructed to supervise the work. Many research institutes, 900 enterprises of various people's commissariats (ministries) were involved. Three Boeings were transferred to the airfield near Moscow. One was dismantled for the release of drawings. The other two were left as standards. Ultimately, in 1947, the Soviet Tu-4 bomber appeared. Its characteristics: maximum speed - 558 km / h (at an altitude of 10 km); flight range - 5100 km (with 2 tons of bombs);

the number of

bombs - up to 8 tons; engines - 4 piston 2400 hp each

every. L. Kerber's book "THE MAN AND THE PLANE" (Moscow,

"Sovetskaya Rossiya", 1973) says that in order

to speed up the production of the Tu-4, a government decision provided for the release of a batch of 20 aircraft at once without relying on an experimental machine. Kerber notes that this required the perfect quality of the drawings. In July 1947, three aircraft were shown at an air parade in Tushino, and by the end of the year all 20 aircraft were assembled and their flight tests began, which ended in 1948 (the act was approved by Stalin himself). And during the years of operation of Tu-4 aircraft, their urgent modification was required. She was needed so urgently that one of the leaders

defense industry B. L. Vannikov offered to work on the May holidays. As you can see, in

Soviet times they did not want to remember copying the American Boeing. But it was necessary to explain the story, so they came up with the reason for the "quality of the drawings."

But it turns out that the Tupolev Design Bureau began to turn to the design of a long-range aircraft as early as 1943, and especially in 1944. And by the time work began on the Tu-4, much had already been done. In the article "Do the same!" P. Kolesnikov reports that on Stalin's assignment to master the B-29, Tupolev said that he could do better. But Stalin did not agree with this and said: "Better not. Do the same!" This suggests that timing was important for Stalin in the first place.

The Tu-4 remained in service until the mid-1950s, forming the backbone of the long-range aviation of the USSR. He became the first Soviet missile carrier - KS-1 cruise missiles were hung under his wings. It was from him that the first atomic bomb was dropped. The experience gained

over the Tu-4 made it possible in the future to create an even heavier Tu-85 aircraft. It was indeed a long-range bomber. It was the largest and last piston bomber built in the USSR. Characteristics of the Tu-85: maximum speed - 605 km / h; flight range - up

to 13,000 km; the

number of bombs - up to 5 tons;

engines - 4 piston 4300 hp each

every; ceiling - 13 km. They

completed the construction of the Tu-85 in 1950. The total

flight weight of the aircraft exceeded 100 tons. It successfully passed all flight tests. At an average speed of about 500 km per hour, a full-range flight took more than a day. But the Tu-85 became the "swan song" of long-range aircraft with piston engines.

The fact is that since the mid-40s, jet aviation began to develop. And the first combat jet aircraft were fighters. In Nazi Germany, for example, it was the Me-262. Their main characteristic was high speed.

Progress in the improvement of jet fighters was very rapid. In 1947-1949, the La-15 and MiG-15 fighters were put into production in the USSR, of which the latter was produced en masse. The maximum speed of the MiG-15 was 1050 km / h, range - 1420 km. Following him, in 1952-1953, the MiG-19 was launched into the series (as a front-line fighter, its maximum speed is already 1454 km / h, the range is about the same) and the Yak-25 (as an all-weather night fighter-interceptor, maximum speed is 1090 km / hour, but the range is 3000 km).

In 1949, Stalin set the task of developing an interceptor fighter in front of three design bureaus: MiG, La and Yak. The Yak-25 won, followed by the development of the supersonic Yak-28.

Until the end of the 50s, the MiG-19 and Yak-25 formed the basis fighter aviation of the USSR.

The creation of jet aircraft depended on the availability of jet engines. And since this case was new, then the engines were first developed small (for fighters). Moreover, in the early 40s there was a competition between liquid-propellant jet engines and air-jet engines. In liquid, in addition to fuel, it was also necessary to refuel the oxidizer, which made the aircraft heavier and reduced the flight time. The air-jet ones won. Moreover, overseas. Many authors on the history of Soviet post-war aircraft (including A. Yakovlev) emphasize that the development of jet engines took place in three stages: first, captured German engines were installed on aircraft, then licensed English ones (on the MiG-15, Tu-14, Il-28), and only then - the engines of Soviet designers. The English engine "Rolls Royce Nene" turned out to be licensed, put into serial production in the USSR in the summer of 1947 under the brand name RD-45F (reliable, with a long service life, with a take-off thrust of more than 2 tons). However, the advent of jet fighters with twice the speed of

piston bombers showed that it was time to build jet bombers as well. The matter was restrained by the presence of suitable motors.

As noted above, in 1948 the Tupolev Design Bureau created a three-engine jet Tu-14. However, due to the presence at that time of the economical Il-28, the Tu-14 did not receive much development and

used in small numbers in the arsenal of the Navy as a torpedo bomber.

Work on a heavy jet long-range high-speed bomber was entrusted to the Tupolev Design Bureau. Under this program, by the beginning of 1952, a twin-engine Tu-16 was created. Soon, after it reached a speed slightly higher than designed, the car was launched into large-scale production.

The Tu-16 could deliver 3 tons of bombs to a range of 5760 km at a maximum speed of up to 1000 km/h. Later, the Tu-104 passenger aircraft was made on its basis. But

urgent work in the USSR to create an ever more advanced strategic jet bomber did not stop there. Stalin needed an intercontinental jet bomber. The piston Tu-85 could fly at such a range. But the war in Korea showed that the first combat flight of any piston bomber could be his last. The Tupolev Design Bureau began designing the Tu-16 jet in 1949. At the same time, work on the creation of the

B-52 strategic intercontinental bomber accelerated in the United States. In D. Guy's book "Heavenly Gravity" (Moscow, "Moskovsky Rabochiy", 1984), it is said this way (p. 118): "It was made in extreme haste [after the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb]... leak information about the B-52. "Aviation Week" in November 1949 announced the beginning of the design of the aircraft. "

Stalin, apparently, at first hoped for the Tupolev Design Bureau. And other design bureaus were not involved in this task until the results of air battles in Korea at the end of 1950, which dramatically changed the situation. There will be a separate chapter on the war in Korea, here it can be noted that in September 1950, US troops entered the battles. And in November, the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps began hostilities. Together with the MiG-15, he had Yak-9U and La-11 piston fighters (magazine "TEKHNICA-MOLODEZHI", N: 5-7, 1992, p. 19, article by aircraft engineer P. Kolesnikov about La-11 "Last piston"). And for some time, piston fighters were also used on the side of the "southerners": the American P-51D Mustang and the deck-based F4U Corsair, as well as the English Fury.

Everything related to the participation of the Soviet Air Force in the Korean War was secret for many years. The fact that none of the Soviet pilots was captured by the Americans contributed to the preservation of the secret. At first they even tried to organize negotiations in the air in Korean. However, this did not work out, the pilots used Russian. The Americans were able to record the negotiations and submitted them to the UN, but in response it was stated that any record could be edited. And only from the end of the 80s different memories began to appear in the press. For example, Guard Lieutenant Colonel B. S. Abakumov "SOVIET PILOT IN THE SKIES OF KOREA" in the journal "ISTORY QUESTIONS", No 1, 1993. He confirms that all Soviet pilots "were listed as Chinese volunteers according to some kind of lists. My name (for outside world) was Yu Huachun." But he writes that real Chinese and Korean pilots also took part in the battles. However, they were less skilled. And he gives the usual losses of Soviet pilots compared to the enemy as 1 to 16 in favor of

Soviet.

But the most complete memoirs under the title "IN THE SKY OF NORTH KOREA" were published in many issues of the journal "AVIATION AND COSMONAUTIKA" for 1990 and 1991. Their author is one of the former commanders of the 64th Corps, retired Lieutenant General G. Lobov, Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1952, the corps numbered about 26 thousand people and included 6 divisions (both pilots and anti-aircraft gunners), 3 separate regiments and other units. General Lobov described in detail the tactics of air battles, in particular, that the time of the MiG-15 attack on the American "Flying Fortresses" was measured in seconds (due to the large difference in speed). During this time, the shooters on American planes could not oppose anything. As a result, the Americans began to suffer heavy losses, began to change tactics, switch to night bombing, but nothing helped. Even American congressmen came to analyze the situation. But in the years 1950-1953 in the USSR, reports of air battles in Korea were cited in such

a way that only "Korean" pilots were participants in them from the DPRK. Examples: "PRAVDA", December 27, 1950, p. 4, V. Kornilov, "At the KOREAN PILOT":

... In the days of their temporary successes, the command of the American interventionists in Korea has repeatedly boastfully declared that the North Korean aviation is finished, they say, it is lighter at night on American airfields in Korea than on Broadway in New York. While the American interventionists were amusing themselves with witticisms, the power of the young Korean aviation was growing and strengthening, the skill of its flight personnel was maturing. Now other motives are heard in the reports of the American command. American gangsters have no time for jokes and witticisms. Increasingly, "flying fortresses" engulfed in fire are falling down, "mustangs" shot down by Korean pilots crash into the ground ... In the evening, during the analysis of the results of the battle, the commander of the unit, Kim Tal Won, said that a "flying fortress", five aircraft "B" were shot down that day -26" (medium bomber) and one jet fighter.

"PRAVDA", January 7, 1951, p. 4, "Glorious deeds
KOREAN ANTI-Aircraft Gunners":

... From the beginning of the war to January 4 of this year, all the anti-aircraft units of the Korean People's Army, the backbone of which was now the 19th Guards Anti-Aircraft Regiment, shot down 511 American aircraft, including: 53 "flying fortresses" "B-29", 90 light bombers, 254 jets, 88 attack aircraft and 26 fighters and reconnaissance aircraft. "PRAVDA", January 16, 1951, p. 4, "BATTLE

ACTIVITIES OF PEOPLE'S ARMY PILOT": ... Pilot An Heng Tsung, who has 6 downed

enemy aircraft on his combat account, told the correspondent the details of the battle. "We were ordered," he said, "to intercept a group of American aircraft heading to bombard one city. As soon as we discovered 8 enemy bombers, which were escorted by 12 fighters, our lead aircraft dived on enemy aircraft, disrupted their formation and shot down one bomber "B -26". I followed my commander, attached myself to the tail of one "flying fortress" and fired at it until it collapsed in flames." When asked by a correspondent where the fighters escorting enemy bombers were, An Heng Tsung replied: "American pilots are brave when they bombard our villages and unarmed people. But when they meet our planes, they usually prefer to hide to save their lives,

leaving their slower bombers to defend themselves." Thus, the results of the battles

quickly showed that the age of piston military aircraft was over. The Tu-85 was outdated before it was born. This made it necessary to speed up work on the creation of jet strategic bombers. Guy's book says that Stalin decided to find out the capabilities of Soviet designers, primarily Tupolev (pp. 118-119). Stalin directly asked him if he could design a strategic machine with turbojet engines in a short time? Andrei Nikolaevich honestly and frankly said: "No." Then he added "It won't work with two engines. Stalin said why not add a couple more? But Tupolev replied: "We are preparing a project for an intercontinental aircraft with turboprop engines, which, apparently, should give a strategic range. Turbojet fuel consumption is too high, and it is not clear how to reduce it."

This project should be understood as work on the creation of a four-engine ultra-long-range Tu-95 bomber. For some reason, in several books devoted to Soviet aviation in general and Tupolev Design Bureau aircraft, in particular, for some reason there is no exact data on the time of work on it. But there is indirect data on which it is possible to set approximate dates. There is

information that in 1954 Tupolev received an assignment for a new passenger aircraft. And in 1957, the ultra-long-range Tu-114, built on the basis of the Tu-95 bomber, was released. It was a four-engine aircraft with turboprop coaxial engines (two propellers on one axis) of 15,000 hp each. every. The flight range was: 8400 km (the largest with 16 tons of cargo) or 7000 km with a maximum payload. Cruising speed is 750 km / h, the highest is about 900 km / h. (Data from A. Yakovlev's book "SOVIET AIRCRAFT", Moscow, "Nauka", 1975). But under certain conditions, he could fly even longer distances. So, in December 1962, a non-stop flight Moscow-Havana was made, then back. The range was 10900 km. The flight there was completed in 17 hours 9 minutes, back - in 13 hours 55 minutes (from A. Yakovlev's book, but published in 1982, pp. 367-368).

Kerber's book says that testing of the Tu-114 was completed in 1956 (p. 249). The article "Secrets of the Closed Skies" in the journal "NOVAYA AND NOVESHAYA HISTORY", N: 6 for 1992, says that the Tu-16 and Tu-95 were shown at the air parade in Tushino in 1955 as analogues of the American B-47 and B-52. It turns out that the Tu-95 flew

in 1955, and apparently in 1953, i.e. by the time in 1954, when Tupolev began to create a passenger version on its basis. For some reason, for a long time, some secret was

connected with the Tu-95 aircraft. In the fourth edition of A. Yakovlev's book "SOVIET AIRCRAFT" (Moscow, "Nauka", 1982), the mention of him was completely removed! It is only said that "the experience of creating a passenger aircraft based on a bomber was repeated during the construction of the Tu-114 ... It was based on a heavy long-range bomber equipped with four NK-12 turboprop engines designed by N. D. Kuznetsov" (p. 267). Excuse me, what was the make of that bomber? In the magazine "TEKHNIKA-YOUTH", N: 11 for 1988, on pages 61-64, an article "Andrey Tupolev's Style" is placed. It provides

not only a description of the most famous Tupolev aircraft, but also contains many color images of their appearance. Of the post-war bombers, there are Tu-4, Tu-14, Tu-16, even Tu-85. But there is no Tu-95! Not even a mention! However, a drawing and description of the passenger Tu-114 is given.

And even in 1990, the process of creating the Tu-95 remained secret! IN That year, the military publishing house published the third edition of the book by Colonel General of Aviation, Dr. Sciences A.N. Ponomarev "SOVIET AVIATION DESIGNERS". The annotation says that it "illuminates some" white spots "of the history of aviation development." On pages 50-51, the following is said about the creation of the Tu-95: Creation of a medium-range bomber with

a swept wing [meaning the Tu-16 (1952)] and a passenger liner based on it [i.e. Tu-104, the first flight of which took place on 07/17/1955] made it possible to start designing a heavy combat aircraft of intercontinental range. ... The aircraft with four engines was originally created as a missile carrier. Subsequently, at its base was

a Tu-114 passenger aircraft was built, designed for flights on long-distance routes ...

Famously shuffled! Judging by this explanation, the Tu-95 (by the way, the brand is not indicated again!) They began to design ... already in 1955! And according to other sources, in the same year, SEVEN SERIAL Tu-95s were already

demonstrated at the parade in Tushino ?! But closer to the collapse of the USSR, the veil of secrecy over this aircraft began to weaken. In the journal "TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI", N: 11, 1990, G. Fedorov's article "BATTLE WITH" BOA "is published about how on 04/27/1983 during refueling in the air of one Tu-95, the hose came off the tanker aircraft, encircled the missile carrier and began to make strikes on its hull. The pilots managed to land the plane. As an illustration of what was said on page 28, there are photographs of the Tu-95 from the side and a view of the cockpit from the front. The inscriptions to them say: "The same strategic bomber-missile carrier Tu-95 withstood a mortal battle with a "boa constrictor" and "Tu-95 before the next flight". And a beautiful color photograph of the Tu-95 refueling in the air, viewed from above,

is given in another issue of "TEHNIKA YOUTH" (N: 9, 1991, p. 4 , although the inscription erroneously indicates the Tu-16). the crew of the Tu-95 consists of five people (two pilots, a navigator, two radio operator gunners), and the weight of the aircraft is about 200 tons. What the

timing of creation can say, we are talking ahead, but for now let's return to the above conversation between Stalin and Tupolev. It could take place no earlier than January and no later than March 1951. The fact is that Soviet pilots began to participate in battles in Korea from November 1950. But some time had to pass in order to be able to draw conclusions on the use of different types of aircraft. Laudatory reports in the newspaper "PRAVDA" began to appear from the end of December 1950, especially in January of the following. And in March 1951, the design bureau headed by V. M. Myasishchev, who had previously replaced Petlyakov for some time after his death in a plane crash in 1942, was urgently restored. My

heavy long-range bombers and by 1951 already had a scheme for a large jet aircraft. Most likely, Stalin's

conversation with Tupolev took place in the first half of February 1951. The fact is that, for example, in the newspaper Pravda until December 1950, the main theme of almost all materials was "unbridled" propaganda of the struggle for peace. Naturally, any sane reader should have understood its main reason - the very high probability of a new world war. But from the end of December, its intensity began to weaken. And on February 17,

Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent was printed on the front page, in which he stated that he did not consider a new world war to be inevitable, "at least at the present time." Thus, it is quite possible that by February 17, Stalin decided not to start a world war yet. And it is most likely that such a decision was influenced by the B-29 "flying fortresses" successfully falling down in flames, which were hastily produced in the USSR under the name Tu-4. The fact that the war was decided to be postponed is also evidenced by such facts as the urgent

adoption by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in March 1951 of the "Law on the Protection of Peace" and the dissolution of the homes of "younger" draft ages (who were kept in the army since the war). In a conversation with Stalin, Tupolev said

that he was working on a strategic bomber, but not on a jet. Thus, the Tu-95 could have appeared in 1952 - 1953 (taking into account the required tests of the prototype and the decision to launch it in a series). But for some reason Stalin was in a hurry. And since he usually entrusted very

important tasks to at least two groups of performers, which is why the second design bureau for the design of an intercontinental jet aircraft appeared under the leadership of V. M. Myasishchev. The following information is given about this in Guy's book: ... the spring

of 1951 turned for Myasishchev and his

entourage into an impatient, greedy, all-consuming work that one can only dream of. They had not known anything like this since the war. "There was a real mobilization, like in a war," Georgy Nikolayevich Nazarov described the April and May days ... OKB

was formed on the direct orders of Stalin, that said everything (p. 120) ... People immediately joined in the incredible pace of design, production of drawings. Yakov Borisovich Nodelman recalls how the next day after coming to the design bureau he sat at the board until 11 pm, and the next day he spent the night at work on a cot. This was not the exception, but rather the norm. (p. 121)... To speed up the construction of the aircraft, almost all the mechanical shops of the plant were engaged in the manufacture of purge models. Models were produced almost around the clock. (p. 123)... In less than a year, the team managed to complete and transfer to the plant all the technical documentation - 55 thousand drawings. The construction of the machine began. (p. 130)... In December 1952, a car of grandiose dimensions, which later received the index 103M [M4], was rolled out to the airfield. (p. 138)... [The first flight took place on January 20, 1953]... On May 1, 1954, Myasishchev's 103M bomber majestically sailed over Red Square for the first time... The issue of launching the giant into a series was discussed. (p. 142) Briefly about the

further fate of Myasishchev Design Bureau. Following the 103M model, the 201M aircraft was developed, which made its first flight in 1956. Then the 50M supersonic bomber was developed (and even flew). There were plans for a supersonic passenger aircraft. But in connection with the creation of intercontinental missiles in the early autumn of 1960, the design bureau ceased to exist, and Myasishchev himself went to work as director of TsAGI.

And only after the collapse of the USSR, some information about the creation of the Tu-95 began to appear in the press. For example, in the magazine "CIVIL AVIATION" No. 12, 1994, on pages 9 - 12, a memoir about the previously little-known designer S. M. Eger ("Tupolev's Right Hand", author - S. Agavelyan) was placed. It cites the consequences of Stalin's conversation with Tupolev: "... Tupolev returned in the evening. Out of breath, he sank into an armchair. Everyone was silent ... -" Well, what, "he began. "Wait? They ordered to "storm" now the Tu-95. From today, suspend all work on the Tu-80 and Tu-85. Close orders!" The following describes how the first copies of the Tu-95 were tested. In particular, the very first had the number "951". He made 16 successful flights, but on the 17th (05/11/1953) a fire broke out on board and the plane crashed, pilot A. D. Flight and

flight engineer A. I. Chernov. "Black clouds were gathering over the plane. But the government demanded, without slowing down, to take on the construction of an understudy ... The Tu-95 ("952") understudy was not a repetition of the first copy. The car was significantly lightened, reliability increased. aircraft production. At the air parade in Tushino in 1955, seven Tu-95 strategic bombers were demonstrated." In the same 1994, a book by Yu. Zuenko and S. Korostelev "RUSSIAN COMBAT AIRCRAFT" was published in Moscow. It indicates the year of the first flight of the Tu-95 - "1952". But the most complete description appeared even later. One day at the end of

1996, I went into a bookstore and saw a magazine that left me speechless for a while from one cover. It was

No 5 for 1996 of the Ukrainian magazine "AVIATION AND TIME". Half of it was devoted to the history of the creation of the Tu-95. And on the cover there was a headline: "Tu-95 in the article" Target - America ". The text of the authors from Moscow was supplemented by a large number of photographs. And inside was a tab with detailed drawings of some modifications of the Tu-95. are stated as follows:

On October 31, 1951, the preliminary design "95" received a positive Aviation Technical conclusion under the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force committee, although work on it was completed only in mid-December. On November 15, the Kuibyshev Aircraft Plant No. 18 received an order to begin preparations for the serial production of the 95 aircraft with a completion date of September 1, 1952. During 1954-55. serial bomber plant, and the engine-building plant No. 24 (also located in Kuibyshev) - to master the TV-12 engine in the series, received prescribed hand over to Air Force 15 which the designation NK-12. At the same time, V. M. Myasishchev's OKB-23 and the Moscow plant No. 23 were hastily preparing for the serial production of the M-4. The estimated date for the start of a nuclear conflict with the United States, 1954, was approaching. (page 3). Briefly about turboprop engines for TU-95. The magazine says that they were developed by OKB-276 under the leadership of N. D. Kuznetsov. In 1951, only the TV-2 model was really available,

developed on the basis of the captured German Jumo 022. Its forced version TV-2F had a power of 6250 hp. New TV-12 engine with a power of 12,000 hp ("horsepower equivalents") had yet to be developed. Therefore, in order to shorten the time, it was decided to make the first Tu-95 on four twin engines, each of which consisted of two TV-2Fs and had a total power of 12,000 hp. A number of technical solutions had to be carried out for the first time in the world. Thus, as expected, information about the creation of the Tu-95 is directly related to the plans of the Soviet Union to prepare for war

with the United States. Of particular interest is the message about the start of the war - 1954. But what does the "estimated date" mean? Who assumed it? The United States, according to the Dropshot plan, assumed D-Day for 01/01/1957. It turns out that Stalin planned the war for 1954?! And this statement is printed in 10,000 copies!? Besides, what does it mean "the former allies developed ruthless plans for the total destruction of each other" (p. 1)? The American plans were declassified. And they were widely and willingly quoted by Soviet historians in the 80s. But no matter how much Western historians urged the Soviet side to do the same, this has not yet been done. Soviet historians hinted that the USSR did not develop any plans to attack someone! And if something was developed, then only as plans for protecting their own territory from a possible external attack! And what suspicions can there be about the policy of the Soviet government after the most cruel Great Patriotic War? But as the above materials have already shown, I think there may be doubts

legal place.

From other materials of the magazine, it can also be noted that the case for the creation of the Tu-95 turned out to be more complicated than it was first thought. In particular, in 1955, only one Tu-95 could be demonstrated at the air parade in Tushino. And in the combat units of the Soviet Long-Range Aviation, he began to act from the beginning of 1956. Myasishchevsky competitor (M4) could not reach the planned range of 12,000 km (it turned out to be only 9,800 km), but it was also put into mass production in 1954.

In recent years, other magazines have devoted their pages to the creation of the Tu-95. For example, "AVIATION AND SPACE", No

10, 1995, a selection of materials under the general title "HISTORY OF THE AIRCRAFT FAMILY from TU-95 to TU-114 - 142". In particular, it says on page 2 that by the end of 1952, about 1000 Tu-4s were produced. And although it was outdated by this time, it was quite suitable for some combat and, especially, for transport and test work. In addition, the production of the Tu-4 was also established in China, where it remained the main long-range bomber for a longer time (although this can be understood, since its opponents turned out to be closer than those of the USSR).

In addition to magazines, the history of the creation of the Tu-95 was devoted to a separate series of the multi-part Ukrainian documentary "Chervoni zirki" ("Red Stars"), in which it was directly stated that this aircraft was being prepared for the Soviet-American war of 1954, the Soviet plan of which was called "Thunderstorm-2".

Now about their (Tu-95 and M4) competitor - the American B-52 "Stratofortress" ("Stratospheric Flying Fortress") (data from the "HANDBOOK OF FOREIGN MILITARY AND CIVIL AIRCRAFT", Moscow, TsAGI, 1973):

The prototype B-52 made its first flight on 04/15/1952 (Tu-95 on 11/12/1952). Aircraft of this model were mass-produced since 1954, and entered the troops from 1955. Until 1961, 640 pieces of modifications A, B, C, D, E, F, G were produced. Then another 102 pieces of modification "H". (90 aircraft were made per year). The take-off weight of the latter is up to 220 tons. Flight range - up to 16,000 km. Flight altitude up to 17 km. The maximum speed is 1050 km / h. The number of bombs - up to 23 tons. Crew - 6 people.

The strategic bomber ("Hawker Siddley "Volcano" B.1") was also produced in England. But few of them were made - only 45 in 1955 - 1958. This was followed by the release of the "B.2" model. An experimental aircraft model "B.1" took off in August

1952. In conclusion of the conversation about long-range aviation, it is necessary to draw conclusions:

1. After 1945, long-range strategic aviation based on piston bombers was urgently created in the USSR. By the beginning of 1951, there were a certain number of aircraft in it, but by this time they were sharply outdated.

2. Since March 1951, work on the creation of faster strategic bombers by two design bureaus has been greatly accelerated. But by Stalin's death in March 1953, only their prototypes flew. And for some reason, the timing of the creation of the Tu-95 (and its brand itself) was kept in the strictest confidence for a long time. 3. By the beginning of 1951, there were many long-range piston bombers in the British and US Air Forces. But by that time they were also sharply outdated and among them there were no intercontinental range. 4.

Urgent work in the United States on the creation of the B-52 jet bomber began at the end of 1949. But from 1952 until 1954, only its prototypes flew.

5. Intercontinental missiles appeared by the end of the 50s. 2. STAGES OF THE GREAT NUCLEAR ROAD After 1945, Stalin could not start a new major war without atomic weapons. Therefore, it is useful to briefly familiarize yourself with how it was created in the USSR. Recently, various books and articles in magazines have appeared in the press, shedding light on this topic. A rather detailed presentation of the history of the development of nuclear weapons in different countries is presented in the book by Al Yorysh "WHAT THE BELL RINGS ABOUT" (Moscow, Politizdat, 1991). In it, a separate chapter is devoted to work in the USSR, in which much space is also given to pre-war research. But they passed under the special control of the government and Stalin personally in 1942. Gradually, the scale of work expanded.

In March 1943, a special resolution of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on work on the "uranium project" was issued. I. V. Kurchatov was appointed scientific

supervisor. The government allowed the project management one hundred Moscow registrations for any specialists from all over the Soviet Union. They could also be withdrawn from the army, incl. from the front. However, instead of the allowed one hundred scientists, Kurchatov initially limited

himself to a small group. On August 20, 1945, by the decision of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, a special committee was created under him, and L.P. Beria was appointed chairman. The same decision was organized by the First Main Directorate (PGU) under the government of the USSR, headed

People's Commissar (Minister) of Ammunition B. L. Vannikov. In July 1953, it was transformed into the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. In addition, the Scientific and Technical Council was established under the chairmanship of the same Vannikov (Kurchatov became his deputy). At the end of 1945, a selection and

survey was carried out
construction site of the first industrial nuclear boiler.

By 1946, Professor Yu. Khariton prepared a tactical and technical assignment for the first Soviet atomic bomb. For its implementation, by a government decision in 1946, the country's first research center was created under the name KB-11 (at laboratory N: 2). It was built on the basis of one of the factories of the former People's Commissariat of Ammunition by the Glavpromstroy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Here it is useful to digress a little and get acquainted with the curious background information from the book "ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE USSR" (Book 1, 1917 - 1950, Moscow, "Soviet Encyclopedia", 1967).

01/07/1946 issued a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (SC USSR) Education (Ministry) of Agricultural Engineering "on the basis of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition and its enterprises, tractor plants of the People's Commissariat of the People's Commissariat of Medium Building and Transport Engineering, as well as Machine agricultural engineering plants of the People's Commissariat of Mortar Weapons. The People's Commissariat of Ammunition is abolished On January 19, 1946, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces

"On the Formation of the People's Commissariat (Ministry) for the Construction of Military and Naval Enterprises" was issued. Government of the USSR from September

1, 1946, the salary of workers and engineers of enterprises and construction sites located in the Urals, Siberia and the Far East increased by 20%.

We return to the history of the "uranium project". On December 25, 1946, at 18:00, an experimental nuclear reactor F-1 was put into operation. Its launch was one of the key moments in the creation of atomic weapons, look at

which came Lavrenty Beria himself. Yorysh's book contains a dialogue between him and Kurchatov. Here are some quotes:

(Beria:) - Well, what else will you show? Crack in the loudspeaker, knot on a string Not enough. How else can you prove it's a chain reaction?

(Kurchatov:) - ... Let's put uranium samples, we'll have them for a month irradiate, and chemists will see the release of plutonium.

- How much will stand out?

- Micrograms. -

Micrograms... Again you won't see anything. Under the microscope can you tell if it is plutonium or something else you slipped?

- It will be possible to distinguish only with the help of instruments by radioactivity, by chemical properties.

- And when will you see that this is not a deception, not your

fantasy? After the successful start-up of the atomic reactor, I. V.

Kurchatov said: "Nuclear energy is now subject to the will of the Soviet man." (I could have specified which one specifically: "- I. V. Stalin").

At the same time, a large reactor was being built in the Urals (near Chelyabinsk), which could already be used to manufacture plutonium for weapons (Plant "A"). A radiochemical enterprise was also being built, at which it was necessary to separate plutonium from uranium irradiated in the reactor (Plant "B"). The entire plant with a uranium-graphite reactor was put into operation in 1948 (plant "A" - in the summer, plant "B" - a few months later). After that, the production of military plutonium and the manufacture of the first atomic bomb began. On October 1, 1948,

at a meeting of the First Committee of the III session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet representative declared that the secret of the atomic bomb does not exist. And the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Molotov said this on November 6, 1947.

In 1948, the government of the USSR ordered I. V. Kurchatov, Yu. B. Khariton and P. M. Zernov to manufacture and transfer the first copies of the atomic bomb for state testing as soon as possible. Yu. B. Khariton was appointed chief designer. This task has been completed successfully.

The bomb tests were preceded by a reception at Stalin's. It took place, apparently, in April 1949, because. Yorysh's book says that after him, Kurchatov went to the Kazakh training ground near Semipalatinsk in May.

According to the book, I. V. Kurchatov, Yu. B. Khariton and P. M. Zernov came to Stalin's office in the Kremlin. With them, they allegedly brought in a box a nickel-plated plutonium ball almost 10 cm in diameter - the nuclear charge of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Kurchatov reported to Stalin about readiness and asked for permission to explode, then a dialogue took place between them, in which Stalin asked how quickly the charges were accumulating. And when he found out that it takes four months to make one bomb, this did not please him. At the end of the conversation, Stalin allegedly touched the charge ball with his hand. ("Stalin himself put his hand on the ball and said: - Yes, warm. And always warm? -

Always, Iosif Vissarionovich").

Stalin agreed to the test. In May 1949, Kurchatov went to the training ground, which was located 70 km from Semipalatinsk in a spacious bowl surrounded by hills. But Kurchatov did not like the quality of the work and he demanded that some objects be redone, especially the central tower, which is why the date of the explosion was postponed

to August. The explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb took place on August 29, 1949. 10 minutes before him, Beria's voice rang out: - And nothing will work for you, Igor Vasilyevich! - What are you, Lavrenty Pavlovich! Will

definitely work! Kurchatov exclaimed. After the explosion, the chairman of the state commission, Beria, doubted whether the Americans had such an explosion and decided to clarify this with M.G. Meshcheryakov, who, together with D.V. explosion:

- Mikhail Grigorievich! Does it look like American? ... Very? ... We did not blunder? Kurchatov doesn't rub our glasses? Still the same?... Good. So, you can report to Stalin that the test was successful?... Good, good....

These are the stages in the creation of Soviet atomic (plutonium) bombs based on atomic fission reactions. And in 1947, a special group of scientists was formed with the participation of I. E. Tamm and A. D. Sakharov to study the possibility of creating a hydrogen bomb based on the fusion reactions of the nuclei of light atoms.

At the end of July 1953, preparations began for testing a thermonuclear bomb at a test site near Semipalatinsk. The explosion was carried out on August 12, 1953. United

States detonated a hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll 03/1/1954 of the year. England exploded its first atomic bomb on 10/3/1952.

These data are given in Yorysh's book, published in 1991. And in the 33rd issue of the OGONEK magazine for 1993, a conversation was published with Academician Julius Khariton himself, who describes some events differently. For example, he confirmed that on the eve of the first test there was a meeting with Stalin, who, in the presence of Beria and Kurchatov (project leaders), heard all the other main specialists. During a conversation with Khariton, Stalin asked:

"Is it not possible to make two, albeit weaker ones, out of the amount of plutonium available for the charge instead of one? So that one remains in reserve ..." Yu. Khariton

explained that the accumulated amount of plutonium exactly corresponds to the charge manufactured according to the American scheme, and risk is unacceptable. Stalin agreed.

And there was no display of a plutonium ball in the Kremlin, because. it was delivered from Chelyabinsk-40, where it was manufactured, to Arzamas-16, in the design bureau to Khariton. And then, on the eve of the tests, he was sent to the Semipalatinsk test site.

[Question:] - You are called the "father of the nuclear bomb"... [Answer:] - This is wrong... Creating the bomb required the efforts of a huge number of people... Of course, the main role in the uranium project belongs to Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov. I supervised specifically the creation of the bomb, all physics, that is, I was the scientific director and chief designer ... When organizing the institute and design bureau, I said that I was poorly versed in organizational issues. In order to be able to use the maximum of opportunities and engage only in science and technology, that is, to be a truly chief designer, one more person is needed who would take care of everything else. This is how the post of director appeared ... Pavel Mikhailovich Zernov became it. And very energetic work began on the creation of laboratories and the recruitment of personnel ... Nobody then imagined the scale of the work ... We received quite detailed information from America from Fuchs. He gave a description of the atomic bomb, and we decided to repeat it.

- It's easier to copy, of course...

- Don't tell me! The work was tense and nervous. It was necessary to calculate all the processes occurring in the atomic bomb ...

The same OGONEK magazine also published other materials on the history of the Soviet atomic project: an article by Yuli Khariton "THE HAPPIEST YEARS OF MY LIFE" and an interview with Academician V.I. Goldansky.

In his article Yu. Khariton explains the role of Klaus Fuchs.

He was a talented German theoretical physicist and at the same time a communist. In 1934 he emigrated to England, where he became involved in the development of nuclear weapons. There, in England, he came to the Soviet embassy and reported on the ongoing work. After some time, the group where Fuchs worked was invited to the United States at the Los Alamos Laboratory in southeastern New Mexico. Soviet intelligence was able to contact Fuchs there too, who systematically transmitted extremely valuable information about the progress of work. And although the schematic diagram of an atomic bomb based on uranium-235 or plutonium-239 was known to Soviet physicists as early as 1939-1940, it was decided to postpone inventive activity and act in accordance with the information received. Academician Goldansky commented on this as follows:

"Intelligence reports by themselves, in the absence of a trained school of physicists and physical chemists, would not have yielded results. Meanwhile, even without intelligence data, our physicists would still have come to create a bomb, perhaps two years later ." This idea - that they could have done it themselves, but

later - is also found in other testimonies of that time. But what is the reason for the lag in independent work? In the fact that in this case it would be necessary to go through all the stages sequentially. Those. it would be impossible to deploy mass production PARALLEL to the creation of the first, in fact, EXPERIMENTAL samples. And a completely different situation is when this same sample has already been made, tested and mass-produced by someone. And given that it was necessary to create new industries, the best option in terms of timing was the development of someone's finished products or proven technologies.

Thus, only with the help of intelligence data it was possible to simultaneously build an experimental nuclear reactor, an industrial nuclear reactor and a plutonium separation plant. And also to develop the terms of reference for the atomic bomb. This is what shortened the time of work on the Soviet "uranium project"!

The first atomic explosion, as mentioned above, was carried out in the USSR at the end of August 1949. That bomb had the RDS-1 index (joking translation - "Russia does it herself"). The second - tower 09/24/1951. And on October 17 or 18, 1951 at 13-00 Moscow time, the Tu-4A crew dropped the Maria bomb with an RDS-3 charge with a capacity of about 30 kilotons at a training ground in the Semipalatinsk region. But she did not go into mass production either (apparently due to the fact that the designers were required to minimize the weight of serial bombs). The first serial nuclear warhead was the unified 30-kiloton charge RDS-4, designed for both missiles and free-falling bombs. His version of the RDS-4T became the basis for the Tatyana bomb, which entered service with long-range and front-line aviation (with a weight of not 5 tons, like the RDS-1, but only 1.2 tons).

In 1953, a government decree was approved on the adoption of "Tatiana" into service and launch into mass production with an annual number of 20 pieces.

Reducing the weight and made it possible to turn the front-line IL-28 into a carrier of atomic weapons. As a result, entire divisions of such bombers were deployed near the western borders of the socialist camp. At first they were based in the western regions of the USSR, but their crews turned into a kind of "suicide bombers" (there were practically no chances for a return). But then the IL-28 (including those with nuclear weapons) began to be deployed on the territory of Poland and the GDR. Their range made it possible to reach the shores of the English Channel. But this already applies to the time after 1953 (to the period of "détente").

By June 1953, the USA had carried out 34 atomic explosions, Great Britain - 1 (sources of data from the journals: "AVIO" No. 5, 1996 (Kharkov), "TECHNIKA- YOUTH", N: 1-2, 1992 (article "Nuclear War 53rd") and "AVIATION AND TIME", No 1, 1997).

Finally, two pieces of information. The first is that in the newspaper "Izvestia" in the issue of March 8, 1950, a TASS refutation was published on the report of the Reuters agency about the trial in London of

English physicist Fuchs, sentenced to 14 years in prison for passing atomic secrets to "agents of the Soviet Government": TASS is authorized to report that this statement is a gross fabrication, since Fuchs is unknown to the Soviet Government and no "agents" of the Soviet Government had any contact with Fuchs no relationship. The second information is related to the second Soviet nuclear explosion in 1951. On October 6, 1951, the

newspaper Pravda published "COMRADE I.V. STALIN'S ANSWER TO THE CORRESPONDENT OF PRAVDA ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS" (later it was published as a separate pamphlet with a circulation of 2 million copies). Here are some

quotes from it:

(Question): What do you think about the noise raised recently in the foreign press in connection with the testing of the atomic bomb in the Soviet Union?

(Answer): Indeed, we recently conducted a test of one of the types of an atomic bomb. Tests of atomic bombs of various calibers will continue to be carried out in accordance with the plan for the defense of our country against attack by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc. (Question):

In connection with the test of the atomic bomb, various US officials are raising the alarm and shouting about the threat to US security. Is there any basis for such anxiety?

(Answer): There are no grounds for such anxiety ... If the USA does not think of attacking the Soviet Union, the anxiety of the US leaders must be considered pointless and false, because the Soviet Union does not think of ever attacking the USA or any other another country. Tests of the first Soviet nuclear weapons

forced the Americans to change their approach to planning a possible war against the USSR. The directive of the US National Security Council dated 04/14/1950 indicated that the potential enemy had more than 1000 Tu-4 bombers and at least 10 atomic bombs. And this, as emphasized, radically changes the likely picture of hostilities in Europe, because. the main targets for them will be NATO military groupings. To improve the efficiency of Soviet long-range and strategic aviation, since 1948, technology has also been

developed.

refueling in the air (adopted in 1951).

3. "BLIND SPOT" OF POST-WAR HISTORY SOVIET TECHNOLOGY

It turns out that the policy of mass application of foreign experience was used not only in the creation of the Tu-4 or in the "uranium project". After the war, many Soviet engineers and designers, by an unspoken decision of the government, switched to mastering foreign achievements. The scientific observer Vadim Orlov reflects on this in the article "Heroes? Pirates? or ... "circle members"?" in the journal "TEHNIKA-YOUDODEZHI", N: 4, 1993.

He writes: "You can't erase a word from a song: in our history there is a period [post-war?], when the production of "solid" [i.e. wholly copied] structures was elevated almost to the level of state policy. It was a deliberately launched campaign, but on its occasion, they did not beat the propaganda drums, but did everything quietly, to the mute. And he gives an example of "pure copying" by the Soviet industry of the American B-29 bomber (under the name Tu-4 and which was considered in the chapter on aircraft). In addition, other stories are given in the article: - The brainchild of S. Korolev, the R-1

rocket was an improved V-2. On the basis of the German Wasserfall, the designer Sinelnikov made an anti-aircraft missile for the air defense forces. At first, they copied foreign radars, sonars and gyrocompasses, recreated technologies for producing alloys and plastics, and produced cars that differed little from foreign prototypes. Etc. ... Moreover, if the information about foreign

products was sufficiently detailed, then attempts by Soviet engineers to create something of their own were thwarted. Vadim Orlov gives an example of the removal from work of Academician P. L. Kapitsa in August 1949. In accordance with a government decree signed by Stalin, he was dismissed due to "failure to use the existing advanced technology in the field of oxygen abroad." Although, according to his usual rule, Stalin could solve another problem in this case: some specialists should be persecuted to force the rest to unquestioning obedience and to high responsibility for the results of the work. At the beginning of 1949, Stalin planned a "preventive purge" of physicists, similar to the fact that

done in biology. But successful work on the creation of the atomic bomb prevented. However, Stalin may not have allowed too free an atmosphere among scientists (the post-war terror will be discussed in more detail in a separate chapter).

An interesting confirmation of the post-war situation in the Soviet rocket industry is given in the article "CHIEF DESIGNER AND HIS TIME" of the journal "SCIENCE AND LIFE" No. 4, 1992 (author - Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences

V. I. Fedoseev). He writes: Immediately after the end of hostilities, a stream of our technical specialists poured into the Soviet occupation zone [of Germany]. There was a lot to see, a lot to learn. All rocket affairs were in a hastily created institute code-named "Berlin", where General L. M. Gaidukov was the head, and "Colonel" S. P. Korolev was his deputy and chief designer. Germans from among those specialists who did not leave or did not have time to leave for the western zones of occupation also worked at the institute. At the end of 1946, when the "Berlin" was preparing to leave for their homeland [in the USSR], the Germans were also taken out. After 3 years, it was decided to send them back. In 1946, when the Berlin was still in Germany, a secret government decree on rocket technology was issued. It was not only about ballistic, but also about anti-aircraft missiles. Sergei Pavlovich was appointed chief designer for ballistic One can confidently say that if it were not for the Germans with their V-2, Sergei Pavlovich Korolev would have needed another ten years of hard work to break distrust and achieve such a powerful turnaround of work

walking through the authorities.

The militarization of the national economy, so necessary and natural during the war, acquired a new breath after its end... In those distant times, the word "rocket"... carried an element of state secrets. We said "product", "object", or "two", "five". R1 - the same V-2 rocket, but made by us. As for the P2, there was something essentially new in it: a detachable warhead, a carrying block (so far one) and rearranged from the bow to the tail instrument compartment. Range P1 300 km, P2 - 540 km In those years there was a military-industrial boom. Unlimited funds were rushed to create new means of military equipment. Many

various, mostly quite real projects. I remember that Chelomei intensively modernized the German V-1 projectile ... promising a real range of about 300 km. I remember that a huge design bureau was created for Beria's son to develop another projectile aircraft ... with a range of several thousand km. There were other projects that I only heard about out of the corner of my ear. Like mushrooms, new design bureaus for liquid and solid propellant engines, for anti-aircraft missiles, for guided bombs and other destructive weapons grew. The completion of work on P1 and P2

set new tasks for the military-industrial complex. The first is their mass production. A special factory was needed. He was found in Dnepropetrovsk. Before that, it seems, tractors were made there. Now, rockets. There was, one might say, an anti-conversion. The second task necessary for the military is the transition from oxygen to new ones, the so-called. high boiling oxidizers. In parallel, the development of rockets R5 (on oxygen) and R11 (on nitric acid and kerosene) was going on. They entered flight tests at the same time - in April 1953. The range of the R5 was 1200 km, it was capable of carrying a nuclear charge. An interesting memory of the post-war years: "military industrial boom", "unlimited funds", "anti-conversion", "cruise missiles", "multiple heads". And frantic deadlines ("Faster! ... Even faster!"). What for? By the way, was it similar in the USA? We will see something about the situation in the United States during the war and after the war later, but for now let's return to Vadim Orlov's article.

He only tries to explain the post-war policy of copying foreign designs. But the explanation is limited by the need for "short timeframes" and remarks that "searching for an answer, historians have not yet come to a consensus" and that "for historians of technology, the post-war period is a solid palisade of questions." It's strange, but "short deadlines" should also be explained by something? It is sometimes said that the United States threatened to attack the Soviet Union, and the American plans declassified in the 70s are cited as evidence. As a counter-argument, I can ask two questions: 1. When was the German plan of attack on

the USSR (the famous "Barbarossa") developed and when were the preparatory

work on it? 2.

And what were the relations between the USSR and Germany at that

time? Answers: 1. From the

summer of 1940 to June 1941. 2. Friendship and

cooperation and no "Cold War"! Moreover, historians explain the pre-war period in such a way that it is impossible to understand anything: was anything done on defense or not done? Judging by the catastrophic defeat in 1941, it turns out - what was not done. But the generals justify themselves, for example, Marshal Zhukov assures that Marshal Timoshenko, People's Commissar for Defense, worked 19 hours a day, even slept on a cot. And what did he do? Maybe the entire pre-war Soviet generals consisted of solid German agents? Why didn't Stalin then accuse them all of treason and didn't shoot them? Maybe he was also one of the same "friends" of Germany? Then it is not clear why they

spent so much effort on organizing defense? As a reminder of how historians should study the past, I suggest that you familiarize yourself with the thought of V. I. Lenin, which he cited in his unfinished work "STATISTICS

AND SOCIOLOGY" (PSS, vol. 30): On the whole, in their connection, not only a stubborn, but also an unconditionally conclusive thing... We must try to establish such a foundation from exact and indisputable facts, on which one could rely.... In order for this to be a real foundation, it is necessary to take not individual facts, but the whole set of facts related to the issue under consideration, without a single exception, because otherwise there will inevitably arise a suspicion, and a completely legitimate suspicion, that the facts are chosen or chosen arbitrarily, that instead of an objective connection and interdependence of historical phenomena as a whole, "subjective "cooking to justify, maybe dirty business."

Moreover, this quote is taken not from a volume of Lenin's works, but from the "Ryutin platform" of 1932 (Section 3. "Stalin as a sophist") (Collection "REHABILITATION: POLITICAL PROCESSES of the 30-50s", Moscow, 1991, p. 349). The quoted words of Stalin's predecessor as party leader were cited by the authors of the "platform" as an illustration to their evidence of the "dirty deeds" of the

Stalin, incl. dealing with facts. Many of them echo the rules of scientific falsification outlined at the beginning of this book. A more detailed acquaintance with the documents of the "Ryutin group" leads to the idea that official historians assign insufficient importance to them, especially in the matter of strengthening terror in the USSR since the mid-30s. But a separate chapter will be devoted to the topic of terror. And here I propose to get acquainted with another interesting thought of LENIN (from the article by Yu. Chernichenko "SCIENCE AND AGRICULTURE", the journal "NOVY MIR", No 7, 1981, p. 164):

"... To draw good things from abroad with both hands: Soviet power + Prussian order of railways + American technology and organization of trusts + American public education etc. etc. + + = S = socialism ..." But firstly, Soviet It is

still possible to combine power with the Prussian order, it is much more difficult to combine the absence of private property with the American private property management system - this is not even nonsense at all, but how to call it ... But we digress. By the way, during the time of Stalin, the first

MOBILE complexes for launching missiles (P11) were developed (by the same Korolev). Their flight tests began in 1953 ("SCIENCE AND LIFE", No 1, 1992, article by A. Abramov, Doctor of Technical Sciences "SINCE RECENTLY IT WAS SECRET"). Then the idea arose to put them on submarines ... And how much dirt was then "poured out" about mobile missile systems in the United States (and how did these "paranoids" dare to spend billions of dollars on such barbaric means of destroying humanity!?) But let's get back to post-war demand for "shorter deadlines". They

were achieved in different ways. First of all - complete copying of foreign samples. And where this could not be done, then several (at least two) teams of designers were involved in the work. In any case, maximum information about foreign achievements was required. It turns out that they were received

not only through scouts, but also in a completely open way. And not only when reading special technical publications.

For example, in the magazine "NOVY MIR", N: 10 for 1979 A. Malinov's article "160 MINUTES AND ... ALL LIFE" about the Soviet astronomer A. B. Severny was published. There were two interesting moments in his life after the war. In May 1945, the Defense Committee and the Soviet government ordered him to leave for defeated Germany as part of a group of Soviet specialists to search for and send home the scientific equipment stolen by the Nazis. But little of the loot they managed to find. In addition, the article does not say whether the group was interested in German achievements. But, it turns out, there was no point in creating the lost devices again, because. "during the years of the war, scientific instrumentation in the United States made a noticeable step forward"! (By the way, such a conclusion is interesting in itself. For its appearance, it was necessary to carry out constant monitoring of the state of American instrumentation! Apparently, surveillance was "on top".)

The article goes on to say that in 1946 a group of Soviet specialists was sent to the United States to "study the American experience." A. Severny stayed there for half a year (returned in 1947). "A participant in the same trip, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Vladimir Borisovich Nikonov, spoke about how furiously, snatching literally a few hours for sleep, he studied, like a schoolboy, the art of scientific instrumentation from overseas colleagues, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences A. Severny." (By the way, we will also touch on the bashful term "studied." If in other countries something from Soviet achievements is repeated, then it was called "copied", "stolen", and the reverse process for some reason is called "study". Although, copyright is an element of commercial competition in peacetime. As for the field of armaments, I believe that monopolies in this matter always bear the temptation of military confrontation, and therefore are unacceptable. And there is nothing to be ashamed of, just as to be indignant). But the question may

arise: how much knowledge could Soviet specialists have obtained in the United States at that time? After all, it is believed that since March 1946 the Cold War has been unfolding. Historians write that at that time the United States began preparations for a nuclear attack, which forced the Soviet Union to sharply accelerate military preparations, in particular for the atomic project.

But not everything is so simple. In the article "How can Minerva conquer Mars?" (Journal "ZNANIE-SILA" N: 3, 1991) E. N. Kuznetsov, an intern at Cornell University, USA, Candidate of Economic Sciences, explains that in the United States in 1946, twelve and a half million demobilized soldiers and officers appeared on the labor market and those released from the defense industry. In total - 24 million people! However, there was no "lost generation" in the United States, as happened in Western Europe. And this happened because the developments of defense laboratories created during the war were immediately declassified and quickly transferred to a commercial basis. All engineers working for the armed forces were given the opportunity (it was even encouraged) to create their own firms. "So the war began to serve the world and became the most powerful impulse of post-war development." This is also confirmed by the American magazine "ELEK-TRONIKA", a special issue of which, dedicated to its 50th anniversary, was

translated in 1980 by the publishing house "Mir" (Moscow) (original issue of the magazine - 1980, Vol. 53, No. 9 (587)). Its pages 12, 13, 48-71 provide a brief overview of developments in the electrical and radio engineering industries in the United States during the war and post-war period.

It turns out that in the years 1941-1945, the US electronics industry was flooded with a multibillion-dollar stream of funds, under the influence of which it turned from an insignificant industry focused on the production of consumer radio devices into an important manufacturer of products for military equipment. In particular, the development of such branches of science as computer technology, miniaturization technology, radar, long-range navigation and guided missiles has received a sharp breakthrough. During the war years, the number of people employed in the US electronics industry increased by about five times, reaching 560,000 people. The War Production Committee noted that if in 1941 the total volume of factory sales for 55 manufacturers of radio equipment amounted to \$ 240 million, then in 1944 the sales volume of this industry, which by that time had become the industry of radio communication equipment (from

taking into account the production of parts), reached an annual figure of 4.5 billion dollars, which amounted to an increase of 1875%.

A large number of radio devices were widely used in the main types of military equipment. According to William L. Batt, chairman of the Needs Committee of the War Production Committee, each tank of that time contained about \$5,000 worth of radio equipment, and a heavy bomber worth \$50,000. To improve the efficiency of the implementation of electronics achievements and reduce costs, standardization was carried out in the United States, carried out by the engineering department of the Radio Manufacturers Association. On June 27, 1940, the US government created the

National Defense Research Committee. It was chaired by Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and an electronics specialist. It was he who approached President Roosevelt with a proposal to mobilize science for defense needs. The members of the committee included prominent scientists, businessmen and representatives of the military. It lasted throughout the war and was dissolved in January 1947.

Much attention was paid to the creation of new research laboratories, which were created under the direction of a special National Research Committee. He created: two anti-submarine defense centers, a radar center for studying the use of microwave frequencies (UHF), a laboratory for creating countermeasures to interfere with enemy communications and radars, etc.

Great success was achieved by American and British scientists in the development of radars, especially in the microwave range (in the microwave frequency range up to 30,000 MHz), while in France, the USSR, Japan and Germany they managed to create radars only in the range up to 300 MHz. Moreover, more funds were spent on the development and production of radars in the USA than on the atomic bomb (\$2.5 billion versus \$2 billion). As a result, the American and British radars had a 2 times greater range than the German ones (80 km against the German 40). And the experimental American S-band station had a range 5 times further than the German ones - 200 km. For

to improve the convenience of displaying the information received, all-round visibility indicators (PPI) were developed based on new kinescopes. The first such aircraft IKO was installed in July 1942 on a Lockheed Navy patrol bomber.

These developments led to the creation in the United States in the early 40s of a prototype microwave early warning radar, which provided target detection at a distance of more than 240 km and could mark several targets. Some facts about this system remained classified for decades. It used a powerful S-band magnetron. In the 1950s, it provided the basis for the American early warning radar system deployed in Canada.

In 1943, the h5X station was developed for precision bombing in bad weather (with an accuracy of up to 100 m). It was installed in the nose of B-17 bombers during flights to Germany. In addition to radar, sonar was developed to

combat submarines. And in the end, the study of enemy search methods led to the creation of navigation systems for their ships and aircraft. In this case, the Loran system, developed at the Radiation Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has achieved great success. Its first sample was installed in October 1942 on the Atlantic (East) coast of the United States. The range of the system ranged from 300 to 800 nautical miles during the day and 1500 at night. She could determine the location of ships with an accuracy of 1% with a distance of up to 800 nautical miles and 5% - over.

One of the greatest achievements of research and development during the Second World War was the work on miniaturization. This was required to create highly efficient self-guided radio fuses for mines, shells and bombs. For this, subminiature lamps were invented. In addition, thick-film printing technology has been developed. This allowed a third of the US electronics industry to turn to the production of radio fuses. The total cost of the project approached \$1 billion and more than 20 million of these fuses were produced in total. They were first used on January 5, 1943 by anti-aircraft gunners of the American cruiser Helena. Shells with radio fuses turned out to be three

times more effective than projectiles equipped with remote fuses, even when using radar control fire.

Military needs stimulated work on the creation of electronic computers, especially for calculating the trajectories needed to create firing tables. Bell Telephone Laboratories completed the Model III relay computer in 1943. It weighed 10 tons, but could calculate the trajectory in 40 minutes. Then the creation of computers "Mark I" and "Mark II" was completed at Harvard University together with IBM. The broad advent of the era of electronic digital computers began after the official introduction of the Eniac machine in February 1946. It weighed 30 tons, occupied a room of 9 x 15 meters, had 18,000 lamps, but worked until 1955. developments in the direction of improving cathode ray tubes (CRT or "kinescopes"). They were used in radars, sonars, equipment of the Loran system, etc. Various types of CRT have been developed. In 1945, RCA

Other in creating the military succeeded became superorticon, a new television transmission tube that replaced the iconoscope, which had less image clarity. By the same year, the issue of frequency allocation for non-military FM broadcasting was resolved, after which television began to develop rapidly as a separate industry. In 1946, six commercial stations began broadcasting to several thousand black-and-white television receivers in the United States. At the same time, work was underway to create color television. Due to the fact that in 1945 the possibility of a new world war was not seriously discussed (and was not yet visible), it is natural that after the end of the fighting, these and many other military developments were widely used for peaceful purposes. Most of them have been declassified and put into commercial use.

In particular, radars began to be used to ensure the flights of civil aircraft and the movement of ships. They also found application for radar mapping. The business world became interested in computers, and in 1947 the first company (Eckert Mauchly) was founded to produce them.

Computer Corp.). Improved broadcast quality. The quality of the gramophone record has been improved. Microwaves began to be used both in industry (for drying fabrics, heat treatment of rubber, preheating plastics) and in everyday life for heating food (the first microwave oven was released by General Electric in 1947). The German invention - the tape recorder - was actively introduced into life. You read these lines and refuse to believe that the first microwave ovens went on sale

in the USA in 1947! Of course, it is quite possible that not everyone could afford them for the price, but in the countries of the former socialist bloc they remained an unrealizable dream of housewives! The production of household tape recorders in the USSR was still somehow able to be established, but they were of such quality that it's better to talk about it

shut up.

The introduction of new products in civilian industries in the United States after the war became possible not only due to the declassification of military developments, but also through the transfer of personnel from the military industry to the civilian sector. In 1944, the law on the rights of military personnel came into force, thanks to which millions of veterans after the war did not find themselves idle, and many of them were able to return to educational institutions. The Act also provided veterans with unemployment benefits, special medical care, and loans to buy homes, farms, and start businesses. Many former military engineers created their own firms (for example: William Hewlett, David Packard, Howard Vollum, Joseph Keithley and others).

For even wider distribution of new products, their description began to appear in magazines, for example, in the same ELECTRONICS, one of the editors of which was Donald Fink. He recalled: "When I returned from the war, of course, I had access to almost everything that happened in the radiation laboratory. Very soon everything was declassified, and a lot of materials on radar were ready for publication in the journal Immediately after the war, electronics consumer electronics boomed, television came in. All the industries that boomed during the war, microwave and microwave technology, magnetrons, semiconductor devices (diodes, not yet transistors) became available in household and

commercial spheres". Fink himself prepared an extremely interesting series of articles on the secrets of radar. A similar

increase in achievements should have been in other areas of American science and technology, it is quite possible that in optics. In other words, A. Severny and other Soviet specialists, if desired in 1946-1947 they could learn a lot about American technical innovations! Does this mean that the United States did not even think about a big war in 1945-1947? Or did they think that they would "throw hats" if someone attacked? (I mean - atomic?) So, the attack on someone was not seriously planned?

Indeed, why did the United States "spit" on the four B-29s that ended up in the Soviet Union? Why did they drastically reduce the army and the "defense industry"? Why have declassified many developments of military laboratories? Moreover, groups of Soviet specialists were allowed in? (Not counting the presence of intelligence officers of various levels. By the way, the fact that there were a lot of Soviet diplomats and various specialists in the United States during the war is mentioned in the memoirs of pilot I.P. Mazuruk, who in 1944 made a long business trip across the North and South America). Who is preparing a war like that?! Here we can also recall the fact that Great Britain sold the latest jet engines to the Soviet Union, which were then installed on the MiG-15, Il-28 and other mass Soviet combat aircraft. By the way, the proposal to buy from the British a license for the purchase of jet engines was made by the aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev during a meeting with Stalin (he writes about this in his memoirs). Stalin did not even believe it, he said that "what kind of fool would sell his secrets?" That's right, if you prepare for war, then this is the stupidity of stupidity! Of course, if the British only thought about a new war, then such a possibility is incredible! But let's look at this problem from the British side. The war is over, in the next 10 years such a war does not seem to be expected. And during this period, the engines become obsolete. Why will they "gather dust" if they can be sold to someone? Moreover, the Treaty of Friendship, concluded in 1942, was then in force between Great Britain and the USSR!

Although, there are other data on post-war American conversion, which are somewhat different from those given above.

(PRAVDA newspaper, 10/31/1988, J. L. Geddis (USA) "ABOUT THE PAST FOR THE SAKE OF THE FUTURE"): "between 1945 and 1947, the personnel of the American armed forces were reduced from 12 million to 1.6 million people, and military appropriations were reduced from 81.6 billion to 13.1 billion dollars." The numbers are less than E. Kuznetsov gives, but also impress.

So if the leadership of the United States did not intend to start a new world war in the coming years after the victory in 1945, then why did Stalin set "very tight deadlines" for Soviet designers? Why such a hurry? However, the "blank spots" in the post-war history of Soviet science and technology

do not end there. These include the development and production of technical products for "special" purposes. For example - gas generating trucks. Those cars that ran on gas obtained in a special device by burning solid fuel (wood chocks). Here are some of their characteristics: Table 2. Gas-generating trucks produced in the USSR

Brand	Years of manufacture	Load capacity. (tons)	Consumption of chocks per 100 km of track (kg)
GAZ-42	1939-1942	1.2	60 (30 hp)
ZIS-21	1939-1944	2.5	95 (45 hp)
ZIS-21A	1944 -1952	2.5	95 (45 hp)
Ural-ZIS-352	(based on ZIS-5M)		
	1952-1956	2.5	115 (45 hp)

(The data is taken from the "SHORT AUTOMOBILE HANDBOOK", which had many editions from the late 50s to the late 80s). What are NGVs for? I give

a certificate from
"GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA" (vol. 6, 1971, p. 21):

A gas generating vehicle is a vehicle whose engine is powered by gas produced from solid fuel in a gas generator mounted on its chassis. In the USSR, work on the creation of G.a. were started in 1923, serial production of G.a. (ZiS-13) was mastered in 1938. As a fuel for G.a. wood chocks or brown coal are used. It is possible to use charcoal, peat, semi-coke, etc. G.a. designed for operation in areas remote from the production of liquid fuels. G.a. were widely used during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, when there was an acute shortage of liquid fuel for the needs of road transport. In other words, during the preparation and conduct of the war of 1941-1945, and also until the mid-1950s, one or two car

models were mass-produced in the USSR that could not run on fuel obtained from oil. You can understand this during a war - oil is saved for other equipment: tanks, aircraft, etc. For comparison, we can recall that gas-generating cars were also produced in Nazi Germany. The remark that such a technique is useful even in peacetime in areas rich in forest does not work! The fact is that its operation is fraught with a number of difficulties. The best wood for gas generators is oak and birch, while conifers are more common in the forests of the Soviet Union. The importance lies in the different properties of retaining and releasing moisture by different tree species. There are also difficulties when using peat or coal (this is due to the degree of slag formation, etc.). Ultimately, the power of a gas generator engine is reduced by 35-40% compared to a gasoline engine. And besides, on such a car, additional space is required for the installations themselves and for a larger supply of fuel. This results in a reduction in load capacity. It is quite logical that over time they abandoned such a technique. But

in the period under consideration in the history of the USSR, for some reason, the need for it

remained. But it turns out that after the war in the USSR, gas-generating diesel locomotives were also developed! This is written in the reference book "SOVIET DIESEL LOCOMOTIVES" (Moscow, "Mashgiz", 1961), p. 42:

"In 1950, the All-Union Research Institute of Railway Transport switched one diesel locomotive of the TE1 series to mixed fuel. Gas was obtained in a gas generator plant from anthracite [i.e. coal] grade AM. Then an experimental batch of such diesel locomotives was manufactured at the Ulan-Ude Steam Locomotive-Car Repair Plant and sent to work at the Baskunchak depot of the Volga railway ... However, the use of two types of fuel significantly complicates the work of the depot, and if there is a sufficient amount of liquid fuel, such a complication is not necessary. Therefore, further experiments in this direction were stopped. " For reference, it should be noted that single-section diesel

locomotives of the TE1 series have been produced by the Kharkov Diesel Locomotive Plant since 1947. Since 1950, the same plant began to produce two-section diesel locomotives TE2. Since 1954, the TE3 series has gone.

The reference book reports on the retrofitting of a single-section TE1. But in the newspaper "PRAVDA" for January 11, 1953, on the first page there was a photograph of a three-section diesel locomotive, the extreme sections of which resembled sections of TE2! The comment says:

"The socialist industry equips our transport with first-class equipment. The directives of the 19th Party Congress under the Fifth Five-Year Plan plan to "start production of new powerful steam locomotives, electric locomotives and diesel locomotives, including gas-generating ones." "It is equipped with a gas generator set and engines with a capacity of 2000 hp. The engines run on anthracite with the addition of a small amount of liquid fuel. Conventional diesel locomotives use only liquid fuel. The new locomotive is able to cover long distances without taking fuel and water. Gas-fired diesel locomotive has passed the first tests ".

But information about this model was not included in the reference book on diesel locomotives. It is possible that this was the result of "further experiments". But for some reason, historians of technology do not want to dwell on this fact in detail.

Indeed, in peacetime, "with a sufficient amount of liquid fuel," the need for such transport is small. But can a situation arise when "liquid fuel" becomes scarce? At least during the war - definitely! It turns out that such an opportunity was provided by customers of such equipment. And the main customer of everything new at that time was I. Stalin.

Another example of "special" - amphibious tanks. Many experts believe that they can be widely used only in the offensive. In defense, when fuel was pumped in, tanks were dug up to the tower into the ground on the front line. So, in the USSR in 1949-1951, under the leadership of J. Kotin, the PT-76 amphibious tank was developed and put into service. Moreover, in addition to it, another model was developed by another design bureau, but did not get into mass production. Modeled on the PT-76, amphibious

tanks were also produced in China in the 70s. In the United States, the LVTH-6 amphibious tank was adopted in 1955, but it was not widely used. And since 1971, the IKV-91 amphibious tank has been produced by Sweden. (Information of the magazine "TEHNIKA-YOUTH", N: 8 for 1990). All this shows that most countries of the world did not particularly care about the presence of such special equipment in their armies (it does not find much need in defense). The next model of "special" military equipment can be considered

snowmobiles. It turns out that before the war, as well as during and after it, military snowmobiles were developed and used for various purposes in the USSR (magazine "MODEL CONSTRUCTION", N: 2, 1988, pp. 6-8 I. Yuvenaliev "Through the fire and snowstorm "). The propeller driven snowmobile was invented in 1904.

During the First World War, a number of transport snowmobiles were developed and used, the operation of which continued during the Civil War in Russia. After its completion, work on the construction of snowmobiles continued. Until 1939, the NAMI and

TsAGI institutes created more

twenty designs. Machines of the NKL type were mass-produced at a special plant of Lessudomashstroy, and of the KM type at the Gorky plant Krasny Metallist. And

most of the models of Soviet snowmobiles were military. Moreover, they were used in battles, starting with the Soviet-Finnish war. Then these were serially produced TsAGI-ANT-IV designs by A. N. Tupolev and OSGA (NKL) -6 N. M. Andreev. For the transportation of the seriously wounded, the NKL-6S ambulance was developed. Then they adopted the headquarters NKL-38, followed by cargo snowmobiles NKL-12 for servicing field airfields.

The improvement of the snowmobile continued after 06/22/1941. Special airborne battalions were even formed.

About the post-war fate of the snowmobiles, the magazine only says that "the combat troops continued to serve mainly in the border troops." Transport was used to transport mail and other goods in Siberia, in the North and in other hard-to-reach places.

The remark "mostly" is interesting. So there were some other special aerosleigh units? Of course,

snowmobiles could be used practically in most of the USSR in winter. But in some places they could be the main ground military transport - in the event of a war in the Arctic! The situation with the northern latitudes will be considered further, and now let's move on to another type of "special" equipment, which is necessary specifically for waging an offensive war on the territory of other countries. It will be about a special connection for Stalin. Very brief information about this is given in

the memoir of a member of the CPSU since 1926, A. A. Zorohovich, published in the collection "... TO HAVE THE FORCE TO REMEMBER" (Stories of those who went through the adversity of repressions), M., "Moskovsky Rabochiy",

1991. Before his arrest on February 7, 1948, he worked at the Research Institute of Minaviaprom. He began serving his term in the Komi ASSR, in Intlag, where at that time there were more than 100,000 prisoners. In January 1949, A. Zorohovich was transferred to a strictly secret research institute near Moscow, which was part of the MGB system. It was called "p / box 222" or "NII-2". In the language of prisoners - "sharashka". Zorohovich notes that there were only more than 300 professional pris

civilians and officers, incl. physicist-mathematician A. Solzhenitsyn. The main task of this "sharashka" is to create a perfect telephone communication system for Stalin, who wants to talk with Soviet representatives in different countries, without the risk of being overheard by anyone's intelligence. In addition, the "owner" set another most difficult condition: his voice must be easily recognizable at the other end of the wire. In 1956 Zorohovich was rehabilitated.

Why did Stalin need such a system? After all, under ordinary ("peaceful") conditions, special haste in international relations is not required. There is quite enough postal diplomatic communication, incl. telegraph using ciphers. It was with their help that Stalin exchanged messages during the preparation and conduct of the Korean War. But it turns out that he assumed the emergence of conditions when he personally would have to talk with some of his representatives in other countries. And for some reason, no other type of communication could replace the telephone. And what advantage does the telephone have over encrypted telegraph or mail? There is only one answer - shorter communication time! Could conditions arise where

fast communication becomes very important? They can. Moreover, in the life of Stalin, this was already in practice. When? - during the Great Patriotic War. There are many examples. They are found in many memoirs of the former commanders of the fronts and armies of the Red Army. It turns out that Stalin assumed the emergence of such a thing in the near future! Those. emergence of a NEW WORLD WAR. More precisely, he did not just "assume", but rather carefully prepared. The list of "special" post-war equipment does not end there.

One can recall Stalin's "buildings of the century", which, for example, D. Volkogonov briefly mentions in the 2nd volume of his book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY": this is the Baikal-Amur Railway, a tunnel from the mainland to Sakhalin Island (under the Strait) and railway line from the Northern Urals to the Yenisei. Volkogonov writes that their construction was started without the necessary economic justification, secretly, and then stopped (p. 522). But they stopped building them AFTER Stalin's death. And they started even before the war of 1941-1945. This is the
memory of the former

prisoner L. M. Gurvich in the collection "... TO HAVE THE FORCE TO REMEMBER". He was arrested in 1938. The verdict was announced on 09/02/1940 and sent to Sevzheldorlag, which was entrusted with the construction of a railway from Kotlas through Konosha to Cherepovets. It was part of the giant northern railway line conceived by Stalin from Leningrad to the Ob and further through the Yenisei and Lena to the Far East, created by the slave labor of prisoners in the extremely difficult climatic conditions of the Far North. In general, there are three reasons for the construction

of any objects: economic, military or other. Others are rare. For example, the construction of a stadium for the Olympic Games can be attributed to it. The first two are the main ones. The fact that some of Stalin's "constructions of the century" were stopped after his death proves that there was no economic sense in them at that time. For example, the railway then came to the north of the Tyumen region, but in a different way - from the south, i.e. as the economic development of those places. The Stalinist highway was built from west to east along the forest-tundra. There is also no other meaning in such construction projects, because it suggests some kind of use of the constructed objects. But they were built in strict secrecy and were abandoned. But this is precisely the fate of most objects created according to military plans! Not in the sense that they are necessarily under construction, but in the sense that the need for them eventually disappears. As evidence, one can recall the city fortifications of the ancient and middle ages, the "Stalin Line" (fortifications on the old western Soviet border, which were abandoned and dismantled after 1939, although they were built very carefully and in strict secrecy), etc. They may turn out to be unfinished if the military need for them ceases before the completion of construction. And they are built, as a rule, in secrecy, secretly.

It turns out that until March 1953 there was some kind of military necessity for some large construction projects in different regions of the USSR, especially in the North. And after that date, she disappeared. And what was it?

The history of "special" technology does not end there, but it's time to move on to the second important historical fact,

testifying to Stalin's desire to start a new world war - to the events in Korea. 4.
KOREA, 1945-1953

Another serious fact showing
that Stalin was not joking at all about the approach of a new world war is the
events in Korea before 1953. Volume 13 of the latest (third) edition of TSB states
that the Soviet Army

entered Korea from the north in August 1945, and in September of the same
year, US troops landed in Korea from the south. This was done in accordance
with the Allied agreements in Yalta (February 1945), in Potsdam (July-August
1945) and by the decision of the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministries of the
USSR, USA and Great Britain (December 1945). The purpose of the entry of the
Allied troops into Korea was to accept the surrender of the Japanese troops there.

Regarding the meetings in Potsdam, another volume of TSB contains only
two articles: one is about the "Potsdam Conference", the second is about the
"Potsdam Declaration". The first one speaks only of the decisions of the allies
regarding Germany, not a word about the decisions to wage war against Japan.
This is referred to in the "Potsdam Declaration", which was published on July 26,
1945 on behalf of the governments of Great Britain, the United States and China.
The declaration, in an ultimatum form, demanded the unconditional surrender of
Japan. It provided for: - the elimination of the power and influence of the militarists
in Japan; - temporary

occupation of Japanese territory; - transfer of the Japanese
economy to a peaceful track;

- etc.

Further in the "TSB" it is said that the Japanese government rejected
(07/28/1945) the requirements of the Declaration. But after the Soviet Union
joined it (08/08/1945) and the beginning (08/09/1945) of hostilities against Japan,
the Japanese government on 08/14/1945 announced the acceptance of the terms
of the Potsdam Declaration.

As you can see, in all the places listed there is no clear description of how
Korea was divided, who and when proposed to do it. Moreover, for some reason
a long list of "agreements" is given: in Yalta, and in Potsdam, and in Moscow
(again, "shuffling"?). The Moscow meeting can be removed from this list - how
could the troops

to act in August-September according to the December decisions? In Yalta they could make fundamental decisions, working out the demarcation line between the armies is a more concrete matter. It turns out that the most realistic place, according to its agreement, is the Potsdam Conference, which took place from 07/17/1945 to

08/02/1945. I wonder what would have been written in TSB if the United States had proposed dividing Korea, the USSR would have been against it, but the United States insisted? Probably, they would have written that the USSR was against the division of Korea, but the militaristic circles of the United States, having received the atomic bomb, brazenly demanded this. And since the Soviet Union did not have an atomic bomb, then Stalin was forced to agree, which later led to incalculable suffering for the Korean people. But ... we do not find such words.

Moreover, despite the presence of the atomic bomb, the United States was interested in the participation of the USSR in the war against Japan, which is why it was unprofitable for them to arrange any disputes before it began. And in Soviet publications, the question of the initiator of the proposal to divide Korea was never raised, it was very diligently avoided. For example, quite recently, the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal "PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST" B. N. Slavinsky in his article "KOREAN WAR ended a long time ago, the problems still remain, and in the matter of their solution, he proposes to "clear away the rubble of the past", to clarify everything that led to the emergence of the Korean problem itself, to abandon silence, omissions, half-truths, "or simply distortion of historical facts, which took place not only during the Stalin era, but also in subsequent years. It is time to clarify a number of "blank spots" in the history of international relations and the foreign policy of the USSR ... "

Then, quite logically, he refers to the history of events in Korea since 1945 and reports the following: "Let us

recall that at the final stage of the war with Japan, the commands of the USSR and the United States agreed to consider the 38th parallel the dividing line of military operations of American and Soviet troops on the Korean Peninsula . In accordance with this decision, the Soviet troops ... "

That the Soviet troops subsequently acted in accordance with this decision is understandable. But having delved into the small details of that conflict, I really want to ask the author of the article (and other historians): "Who FIRST suggested dividing Korea? And where?" Judging by the very approximate information of the above quotation, it turns out that Korea was divided in the process of fighting in connection with the combat situation. And it is hinted that the question of the initiator of the division does not play a role. For my part, I would like to strictly officially note: it is this question that is extremely important, because it immediately answers another important question: who was interested in the future Korean War, the total losses in which (over 10 million people) can be compared, for example, with the losses of Germany in the Second World War (about 13 million people). It is impossible to "untangle the tangle" without finding its beginning. And the beginning of the Korean problem was carefully concealed for many years. I noticed this problem for a long time, although I was not specifically interested in

And when, already at the height of perestroika, a special program began to be broadcast on television about how and where Korea was divided, I watched it with great interest. It outlined in detail the sequence of military negotiations in Potsdam to develop a demarcation line between the troops of the USSR and the USA in the Far East. First, the American delegation expressed its proposals, according to which ALL Korea was included in the zone of action of the Soviet troops. In addition, the Americans also offered to send one Soviet division to the central Japanese island. But the USSR delegation refused and INSISTED that the demarcation line should run through the middle of Korea (along the 38th parallel). The Americans were surprised and offered to think until the next day and report their opinion to Stalin. The next day, the Soviet delegation confirmed its decision to divide Korea along the 38th parallel. The US generals, perplexed, agreed.

But it can be noted that in TSB, due to the principle of encyclopedic brevity, any information cannot be exhaustive, and in articles of a popular nature, a number of details can be omitted without malicious intent or because of the author's preferences. The search for details should be carried out in specialized publications, for example, in "HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION 1941-1945". Really,

in the 5th volume of this "HISTORY ..." (Moscow, 1963) there is a description of the negotiations in Potsdam. Regarding the planning of the war in the Far

East, it says: "During the Potsdam talks, many problems of the war in the Pacific were discussed. Soviet, American and British military representatives exchanged the necessary information. The American-British command was primarily interested in the plan of the upcoming actions of the Red Army ... The military talks in Potsdam on the Far East were successful, which was also noted by representatives of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain. "The meetings of the military in Potsdam," the American General D. Dean later wrote, "ended in an atmosphere of complete

agreement" (p. 539). At this point in the HISTORY... no specific information is given on the plans for military operations in Korea, but such a discussion took place, as can be

judged from the following report on page 586: "On August 15, 1945, the Americans developed a project of the so-called "General Order N: 1" which indicated the areas where the surrender of Japanese troops was accepted by each of the allied powers - the Soviet Union, the USA, China and Great Britain. The order, in particular, provided that Japanese troops in northeastern China, in the northern part of Korea (north of the 38th parallel) and in southern Sakhalin would surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East. The surrender of Japanese troops in Korea south of the 38th parallel was to be accepted by the Americans. The American command refused to conduct landing operations there in order to interact with the Soviet Armed Forces during hostilities. General Marshall stated in this connection at the POTSDAM CONFERENCE that the Americans were not preparing for such an operation, that "at present this operation would be at great risk as long as the United States has no bases in Japan." The American command preferred to land its troops in Korea only after the end of the war without

any risk to itself and solely for imperialist purposes" (September 8-9, 1945)". But there are several possible questions about this paragraph. F

agreed that the post of commander-in-chief of all allied forces was taken by an American general, and he was formally OBLIGED to issue a general order to accept the surrender. More precisely, this post itself was only needed to issue ONE general order to accept surrender. Japan, for its part, gives ONE order to its troops. And by what order should the allied troops accept the surrender? Each commander in chief? But at the same time, problems may arise, for example, due to disputed territories. Of course, to prevent them, you can negotiate in advance. And it was done in Potsdam. But the troops act not according to the decisions of the negotiations, but according to the orders of the commanders.

To illustrate what has been said, I quote from the book "CORRESPONDENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR CM WITH US PRESIDENTS AND GREAT BRITAIN PRIME MINISTERS DURING OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941-1945", volume 2 (August 1941 - December 1945), 2nd edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1989:

N: 360. Personal and secret message from Generalissimo JV Stalin to US President Mr. G. Truman. I have received your

message of August 12 regarding the appointment of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies to accept, coordinate and effect the general surrender of the Japanese forces. The Soviet government agrees with your

proposal. Also, in accordance with the procedure you proposed, which stipulates that General MacArthur will instruct the Japanese imperial headquarters on the unconditional surrender of Japanese troops to the Soviet in the Far East. Lieutenant General Derevyanko was appointed representative of the Soviet Military High Command, and he was given all the necessary instructions. (08/12/1945).

Secondly, what does it mean "General Marshall said IN CONNECTION WITH THIS at the Potsdam Conference"? In connection with what? At the Potsdam Conference from July 17 to August 2, General Marshall could not say anything in connection with the "General Order N: 1" of August 15, 1945. General Marshall could make his statement only during negotiations to discuss future delimitation, and only if someone else suggested dividing Korea, because. Americans are not prepared for

such an operation that "at present, this operation would be at great risk, as long as the United States does not have bases in Japan." Correct remark, what could be the charges? The Americans

did not even imagine that they would have to land in Korea! They are uncomfortable! They don't have bases close to Korea! And who is the most comfortable? British troops from some islands? Or China, which is occupied by Japan in the northeast? What, it was very difficult for the Soviet Army to drive another 450 km south of the 38th parallel? Did you miss two gas stations of gasoline and diesel fuel? Moreover, Soviet military historians note that the division of Korea worsened the landing operations of the Soviet Army (American aircraft dropped sea mines into Korean coastal waters ("HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945", volume 11, Moscow, 1980)). Thirdly, if it was known in

advance that the Americans would land "exclusively for imperialistic purposes", why could not the SO-CALLED "General Order N: 1" be protested? It could be. Moreover, in the same "HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC ..." on page 586, the following paragraph says:

"The Soviet government basically did not object to the content of" General Order N: 1 ", but made several amendments to it. It proposed to include in the area of surrender of the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops, firstly, all the Kuril Islands, which, according to the Yalta decision, were subject to transfer Soviet Union, and, secondly, the NORTHERN HALF of Hokkaido". (p. 586). It is further stated that an exchange of views

took place between the Soviet and American commands, as a result of which a "misunderstanding" with the Kuril Islands was revealed (the Americans, as it turned out, asked for the opportunity to use the airfield on them for an intermediate landing of their aircraft), but did not give up about Hokkaido. More precisely, the exchange of views took place not between the commands, but directly between Stalin and Truman (see "CORRESPONDENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR CM ...", Volume 2). At this, the coordination ended and "General order N: 1" was approved.

Again questions arise. But what about Korea? Why was Stalin not only not against the division of Korea, but also proposed to divide

the Japanese island of Hokkaido? For what? Was there any plan? Formally, in the "CORRESPONDENCE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR CM ...", Volume 2, the demand of the northern half of Fr. Hokkaido was explained by Stalin as a political reason, as if in retaliation for the fact that Japanese troops were on the territory of Soviet Russia during the civil war. The Americans were against it, in return they offered to symbolically send some troops to the central Japanese island. Apparently, they understood the difference between symbolic joint troops and an uncontested occupation.

It has already been noted in VEDENIA that if a historical event has not been accurately written anywhere for many years, but it can be interpreted in different ways, then falsification is possible. Here and about the division of Korea for many years, it was definitely not mentioned anywhere. There are plenty of opportunities for fraud. I found one in the form of a footnote to the article by the candidate of historical sciences V. A. Tarasov "COUNTRY OF MORNING FRESHNESS" (notes on the civil war on the Korean Peninsula) ("VIZH", No 2, 1996, p. 74). We read: "The 38th parallel is the dividing line between the Soviet and American zones for the surrender of Japanese troops, approved on the initiative of the United States [emphasis mine] in August 1945. It turned into the border between the DPRK formed in the north in September 1948 and proclaimed in South in August 1948 by the Republic of Korea". What

was the "initiative", the author does not specify. And this is understandable, since his opinion is based on the absence of a documentary description of the negotiations, which, in fact, should have been published. And this was partially done - in the 80s, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs published 6 volumes under the general title "SOVIET UNION AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945: Collection of documents". Of these, Volume 6 (1984) was entirely devoted to the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference. But in the entire 511-page volume on military negotiations there is only one paragraph, repeated twice: "During the Conference there were meetings of the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest." It turns out that after 40 years, their contents are still secret.

But only de facto governments with subordinate troops and economies can fight. At the end of 1945, there were no such people in Korea either in the north or in the south. Those. there was no one to fight. They had to be created. How was this process? Unlike the division of the country, it is known in more detail, since it took place before the eyes of the whole world, but even in the Soviet interpretation it has "blank spots". And only recently have more real comments begun to appear on the "cultivation" of future military adversaries.

It is quite natural that the Soviet military administration in its (northern) zone of occupation of Korea contributed to the creation of a structure of party and state power along the lines of the model that existed in those years in the Soviet Union. A large number of Soviet advisers, especially those of Korean nationality, were sent to North Korea. And gradually a society of "barracks socialism" began to be created in the north of the country with its command-administrative style of management, extreme centralism, restrictions on democracy (in the Western sense), and the creation of prerequisites for the emergence of a personality cult.

In particular, on October 10, 1945, the Orgburo was created.
Communist Party of Korea (commemorates the date of the establishment of the WPK).

February 1946 - the creation of VNKSK (Provisional People's Committee of North Korea) - the highest authority (without elections).

August 1946 - Unification of the CCP and the New People's Party (established in February 1946) into the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

February 1948 - The Korean People's Army is formed. March 1948 - at the 2nd Congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea, it was decided to create a revolutionary base in the country that could become the stronghold of all revolutionary forces in Korea. (By the way, the partisan separate actions of the Chinese Communists in Manchuria were also defined in Soviet literature as the creation of a "revolutionary base"). May 1948 - "contrary to the national aspirations of the Korean

people, the elections in South Korea were STAGED".

August 1948 - Elections were held for the Upper People's Assembly (UPC) of North Korea and a "so-called" republic was proclaimed in South Korea. Following this, on September 9, 1948, the VNS

North Korea proclaimed the formation of the DPRK and formed a government headed by Kim Il Sung. It

should be noted that back in 1945 the former allies set up a joint commission to prepare and create a unified Korean state. However, in the context of deep differences in approaches to the state structure of the future Korea, she was never able to develop an agreed upon procedure for unification. In particular, as it turns out, the American side could not agree with the Soviet understanding of the term "democracy" and, having a mechanical majority in the UN, referred to it the issue of preparing the elections, which were held in the south of the country. And what does the "national aspirations of the Korean people" have to do with it, if the Soviet and American sides did not come to an agreement on the elections?

March 1949 - an agreement was signed between the USSR and the DPRK on

cooperation. June 1949 - The United Democratic Patriotic Front (EDOF) was created. In 1949 and in 1950 he put forward proposals for peaceful unification. However, they were rejected by the South Korean authorities, "who sought to destroy the people's democratic system in the North by force of arms."

June 25, 1950 - the beginning of the war ("the South Korean military unleashed hostilities against the DPRK"). The Soviet side for many years adhered to the version that the troops of the Republic of Korea ("southerners") were the first to attack. It was based on two radio messages from Pyongyang on June 25, 1950. The first of them said that early in the morning of that day the South Korean army, numbering up to 10 divisions, made a surprise attack on the territory of North Korea along the entire line of the 38th parallel, and that it succeeded in invading into North Korean territory to a depth of 2 to 3 km. The second message informed about the counteroffensive of security (border) detachments together with units of the People's Army. The counteroffensive of the "northerners" turned out to be so powerful that three days later the "southerners" lost their capital, Seoul, and by the end of September, 95% of the country's territory was under the control of Pyongyang.

To this list of events, one can also add that Soviet troops were in the DPRK until December 25, 1948 ("HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945", volume 11, Moscow, 1980, p. 284).

And you can also dwell on the history of the Communist Party of Korea, which in 1945 was created for the second time. In Robert Conquest's book "GREAT TERROR" (Vol. 2, translated from English, Riga, "Rakstnieks", 1991), in the chapter on terror in the Communist International of the late 1930s, there are the following remarks:

"...Tito points out that there was a tendency in the Comintern to dissolve the entire Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as was done with the Communist Parties of Poland and

Korea..." (p. 234) to those few who had the good fortune to end up in a Polish prison and survive there, like Gomulka, people like President Bierut (formerly known as NKVD investigator Rutkovsky) or economic leader Mind, who had previously worked as a lecturer in one of the institutions of Central Asia..." (p. 236-237) "... Undoubtedly, Stalin believed that when necessary, he would be able to scrape together the required number of "leading comrades." As we

know, this happened in practice for several years later. In addition, the Polish communists of the old school, if they had survived, would certainly have reacted hostilely to the upcoming pact with Hitler's Germany and the division of Poland ... "(p. 238) In 1939, Stalin and Hitler divided Poland planning a war there. In 1945, he divided Korea with the Americans, planning a war there as well. The

"old guard" of the communist parties of Poland and Korea was liquidated no later than 1938, along with the parties themselves. Was Stalin already in 1938 preparing to divide Korea? Hardly. The reason, apparently, is different. Perhaps, according to the original plan (even before the war with the Germans), Stalin expected the capture of larger

territories than the result of 1945. Moreover, both in Europe and in Asia. Now they call Hitler an "icebreaker", but Japan could have played a similar role in Asia (by the way, the authors of the "Ryutin Platform" noted the "strange" attitude of the Stalinist leadership of the Comintern to aggressive Japanese actions in China in the early 1930s). It is quite possible that after the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe, Stalin was going to carry out the transfer of troops to the Far East and carry out the "liberation" of the countries occupied by Japan. And it's good for them

prepare "their" governments in advance. The "old guard" of the corresponding communist parties was dangerous for this business. Stalin needed people devoted to him personally, and not to the cause of the liberation of their countries. As for the Poles and Koreans, there were many of them living in the USSR: Poles - in Belarus, in Ukraine; and the Koreans - in the Amur region, in Primorye and on Sakhalin. Perhaps for this purpose, a Korean battalion was trained in the Soviet Army in the Far East (where the future leader of the new Korean communists, Kim Il Sung, served). But initially, apparently, Korea was not supposed to be divided. Until the end of 1941, the United States was not an adversary of Japan. But then life made strong changes in these plans. Most likely, the idea to divide Korea could have occurred to Stalin not earlier than the summer of 1944 (in connection with the planned negotiations with the allies regarding the post-war structure). But by the time of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, it was already there. So, they didn't have time to complete one war (in Europe), they didn't have time to start and finish another one (with Japan), but the "great fighter for

peace", Comrade Stalin, plans to prepare for the next war! To illustrate what has been said, one can cite an excerpt from an interview with a witness of those events, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the DPRK Kang San Ho (or Ivan Afanasyevich Kang) (OGONEK magazine, N: 1, Ja

"- In 1946, at the request of the Organizing Bureau of the Communist Party of North Korea, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks transferred a whole group of party workers of Korean nationality [who lived in the USSR] to permanent work in North Korea. Such requests were repeated three more times, so that, on very many key posts in the party and the state turned out to be Koreans sent by Stalin, and I was among them. A lot of Soviet Koreans remained in the DPRK in 1949, when the Soviet Army left it. We all took Korean citizenship and "turned" into members of the Labor Party North Korea. So, we could influence the situation in the party and in the country very seriously, which in the end was

done ... "As for South Korea, let's first consider a list of US-South Korean agreements. There were three of them: "On Finance and Property" (1948), "On Economic Assistance" (January 1950) and "On Mutual Defense" (August 1953).

It turns out a strange sequence of events: first, the South Korean military, trained by the Americans, unleashed a war, fought with them for three years, and only then a military agreement was concluded between them?!

The search for other data on South Korea unexpectedly led to a detailed description of the events in the DPRK of that time in the OGONEK magazine N: 25-26, June 1993. The article was called "SHOULD THIS BE FEARED?" (behind the scenes of the Korean War) and written by renowned military historian Dmitry Volkogonov. In addition, he also turned out to be the main speaker in the program "WAR IN KOREA", which aired on June 25, 1994 on the Ostankino TV channel. Volkogonov

reports that he was able to work with archival materials, judging by which the sequence of events differs sharply from the officially accepted up to that time. In particular, before the spring of 1949,

Kim Il Sung allegedly increasingly had the idea of a military unification of the country. 03/05/1949 Kim Il Sung

meets with Stalin in Moscow and discusses with him the idea of a military unification of Korea. According to some reports (for example, from the previously cited article "FORBIDDEN WAR" of the magazine "RODINA", No 5, 1990), Stalin was allegedly reluctant to agree to this decision, and could only promise political and moral help. But firstly, Kim Il Sung himself was at the head of the leadership of North Korea with great Soviet participation, and secondly, the types of Soviet assistance turned out to be almost limitless.

Throughout 1949, intensive deliveries from the USSR to the DPRK of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, and other military equipment took place.

On January 19, 1950, a message was sent to Stalin from the Soviet ambassador (and chief military adviser to Kim Il Sung), Colonel General Shtykov, that Kim Il Sung was asking him for permission to start a war with South Korea ("since he himself cannot start an offensive because he is a communist, a disciplined person, and Comrade Stalin's instructions are law for him").

01/30/1950 - From Stalin to Shtykov: "I received a message dated 01/19/50. Such a big deal needs preparation. The case must be organized in such a way that there is no big risk ..."

02/04/1950 - From Shtykov to Stalin: Kim Il Sung asks to speed up loan repayments, to open a new loan from the USSR for the purchase of weapons. And he asks for permission to increase the number of infantry

divisions to 10. 02/09/1950 - Stalin agrees to the preparation of a large-scale operation on the Korean Peninsula. Deliveries of Soviet military equipment and other property are being activated. At the headquarters of the Korean Army, with the participation of Soviet advisers, a plan for an offensive operation is being developed in deep secrecy.

05/14/1950 - Stalin's telegram to Beijing to Mao Zedong that "due to the changed international situation" he agrees with the proposal of the Koreans to begin unification. But he would like the Chinese and Koreans to make the final decision together. If the Chinese are against it, then this matter should be postponed. (Peking agreed). 05/30/1950 - Telegram

from Shtykov N: 408/410 "special, out of turn to Vyshinsky for instance" (i.e. for Stalin): Kim Il Sung reports that he approved the one developed by the chief of the general staff (together with the Soviet adviser Vasiliev) operational decision to attack. Organizational preparation ends by 1.06.1950. Of the 10 divisions, seven are ready for offensive operations. The General Staff proposes to start at the end of June for two reasons: firstly, the southerners can reveal the plan of the offensive, and secondly, in July the weather usually deteriorates, it rains and the offensive may slow down. In addition, the telegram contains another application for additional receipt of property and materials. Stalin's resolution: "On your N: 408/410, the authority approves your proposals. The receipt of medicines and oil will be accelerated." Indeed, on the map given in the 4th volume of the SVE

(insert to pp. 320-321), seven rifle divisions are marked along the line of the 38th parallel from the side of the "northerners" (see "Digest"). The placement of the other three is shown to the north. But why come across strange numbers: 12 sd, 13 sd, 15 sd? So, they were preparing not 10 divisions, but 15? By the way, veterans recalled something similar about 1941 (the fact that not all divisions were fully staffed). The following can be noted to this: firstly, during the war it is easier to complete a complete set than

start from scratch. And secondly, if all divisions are fully staffed, then the economy will collapse! (Besides, it will be too noticeable for the future enemy). On Sunday

06/25/1950 - the beginning of the war. Three days later, Seoul was captured by North Korean troops. In the first days of hostilities, more than 600,000 tons of bombs and more than 220,000 shells were dropped on the cities of South Korea. According to the government report of South Korea, the population of Seoul on 01/04/1951 amounted to 1,200,000 people, by

the end of the war - 500,000. These new facts fully confirm the version of the beginning of the war, which was followed by Western states. In particular, the US ambassador in Seoul reported to Washington on June 25, 1950, that early in the morning the 75,000-strong army of the North rushed across the 38th parallel, attacking six main points along it and landing amphibious assaults at two points on the east coast of South Korea. North Korean radio began immediately claiming that the attack was "defensive" and that South Korea was attempting to invade the North. Meanwhile, developing a swift offensive, the tank column of the KPA units advanced in the direction of Seoul, which was already occupied on June 28. (The data are taken from the previously cited article by V. Slavinsky in the journal "PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST").

06/30/1950 - Kim Il Sung (through Ambassador Shtykov) sends Stalin a large (on many pages) application for a huge amount of materials: cartridges, shells, cars, telephone coils, etc. Resolution: "Satisfy. Stalin." Until mid-September, the DPRK troops achieved great

operational success. It seemed that the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. But...

Here it is useful to stop and analyze something. Volkogonov periodically notes the presence of Soviet advisers in the leadership of the DPRK. They were there even when Kim Il Sung "has the idea" of a military unification. With her, he went to Moscow to meet with Stalin on March 5, 1949. Stalin approved. It is doubtful that Kim Il Sung would not have previously discussed this issue with Soviet advisers. Or maybe they hinted? By the way, Yugoslavia's unwillingness to listen to all the opinions of Soviet advisers and always consult with them became one of the main reasons for the confrontation between this country and the USSR in the late 1940s.

In addition, in the spring of 1949, work on the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb reached the finish line. As already noted above, in N: 33 of the OGONEK magazine for August 1993, memoirs of various leading physicists about that time are printed. The work on the atomic project was well led by L. Beria under constant control by Stalin. Moreover, Stalin periodically summoned one or another leading specialist. An interesting remark is given that at the beginning of 1949, Stalin asked whether it was possible to make not one atomic bomb, but two smaller ones from the materials obtained. They answered that it was impossible, because work is underway, incl. and taking into account the American experience (according to Fuchs). Why did Stalin need several atomic bombs already in 1949? The explosion of the first

Soviet atomic bomb took place in August 1949. Moreover, Academician Gol'danskii cites the following direct evidence (p. 23): "... I cannot but recall here how one of my friends (I will not name him), who was an active participant in the work on atomic weapons, in June 1950 year, when the Korean War began, he doubted that the appearance of Soviet atomic weapons contributed to the cause of peace. He perfectly understood that if we had not had the atomic bomb, there would have been no Korean war ... "

So, at the beginning of 1949, Stalin knows that the atomic bomb is almost ready and gives the go-ahead to Kim Il Sung to prepare an offensive. Throughout 1949 there were "intensive" military deliveries from the USSR to the DPRK. Soviet military advisers are working on a war plan in North Korea. But during the preparation, one interesting point arose, noted by Volkogonov. Korean ground units prepared without any special restrictions. What Kim Il Sung asked for, he got. But he asked Stalin, through Ambassador Shtykov, to strengthen the naval forces. Volkogonov writes that Kim Il Sung could have been reminded of this by Soviet advisers. Shtykov promised as usual, and then sent a request to Moscow. But suddenly he received a reprimand from Stalin that he (Shtykov) should remember whose interests he should defend - the USSR, and not Korea! Kim Il Sung complained that there were few ships. One from the USSR received, but without a crew. And he asked to send a few more with people, because deadlines are already running out, there is no time to train their sailors. But Stalin refused!

Volkogonov explains this by saying that "Stalin really does not want the United States, the UN, world public opinion to catch him in direct participation." But is this the only thing? What did Stalin refuse Kim Il Sung? In the preparation of naval forces, i.e. refused to use amphibious assaults! Ground forces - please! Arm seven divisions, ten - no problem! How about preparing an amphibious assault? IT IS FORBIDDEN! But Korea is a peninsula, an ideal theater for using both airborne and (especially) amphibious assaults!

And who refused - Stalin, who paid a lot of attention before 1941 to the training of air and naval paratroopers in the Soviet Army. The fact that airborne paratroopers were trained more is understandable, they were going to fight mainly on land. Moreover, they were preparing an offensive operation without other goals. That is why they paid so much attention to the landing troops.

And in Korea, a successfully used amphibious assault can dramatically change the situation in hostilities. The Soviet advisers should have understood this. Therefore, apparently, they tried to draw Kim Il Sung's attention to this. Moreover, the Japanese islands with US bases are nearby, filled with warships (American and Japanese prisoners). And so it

happened. We read from Volkogonov: [On Saturday] 09/16/1950, South Korean troops, together with the United States, launched a powerful counterattack. The operation included landing in the Inchon area [slightly south of the 38th parallel on the west coast] of a large amphibious assault, part of the US 10th Army Corps. At the same time, an offensive began from the Pusan bridgehead [the extreme southeast of South Korea]. The defense of the North Koreans was broken through and began to crumble. South Korean and US troops quickly moved north. Kim Il Sung's troops suffered a heavy defeat. They lost most of the artillery, tanks. American aviation dominated the air, destroying everything that moved. [Then Pyongyang and part of the DPRK were lost almost to the Chinese border]. N. S.

Khrushchev in his memoirs (OGONEK magazine, N: 1, January, 1991, pp. 27-28) writes about this as follows:

"But in the end, when Kim Il Sung's army approached Busan, had the courage to take it, and the war would have ended....

Alas, this did not happen. The enemy took advantage of the fact that Lee Syngman organized resistance in Busan and prepared troops for the landing. The landing force was landed, and very difficult conditions were created. Actually, the entire army that was in the south was cut off by this landing, and all the weapons that were there went to Lee Syngman The threat of a catastrophe loomed over North Korea "

On October 1, 1950, Ambassador Shtykov sent an urgent message from Kim Il Sung to Stalin (dated September 29, 1950), in which Kim Il Sung said that the DPRK would not be able to stop the troops of the United States and South Korea on its own.

In response, Stalin sends a request to Beijing, a "terrible" request. Volkogonov writes that he "breathes cold." Here is the quote:

"... Because of prestige, the United States may be drawn into a big war, and, consequently, China will be drawn into the war, and at the same time, the USSR, which is connected with China by a mutual assistance pact, will be drawn into the war. Should we be afraid of this? In my opinion, should not be, because together we will be stronger than the United States and England, and other capitalist European states without Germany, which cannot now provide the United States with any assistance, do not represent a serious military force. If war is inevitable, then let it be now, and not in a few years, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the United States ... "

Let us suppose that Stalin exaggerated a little about Japanese militarism. It is more possible that by doing this he wanted to make the Chinese more accommodating, especially since they did not very willingly decide to send "volunteers" to Korea. At first, Mao Zedong encouraged Stalin ("... of course, if you fight, then you need to fight now ... It is advisable to send not 5 - 6 divisions, but at least nine ..."). But then a message came to Moscow from Beijing that the Chinese leadership was still considering whether to send troops to Korea. Volkogonov writes that Moscow is worried. However, Beijing soon agreed. The offensive of the Chinese troops began on 10/25/1950 and continued until 07/09/1951. They liberated Pyongyang, once again took Seoul, Incheon, Wokju, and other cities. But then a new southern offensive followed, which was stopped at about the 38th parallel at the end of July of that year. With this, the dynamic period of the war ended. The front line almost froze until the very end of the war, making small fluctuations.

But the war was brutal. Both sides suffered heavy losses. According to the American press, it was the fourth largest war in US history. According to the article FORBIDDEN WAR (RODINA magazine, No 5, 1990), 9 million Koreans died in the Korean War, about 1 million Chinese (including the death of Mao Zedong's son), more than 50 thousand Americans and an unknown number of Soviet citizens. The materials of this article confirm that the war began at 4 o'clock in the morning with the artillery preparation of the North Korean troops, which lasted two hours. Then, the 100,000-strong North Korean army, supported by T-34 tanks, went on the attack and began to quickly move south. But then, after the American troops entered the war, the fierceness of the fighting grew. There is a telegram from Kim Il Sung to Stalin (Volkogonov did not indicate the date) in which it is reported that the

troops of the DPRK are losing 400-500 people daily. Stalin himself told Kim Il Sung in 1951 that peace negotiations should be initiated.

They started on 07/10/1951 in Kaesong. And they walked for a very long time. The Soviet media said that the Korean and Chinese sides sincerely want an end to the war as soon as possible, but the American generals allegedly do not want this. Moreover, it is known that during the negotiations the Americans periodically tried to repeat the offensive.

An interesting reason for the need for negotiations was expressed by D. Volkogonov in the book "TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY" (Kyiv, "Political Publishing House of Ukraine", 1990, volume 2, p. 498):

"After about 30 Chinese divisions [according to other sources there were more - 40] moved forward, the situation changed dramatically again. Chinese and North Korean troops not only liberated the territory north of the 38th parallel, but also advanced south to 100 km. The morale of the American troops and the military prestige of the United States by the middle of the summer of 1951 had noticeably fallen. ... the most responsible and unsafe moment had come. The Americans could not stand the defeat and could seize on the last, nuclear argument. Perhaps then, after 1945, this was the most obvious threat to the third US General MacArthur began to insistently demand the bombing of Manchuria. Truman made it clear that the use of

atomic weapons. ... Two long years of negotiations began, during which fierce fighting on the Korean Peninsula did not stop. American aviation dominated the air, Chinese volunteers dominated the ground." On September 19,

1952, Stalin met with Zhou Enlai in Moscow. Peace talks were discussed. But Stalin did not rule out the continuation of the war. He promised the Chinese to supply weapons for 60 Chinese infantry divisions. 20.08. In 1994, Radio Liberty broadcast a special broadcast from Washington on the change of leadership in the DPRK (after the death of Kim Il Sung). was an opponent of ending the Korean War at his very death, he died on March 5, 1953. A month later, in April 1953, the UN finally approved a resolution demanding an early truce in Korea, which was signed on July 27, 1953 between the

Supreme Commander army of the DPRK and the commander of the Chinese "People's Volunteers" on the one hand and the commander-in-chief of the United Nations forces on the other.

ended.

A passing question may arise here: why did the UN troops fight on the part of the "southerners"? It turns out that the decision to send them was taken at the Security Council! But the USSR is not only a member of the United Nations, but also a permanent member of the Security Council! Where was the Soviet representative (diplomat Y. Malik) looking? Why not use the veto? It turns out that he did not look anywhere and could not physically use the right of veto, because. From 01/13/1950 to August of the same year, there was NO Soviet representative in the UN Security Council! ("HISTORY OF THE USSR FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO OUR DAYS", volume 11, Moscow, "Nauka", 1980).

He was recalled "in protest against the refusal of the Western powers to restore China's rights in the UN." True, in August "he again took his seat in the Security Council" (nothing is said about the restoration of China's rights in the UN by this date). In the same "HISTORY OF THE USSR..." it is indicated that the United States achieved the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions accusing the DPRK of an armed attack on South Korea. For reference: at the same time in the

Yugoslavia was a non-permanent member, the relations of the USSR with which were tense, according to Yugoslav terminology - "an atmosphere of armed aggression was escalating" for which everything was prepared and which literally "was in the air" ("STALIN-TITO" Yu. S. Girenko, Moscow, "Politizdat, 1991). In the book "BASIC

INFORMATION ABOUT THE UN" (Moscow, "International Relations", 1991), a separate chapter is devoted to the Korean problem, which gives the following sequence of actions of this organization: 1947 - The question of Korea was first discussed

at the General Assembly, which unsuccessfully tried to achieve the creation unified Korean state through nationwide free elections. 1948 - After the proclamation of two governments in Korea

The General Assembly established its own Commission on it.

06/25/1950 - The United States and the Korean Commission informed the UN that the Republic of Korea had been attacked by the armed forces of North Korea this morning. A meeting of the Security Council took place. It declared this armed attack a violation of the peace and called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of North Korean troops beyond the 38th parallel.

06/27/1950 - In

connection with the continuation of hostilities, the Security Council recommended that the member states of the organization provide effective assistance to South Korea. The US said it had ordered its air force and navy to provide cover and support for the South Korean government's troops.

06/29/1950 the newspaper "IZVESTIA" published two

notes. The first one says that: Mr. Trygve Lee (general secretary of the organization at that time) sent a message to the leadership of the USSR about the decision of the Security Council on the Korean question of 06/27/1950, which notes "that an armed attack on the Republic of Korea by troops from North Korea is a violation of the peace. The UN Security Council called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, called on the North Korean authorities to immediately withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel. But the North Korean authorities did not stop hostilities and did not withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel parallels. In this regard, the Council

The UN Security Council recommends that the members of the UN provide the Republic of Korea with all assistance in repulsing aggression." The

second note is called "RESPONSE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO THE MESSAGE OF Mr. Tryugwe Li." It begins with the following words: "The Soviet government received from you the text of the resolution of the Security Council of June 27 with an appeal to the members of the UN about the need to interfere in Korean affairs in favor of the South Korean authorities." Then there is a justification for the incompetence of the Security Council to take decisions in the absence of representatives of the USSR and the PRC, which ends with a strange conclusion: "In view of the foregoing, it is quite obvious that the said decision of the Security Council on the Korean question is null and void."

And not a word about the fighting itself! What does it mean? How is the recognition of the fact that North Korean troops attacked South Korea? Or not at all? Maybe the information from the Soviet embassy in the DPRK was transmitted by train, which takes at least 8 days to Moscow?

Only on June 30, 1950, an article appeared in the Soviet central newspapers with the Soviet version of the beginning of the war. It is called "IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR". It says:

On June 27, 1950, the US Ambassador, Mr. A. Kirk, sent a memorandum to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko, containing a statement by the US Government urging them to influence the North Korean authorities to end the war (because the USSR refused to take part in meeting of the UN Security Council on June 25, 1950). 06/29/1950 A. Gromyko made the following statement to Mr. A. Kirk:

"In connection with the statement of the Government submitted by you on June 27 USA, the Soviet Government instructed me to state the following:

1. According to reliable information from the Soviet Government, the events taking place in Korea were provoked by an attack by troops of the South Korean authorities on the border regions of North Korea ...

2. The Soviet Government adheres to the principle of inadmissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.
3. It is not true that the Soviet Government

refused to participate in the meetings of the Security Council. It was impossible for the Soviet Government to take part in the meetings of the Soviet

Security Council, because, due to the position of the US Government, a permanent member of the Security Council - China is not admitted to the Council, which made it impossible for the Security Council to make decisions that

have legal force. "Between 06/27/50 and 07/07/50, the United States ordered the use of ground troops that landed on Busan (south coast of Korea) on July 2 - "the beginning of the intervention" - as it is said in the legend to the map in the 4th volume of the SVE.

On July 4, 1950, an article by A. Gromyko appeared in the Izvestia newspaper under the heading: "ABOUT THE AMERICAN ARMED INTERVENTION IN KOREA." But it was still too early for the Soviet representative to appear on the Security

Council. 07/07/50 - The Security Council decided to ask all member states of this organization to place their armed forces at the disposal of the unified command under the leadership of the United States (to which the troops of South Korea were also subordinate). He is allowed to use the UN flag. Subsequently, 16 states sent their armed forces to this call, and 5 - medical units. American General Douglas MacArthur (removed in April 1951 by H. Truman for failures in the war) was appointed commander of the UN troops in Korea. As already mentioned in the quotations, the USSR and the PRC considered

the decisions of the Security Council to be illegal. About the fact that the Soviet representative was not in it, the book "BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE UN" says only that he was absent for 6 months (without specifying the reason). For some reason, "a sign of protest against the refusal of the Western powers to restore the rights of China" does not come to mind. China has been a member of the United Nations since 10/24/1945, but before the 10/25/1971 resolution, there were representatives of the Republic on Taiwan (the government of Chiang Kai-shek) in the UN, and only after it - the PRC. However, the Soviet representative returned to the Security Council on August 2, 1950, without waiting for the restoration of the rights of the PRC (but after the expansion of the war in Korea and the adoption of the main decisions by the Council)! On August 8, 1950, he proposed a draft resolution to end the war, but it was rejected by the United States. By

the way, A. Gromyko in his memoirs "MEMORY" (Book One, Moscow, 1988, p. 207) reports that he offered Stalin

take part in the meetings of the Security Council in order to be able to use the right of veto on any decision that could complicate the course of the war in Korea, but Stalin rejected it! Strange! It turns out that he was not interested in the problem of rapid unification of the country.

"Blitzkrieg" did not suit him! For a

better understanding of the withdrawal of the Soviet representative from the Security Council, it is useful to become more familiar with his capabilities. The book quoted above ("UN BASIC FACTS") states that the Security Council, under the Charter, bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council consists of 15 members: 5 permanent (China, USSR, UK, USA and France), and 10 elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. Decisions require 9 votes, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Council. This is the "great power unanimity" rule, often referred to as "veto". If a permanent member does not support a decision but does not want to block it by vetoing it, it may abstain from voting. While other UN bodies make recommendations to governments, the Council alone has the power to make decisions that Member States are bound by the Charter to comply with.

However, in November 1950, apparently in connection with the problems of resolving the war in Korea, the main deliberative body of the UN - the General Assembly adopted the resolution "Unity for Peace", according to which, in the event of a threat to peace or an act of aggression, it was given the right to take action if The Security Council cannot do anything because of the lack of unity among its permanent members (moreover, the USSR began to

consider it illegal). Thus, the best option for Stalin was the temporary recall of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council. Only in this case could the Soviet Union try to maintain the image of itself as an "uncompromising fighter for peace" (with the expansion of the war itself in Korea). Otherwise, we would have to vote for a resolution that would have stopped this war much earlier. Or it was possible to abstain from voting, showing the whole world ... that the USSR AGREED TO WAR?!

But its quick end, apparently, was not part of Stalin's plans, because after his appearance in the Security Council, the representative of the USSR began to offer such options for ending the war in Korea that could not be accepted by the UN either because of the changed interests of the countries participating in the conflict, or due to linking them with other requirements. For example, in November 1951, "The Soviet Union came up with a new peace initiative, proposing to the VI session of the UN General Assembly to take an important decision "On measures against the threat of a new world war and on strengthening peace and friendship between peoples" ("History of the Ukrainian SSR, vol. 9, Kiev, 1985, pp. 254-255). But in it, the proposal to immediately stop the war in Korea and withdraw all foreign troops from there came as an addition to more "global" problems: the complete prohibition of atomic weapons, the reduction by one third within a year of the armed forces of the states members of the Security Council, etc. Moreover, the proposals of the USSR on a peaceful settlement of the war in Korea were supported by representatives of the BSSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland. How did she get into this group? Because the president/head of government (B. Bierut) and his deputy (K.K. Rokossovsky) were people of the USSR? But as soon as Stalin died, a month later the UN was still able to approve a resolution

The actions of the United Nations lead to another reflection. The troops of the united nations launched an offensive on September 16, 1950. Resolutions were adopted in the absence of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, i.e. late June early July 1950. There were about two months left before the onset. How were the troops supposed to behave, knowing about the upcoming attack on them? On the Kursk Bulge, they prepared for defense, dug into the ground, created a reserve front in the rear. And in Korea? "Until mid-September, the troops of the DPRK achieved great operational successes. Stalin sent congratulations. It seemed that the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion" (Volkogonov). Could Stalin send a warning to Kim Il Sung that the US is gathering troops from all over the world and is about to strike? For some reason, historians like to recall Churchill's "warnings" in 1941. What prevented Stalin from warning Kim Il Sung? Actually, the latter himself could read the UN resolutions, or were

they hidden from him? Of course, it cannot be said that Soviet troops did not participate in the Korean War. It is known from various sources that in November

Stalin sent the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps with anti-aircraft artillery units to the DPRK. It consisted of five divisions: two aviation fighter, two anti-aircraft and one auxiliary. They were located in the DPRK, but also used Chinese airfields. Volkogonov says that the troops in the corps were constantly changing (usually every 5-6 months). The goal of gaining combat experience was also pursued. The uniform was of the Chinese People's Army. The pilots learned Korean, but almost all radio communications were conducted in Russian. The Americans then recorded such radio communications, but they were told that anything could be recorded, and not a single Soviet pilot was taken prisoner. The corps was commanded by Generals Belov and Slyusarev. 35 pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The commander of one aviation regiment, Colonel Pepelyaev, shot down 19 aircraft. During the entire war, 1309 American aircraft were shot down (according to Soviet data). Soviet troops lost 351 aircraft, 311 pilots died.

So let's sum up the results. It turns out that the offensive of the DPRK troops was not prepared with the aim of quickly and completely capturing South Korea with its subsequent retention. Firstly, sufficient naval forces, both combat and amphibious, were not prepared. SUCH IN THE WAR ON THE PENINSULES AND ISLANDS IN THE OCEAN IS UNACCEPTABLE! Soviet military advisers understood this, but Stalin himself FORBIDDEN IT!

Second, for some reason, intelligence either did not work well, or the protection of the coast in the rear was poorly organized. Perhaps both. Otherwise, how to explain that the US troops carried out an amphibious assault of the WHOLE CORPORATION in the rear of the DPRK troops? Moreover, the reality of the offensive of the UN troops was announced IN ADVANCE (two months in advance)!

Incidentally, the landing of large amphibious assault forces is a complex and responsible matter. The ground forces have a concept - a "tank-dangerous direction." The commander of any rank, when organizing a defense, is OBLIGED to determine it in the first place with the appropriate allocation of forces and means (minefields, other barriers, anti-tank artillery, grenade launchers, etc.). When protecting the coast, it is also useful to identify "airborne" places. Not the entire coastline may be suitable for this. In one place there is a steep coast, in another - swamps and no roads, in the third - shoals. Except

In addition, it is necessary to take into account the tides, the weather, the distance to the starting bases, the location of the strongholds of the troops, etc.

In Korea, the eastern coast is the slope of a mountain range with heights up to 1.6 km. Tanks have nowhere to turn around. Flat area - from the west. In the same place, just south of the 38th parallel, there is the port of Incheon (since the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, it has been better known in Europe as "Chempulpo"). US troops landed at Inchon in 1945. Could they have carried out reconnaissance of the rest of the coast with a view to a possible landing in the future? Hardly. South Korea went to them almost unexpectedly, one might say, for nothing. A gift horse, as you know, "do not look in the mouth." Moreover, the US troops had to leave Korea. And they didn't expect attacks at all (what's the point if they already "gave away" ALL Korea in 1945)?

I. A. Kan says in his memoirs that the Americans did not really care about the defense of South Korea: (OGONEK magazine, N: 1, January, 1991, p. 25-27): "- June 28

(1950 years) I came to the border county of Hwachen [Hwacheon? hereinafter, the names used in the "ATLAS OF THE WORLD" are indicated in brackets. The Korean language is very rich in shades of sounds and errors are possible when perceiving by ear]. To be honest, I was quite puzzled by the complete the absence of traces of hostilities on the northern bank of the Hwachen [Hwacheon?] River, along which the demarcation line passed. On our side there was no destruction, no craters from exploding shells or mines, not a single one killed or wounded?! South Korea began on the other side. I went to the city of Chunchen [Chuncheon?], the center of South Gangwon Province [Gangwon-do?], which had just been liberated by our valiant troops, and as I moved south, I increasingly began to come across the destroyed military installations of the southerners, apparently, taken by surprise - here and there were cannons with full ammunition, dozens of uncleaned corpses of soldiers of the South Korean army lay ... - having evacuated all his troops from South Korea with the exception of a single division, the commander of which - Ting [maybe - Ding?] - was also captured by everything ?!"

So, where could the Americans land in 1950? First, somewhere on the west coast of Korea. Secondly, somewhere in the rear of the advancing troops of the DPRK. Thirdly, in a place that in many respects is suitable for the landing of a large mass of troops. For example, a landed corps consists of several divisions (at least two) with other auxiliary units and subunits (such as an anti-aircraft regiment, etc.). Such the best place, of course, is the port of Incheon (Chempulpo). Where the landing was made. In the "Military

Encyclopedic Dictionary" (Moscow, "Voenizdat", 1983) in the section on the "Incheon landing operation" the following data is given: the landing American troops as part of the 10th Army Corps numbered 70 thousand people. There were 3,000 North Korean troops in the port. The landing date is given as September 15, 1950 (Friday). Taking the Soviet system of wartime states, the ratio is about a few divisions (in the United States) against 2 regiments (in the DPRK). The dictionary goes on to say that the Americans captured Inchon and launched an attack on Seoul, which is located near Incheon to the east. The soldiers of the Korean People's Army (KPA), together with the inhabitants of Seoul, heroically defended themselves for two weeks (until September 28, 1951). During this time, the KPA command was able to withdraw the main forces of the army from the south to the north.

However, N. Khrushchev cites a different opinion: "the landing force was landed, and very difficult conditions were created. Actually, the entire army that was in the south was cut off by this landing party and all the weapons that were there went to Syngman Lee The threat of catastrophe looms over North Korea."

Who is right? By the way, already from the first operations of the Nazi Wehrmacht, the main tactics of the troops were attempts to flank outflank strongly defending strongholds (i.e., attempts to create "cauldrons"). There is no point in "laying down" your troops when "gnawing through" the enemy's defense lines, if there are "gaps" along their edges. At the same time, fighting in a big city is difficult in any case. For example, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Sergeant Pavlov and soldiers held one house for 58 days. It is hard to believe that the Americans did not let part of the troops into Seoul.

Anyway, back to the Inchon US amphibious landings. As indicated in the "dictionary", there were troops of the DPRK in Inchon. But this

only 2 regiments. And another question - what. Regiment regiment strife. The results show that effective defense in Inchon was not organized. Why? Did the Soviet military advisers not understand this? Perhaps they understood, but before the start of the war, ALL of them were withdrawn! N. S. Khrushchev speaks about this in his memoirs (OGONEK magazine, N: 1, January, 1991, pp.

27-28): "It was completely incomprehensible to me why Stalin recalled all our advisers who were in divisions ", and maybe in the regiments, when Kim Il Sung was preparing for the campaign. He recalled all the advisers who advised and helped build the army. I then told Stalin about this, and he reacted very hostilely to my remark: "No need. They may be captured. We don't want to have evidence to accuse us of being involved in this case. This is Kim Il Sung's business." Thus, our advisers were not there. This put the army in difficult conditions. I very sympathized with Kim Il Sung and again suggested to Stalin: "Comrade Stalin, why don't we provide more qualified assistance in the form of advice to Kim Il Sen? ... Here is Malinovsky. He now commands the Far Eastern Military District. Why not imprison Malinovsky somewhere in Korea right now so that he incognito develops military operations, gives instructions and thereby assists Kim Il Sung? Stalin reacted very sharply to my remarks. I was amazed: after all, Stalin blessed Kim Il Sung, did not restrain him on this path." Indeed, it is strange. Let us recall what Stalin wrote on January 30, 1950 to Ambassador

Shtykov: "... Such a big deal needs preparation. The matter must be organized in such a way that there is no great risk ... "That is, how? In order to quickly and without any problems capture South Korea? The war must be organized in the form of a " blitzkrieg "? But then where does the threat of encirclement come from? small - to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula from the 38th parallel about 450 km. Who could surround the headquarters of the advancing troops? This could be done only by using a large amphibious assault in the rear of the advancing. South Korean troops were not ready for this! Their military naval forces once, long after the start of the war, accounted for less than 14.1% of all those participating in the war. And for the landing of divisions, large landing ships with a multitude of at least

large warships of protection and escort. It turns out that Stalin assumed or hoped in advance that the troops of the DPRK would be surrounded by someone? By whom?

The absence of Soviet military advisers in the troops of the DPRK at the beginning of the war is also evidenced by Kim Il Sung's telegram to Stalin dated 07/08/1950. In it, he thanks Stalin for his help and asks for permission to use 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the headquarters of the front of the Korean army and the headquarters of army groups. Stalin allows, but specifies that they be in civilian uniform and as correspondents for the newspaper Pravda. However, judging by Khrushchev's data, Stalin did not really want the presence of Soviet advisers in the DPRK army. There was no need to hurry with their departure. Be that as it may, whether they appeared at Kim Il Sung or not, the Americans were able to successfully land on 09/16/1950. Third, the Soviet representative was removed from

the UN Security Council, which opened the way for other countries, especially the United States, to enter the war more quickly. Stalin may well have feared that the Americans alone would not dare to enter the battle on the side of South Korea. Lure tactics? Some data on the role of the United States in this war

Stalin, is in the memoirs of N. S. Khrushchev. He writes: "It

seems that in 1950, ... or a little earlier [more precisely, in March 1949], Kim Il Sung came to Moscow with his delegation. He had a conversation with Stalin and there raised the question of what they would like probing South Korea with a bayonet ... Kim Il Sung reported to Stalin and was completely confident in the success of this matter. I remember Stalin then expressed doubts: he was worried about whether America would get involved or whether she would let it fall on deaf ears...."

And the possibility of the United States refusing to participate in the war was. Khrushchev, while reminiscing about the course of the fighting, writes that "then the American press said that if Busan had been occupied on the move, then it had allegedly been decided not to interfere with the US armed forces. But this did

not happen." So, Stalin was very worried about the decision of the Americans! But this concern can be of one of two types: "God forbid the US gets involved, and the capture of South Korea may not work out!" or: "God forbid the US DOES NOT GET INVOLVED, and the whole plan to carve up Korea will go to v

Which of them worried Stalin? If the former, then why was it necessary to divide Korea back in 1945? It turns out that worried about the second?! And to lure the Americans, a Soviet delegate was removed from the UN Security Council? And to facilitate the landing of American troops, were Soviet military advisers recalled? Let's remember how Stalin reacted to Khrushchev's questions and proposals? - "very hostile", "very sharp"! In other words - "do not interfere!", "It's my business!". But when the Americans "got involved" very well, even began to approach the borders of China and the USSR, Stalin even calmed down somewhere [according to Khrushchev's

memoirs]: "- I remember very well how Stalin, in connection with an exchange of views on the situation that had developed in Northern Korea, said: "Well, what? Let them now be our neighbors in the US Far East. They will come there, but we will not fight with them now. We are not ready to fight." (And no "hostile" or "acute" reaction! Thus, as if saying: "Don't worry, everything is going according to plan").

However, Volkogonov notes that Moscow became agitated when the Chinese delayed their entry into the war. Comparing this fact and Khrushchev's recollection above, one can assume that Stalin had two plans for the war in Korea: a minimum plan (to lure the Americans into the war) and a maximum plan (to lure the Chinese into it as well). Although, for Stalin, China's delay in its entry into the war could have been unexpected, because. The Chinese have been involved in it from the very beginning. This is evidenced in his memoirs by I.A. Kang: (OGONEK magazine, N: 1, January, 1991, p. 25-27): "... At that time I worked

as deputy chairman of the Committee of the WPK of Gangwon Province [Kangwon-do ?]. In May 1950, I went on a business trip to Yeoncheon [Icheon?] county. Here, in the immediate vicinity of the 38th parallel, two divisions, consisting of military personnel exclusively of Korean nationality, had just been introduced from China. Fourth, why did active

hostilities with large movements of troops take place practically only in the first year of the war, and then TWO years of local battles? The Americans, apparently, were not particularly eager to capture North Korea (because of the proximity of the USSR and China, and if they enter the war with full rights?).

Kim Il Sung, without the consent of Stalin, could not negotiate. And Stalin himself cannot decide whether to conclude a peace treaty or continue the war (when meeting with Zhou Enlai).

But war is a very costly business. However, Stalin's decision to start a war in Korea, and then dragging out negotiations for two long years, suggests that he gave her an important place in his plans.

Which? In the article "PROHIBITED WAR"

some possible reasons are expressed: firstly, to make the Chinese leader Mao Zedong more obedient after China is directly involved in the war with the United States. And this, of course, forced the Chinese not to abandon the alliance with the USSR. Secondly, the focus of the war in Asia could help Stalin to consolidate his influence on the communist leadership of the Eastern European countries, making them more obedient because of the threat of a war between the West and the Soviet troops stationed in these countries. Moreover, due to the very performance of hostilities by the Western allies in Korea (ie, due to their heavy losses thousands of kilometers from Europe), their possible assistance to the leaders of the Eastern European countries became much less. But these are not

all possible reasons, more precisely, these are not the main reasons for the war in Korea. At a secret meeting without protocols, Stalin said: "We are NOT READY to fight"! What did he mean by this? Not ready, but getting ready? What will happen when the training is over? And then, what does "we" have to do with it if Korea is at war?

It has already been said above (in the chapter on post-war aviation) that from the end of December a new problem arose for Stalin - the UNREADINESS of long-range piston bombers for modern warfare. The fact that Soviet pilots successfully shot down American B-29s was good news for the North Koreans. But this was a clear example of the fate of the Soviet Tu-4 and Tu-85, then the war between the USSR and the USA began. And judging by the correspondence between Moscow and Beijing, Stalin originally planned to start a war with the United States somewhere at the beginning of 1951. Moreover, according to the magazine "AVIATION AND TIME" (No 5, 1996), at the end of the 40s, the Soviet military seriously considered options for one-way combat flights of piston bombers to the United States, after which the crews had to leave the aircraft in

a given area of the ocean, where they were supposed to be picked up by submarines. But it must be said right away that such flights could be extremely risky for pilots. And not only because of American air defense hope of systems. Too counter-problematic could be the submarines. American experts believed that out of their total number (335 pieces), only 9 former German ones were able to perform tasks in the world's oceans (due to the presence of a snorkel - a device for operating an engine under water). And if we take into account the widespread use of aircraft carriers with the latest radar equipment by the American navy, then its counteraction to Soviet submarines could be very successful. But this did not stop Stalin, but, as already discussed earlier, he was frightened by

the statistics of air battles that arose in the period from December 1950 to early February 1951. He apparently decided to watch their further progress. And by mid-February 1951, no matter how difficult it was for him, Stalin was forced to abandon the idea of starting a war with the United States and its allies. In particular, he himself stated this in an "interview" with a faceless correspondent of the newspaper "PRAVDA" on February 17 of that year.

To the question of a "correspondent": "Do you consider a new world war inevitable?" he replied: "No. At least at the present time it cannot be considered inevitable ...". At the same time, the level of "unbridled" propaganda of the USSR's struggle for peace decreased and other events took place, indicating that Stalin refused to start a new world war in 1951. As for

his readiness to start a war in 1951, there is also a message on pages 380-381 in Giuseppe Boff's book "HISTORY OF THE SOVIET UNION" (volume 2, 1941-1964: Translated from Italian, M. - "International Relations", 1990):

Meanwhile, Stalin took a number of steps, due to which it became increasingly difficult to avoid starting a war. In January 1951, he personally participated in a conference in which the entire staff of the General Staff and the ministers of defense of the European countries of people's democracy were involved; it analyzed the state of readiness of the armed forces of these countries. Stalin argued at this meeting that you can only count on 3-4 years

respite; he saw in the war in Korea only the first test of strength, in which two opponents mutually try on. In conclusion, a secret agreement was signed, according to which the allies of the USSR pledged to transfer their armies under direct Soviet command in the event of a war. (The book says that this secret meeting became known from the Czechoslovak historian Kaplan, who reported it on the basis of reliable documents) Could there have been such a meeting or not? Let's say it was. And in

the course of events, it generally SHOULD BE. By the way, General D. Volkogonov found Stalin's telegram to Beijing with the consent to start a war, without even waiting for 3-4 years of "respite"! Something familiar! Again we are talking about some kind of "respite"? About the possible start of the war "not earlier than 1942"? And prepared for what? Note the dates: in January 1951, Stalin still agreed to

start a war. And on February 17, on the front page of the newspaper, Stalin's interview with a Pravda correspondent was printed, in which he stated that he did not consider a new world war inevitable, "at least at the present time." Oh, and difficult decisions had to be made by Stalin this month! Such preparation failed! But he was forced (for the happiness of all "progressive" and other mankind). And the "younger" draft age, who had been kept since the time of the last war, went home from the Soviet Army! (Father said that the returning guys rested for a long time, "ride bicycles"). But Stalin did not stop the war in Korea. And until his death, he did not give consent to the signing of a peace treaty. This shows that he

did not refuse a new world war. But in the changed conditions, he no longer needed an active war in Korea. It was decided to temporarily "quench" it. That is why he proposed to hold negotiations, but in such a way that they drag on as long as possible, best of all - indefinitely, until the right moment comes.

But he never came. With the death of Stalin, the reasons for delaying the negotiations disappeared, which made it possible to sign a truce in July

1953. In addition, apparently, other reasons also worked. In the USSR, the creation of a strategic bomber was delayed, and the United States

were preparing for serial production of their B-52 bomber, which began in 1954. In general, the North Korean attack on South Korea greatly frightened not only the United States, but also the countries of Western Europe and Canada. They began to more actively create joint defense systems. In addition, due to the rapid progress of strategic areas of technology, especially nuclear missile weapons, a moment could come when it would be madness to start a new world war. Therefore, it was dangerous to drag out the Korean conflict too much by Stalin's heirs.

But Stalin himself did not stop the war in Korea, although every month of delay worsened the strategic balance of power between the USSR and the USA with their allies. And under these conditions, any local war is useful, for example, as a means of destroying American aircraft and other military equipment, as well as their allies.

Indeed, in the early 1950s, there were no hostilities between the USSR and the United States, and the United States was already losing hundreds of combat aircraft. Including long-range bombers, previously released by the thousands in England and the USA. In addition, many other service aviation and naval forces were also distracted. For unceasing dominance in the air, a large consumption of both ammunition and oil products is required, which must be imported somewhere. Not to mention the ground forces. By the way, in the 13th volume of the "BSE" it is said that among the troops of the "southerners" the US troops were (it is not indicated at what stage of the war):

by land forces - 50.3% (over 1 million people; up to 1,000 tanks) by naval

forces - 85.9% (more than 200 ships) by air forces

- 93.4% (more than 1,600 aircraft; committed 104,078 sorties)

(Notes ENCYCLOPEDIA,

1976)

taken

from "SOVIET MILITARY

Reverse calculation shows

that the troops of the "South Korean military, who planned and carried out an attack on the DPRK", and then in a short time retreated almost to the southern coast of their country, among the troops of the "southerners" sometime later (when the Americans recaptured South Korea and mobilized?) amounted to no more: in terms of ground forces

- 49.7%

for naval forces - 14.1%;

for air forces - 6.6%. the

troops of 16 more states participated in the war. This, in particular, is mentioned in various memoirs of former participants in those events. For example, the former Soviet pilot B.S. Abakumov, already mentioned in the chapter on aircraft, cites information that pilots from different countries (for example, England or Australia) were captured by them. Many of them were natural mercenaries who signed special contracts for a certain number of sorties. But they were distinguished by their ability to conduct air battles. Assessing the skill of the enemy, Abakumov makes the assumption that the former pilots of the Nazi Luftwaffe were the best at maneuvering. It is possible that another goal of the ongoing Korean War was to study the combat experience of using new military equipment.

After all, before it, the USSR continued to develop and manufacture not only piston bombers, but also piston fighters (La-11). Only air battles in Korea showed that it was necessary to immediately switch to jet aircraft. And besides, the battles had an impact not only on equipment, but also on people. And it's one thing to beat out the aggressor somewhere near Kursk, and another thing is to

voluntarily die thousands of kilometers from home, and even in conditions of physical overload. It has already been said above that the troops of the Soviet Fighter Aviation Corps in Korea were constantly changing. The purpose of the replacement was to gain combat experience. But some veterans in their memoirs note that when changing pilots, they usually did not share their experience with newcomers, and this negatively affected the results of the battles. And Lieutenant Colonel B. Abakumov also mentions the medical reason for returning to the USSR - the occurrence of pain in the heart of the pilots. For this reason, in October 1951, the doctors suggested that he return home. But the command asked to stay until the imminent official replacement. He agreed, but flew with "medical support" - every day he was injected with intravenous glucose and injected alternately with strychnine and arsenic. But this is important! In Korea, it was still possible to indoctrinate about the aggressiveness of the American

imperialism. But if a war broke out directly between the USSR and the USA, then it could not end quickly under those conditions. The battles were supposed to take place almost all over the globe. And here the question is, how much would the soldiers have enough personal desire to fight. And it would not require a very large "medical support", which would also have to be prepared. On this topic, American filmmakers even staged

a feature film - "NUCLEAR DAWN". Although the action in it was invented for the conditions of the widespread use of rocket weapons, strategic bombers also went into battle. And the main meaning of the picture is not showing military strikes from both sides, but how soldiers, officers, generals and senior leadership behave. In particular, many actors (moreover, American ones), realizing the fatality of nuclear war for the entire planet, are trying to stop it by their non-participation or refusal to carry out combat orders. Stalin could not allow this in the implementation of his plans. Accordingly, he had to work out the ideological training of the performers - the troops. Some of this will be discussed further. And here I propose to pay attention to one more circumstance connected with the war in Korea, but already in theoretical terms. The case concerns the term "provocation". Soviet ideologists have long assured the world community that this war arose because of South Korea's unwillingness to negotiate unification and because its leaders staged various provocations pushed by the US

imperialists. Which, allegedly, sought to create a hotbed of tension on the Korean peninsula.

And the Americans, in turn, (and not only them) saw the actions of the Soviet Union as a threat to the whole world. So who provoked whom and why? The following

chapter is devoted to reflections on this subject with a completely unexpected development.

5. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF

PROVOCATIONS Almost all the time of the existence of the USSR, the basic, constantly repeated idea of Soviet ideologists was the idea of the need to fight for peace. At the same time, it was explained that the opponents of peace only

they do that they are hatching plans for a new war, they want to unleash it as quickly as possible, and for this they arrange various provocations. But you can't succumb to them and you must fight back. And so that the provocations do not develop into a new world war, it is necessary to strengthen the Soviet armed forces in

every possible way. However, after the collapse of socialism, the number of "warmongers" for some reason sharply decreased. And the term itself has practically disappeared from everyday life. Only occasionally in international surveys are individual totalitarian states mentioned. This allows a more sober look at the actions of the Soviet Union itself. Including from the point of view of the fight against provocations.

The previous chapter dealt with the Korean War and its background. It turned out that its main goal was not at all the need to unite the North and the South, but something else. And although a variant of its explanation has already been given, this idea has not yet been officially recognized. Officially, more attention was paid to the fact that the war in Korea had sharply increased international tension and brought the world to the brink of catastrophe. And the beginning of the war, Soviet ideologists and officials persistently associated with the provocations of the South Korean military. This topic was also widely used in the documents of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, incl. in the speeches of Minister A. Vyshinsky himself at the UN. Moreover, it was especially emphasized that the South Korean leaders were pushed by the imperialists of the

United States. And it should be noted that the provocations of the South Koreans still took place. But, as various recent publications show, the situation in those years was not so simple. In particular, a fairly detailed analysis of US attitudes towards the problems of East Asia in the late 40s is given in the article "KOREAN WAR 1950-53: A MODERN RETHINKING" in the journal "PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST", No 2, 1991. Its author is the deputy chief editor of the magazine B. Slavinsky.

It turns out that by 1950 the American government had come up with the idea of recognizing the US "defense perimeter" in the Pacific along the line from the Aleutian Islands through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. This indicates that in the leading circles of Washington in those

over the years, a conviction has been formed that it is necessary to refuse involvement in affairs on the East Asian mainland. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCHN) recommended the withdrawal of troops from South Korea, which was done by Washington in June 1949. Only 500 advisers remained there. The American leadership at that time paid more attention to the threat of the defeat of the Chiang Kai-shek regime on the island of Formosa (Taiwan), and the legal consolidation of the presence of American troops in Japan. These questions were devoted to the January and June 1950 meetings of the top military command of the Pentagon and the US State Department, held both in Japan and in Washington.

And in the Soviet Union for a long time it was believed that they were considering plans to unleash the Korean War. Those. they were cited as proof of the provocative activities of US imperialism. In fact, the Americans, on the contrary, sought to restrain Lee Syng-man's attempts to artificially maintain tension on the Korean Peninsula, who understood that without American military assistance, his regime could collapse. Neighboring China provided a clear example of this outcome. Therefore, Syngman Rhee vehemently opposed the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. And when they were nevertheless withdrawn in June 1949, the South Korean leader tried in every possible way to draw the attention of the United States to the situation in Korea and, to this end, authorized hundreds of armed provocations in the region of the 38th parallel, which could potentially draw the United States into the war in addition to their

desires.

To avoid undesirable developments on the Korean Peninsula, the Americans were forced to promise additional economic and military assistance to Seoul. It was for this purpose that J. Dulles visited South Korea in June 1950. On the very eve of the Korean War (June 18, 1950), he visited the region of the 38th parallel. And Soviet ideologists explained this trip of Dulles for a long time by checking the readiness of South Korean troops to attack the DPRK and discussed with great care the topic of provocations by the South Korean military, which was blamed for starting the war.

But as the materials of the previous chapter have shown, the ENTIRE Korean War can be seen as a major provocation at a higher level of international politics. Did the

Americans understand this? And if so, why did they let themselves be dragged into this conflict? On the one hand, they understood. For example, in the article "FORBIDDEN WAR" (magazine "RODINA", No 5, 1990, author - S. Volovets), the words of the former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, said by him at a meeting in the Pentagon on December 3, 1950,

are quoted: "The strongest the headache is that we are fighting a front country. Our real enemy is the Soviet Union, and we are fighting a secondary enemy. If we continue to fight the Chinese Communists, how much energy will we have left to confront the USSR, which receives everything from this war benefits? If we continue to waste strength and resources in a war with the Chinese, we will not be able to strengthen our defenses in Europe."

But then why didn't the Americans refuse to participate in the Korean events? First, by 1950 their policy in China had collapsed, which was painfully perceived by the American leadership. Under these conditions, further retreats could hurt the prestige of the Washington administration. Secondly, let us turn to the interpretation of the word "provocation". In the 3rd volume of the "DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE" (M., 1984) it is explained as "incitement, inducement of someone (individuals, groups, organizations, etc. [government leaders?]) to such actions that will entail severe, disastrous consequences for them (military provocation). "The United States was well aware that the leaders of the DPRK coordinated all their actions

with Stalin, so Washington turned to Moscow with a request to influence the

leaders of the DPRK to stop their offensive. Moscow officially replied that, according to its information, it was an internal affair of the Koreans to intervene in which she does not want. This answer went through international channels. What was left for the Americans to do?

Stop all actions against Korea? And this after the collapse of American policy in China? Or try to somehow stop the outbreak of the war, using, for example, the means of the UN?

By the way, the UN was obliged to respond to the outbreak of war in accordance with its statutory provisions! And in such a way as to stop military operations and move on to peace negotiations. But there is no Soviet representative in the Security Council (UNSC)! Under these conditions, the solution could only be the one proposed by the United States. The Americans could offer one of two things: Refuse to participate

in Korean events altogether (and suffer yet another foreign policy defeat). Or accept a series of appeals aimed at ending

the war and organize assistance to the government of South Korea, while becoming a direct participant in those events. In fact, the second option was adopted, and the UN Security Council approved it. How

should the Soviet Union have reacted? One could join the decision of the Security Council and influence Kim Il Sung so that he gave the order to stop the offensive and withdraw his troops north of the 38th parallel. Or at least keep silent, since the war in Korea is an internal affair of the Koreans. But why, then, was it necessary to start all this, including the division of Korea itself in the summer of 1945?

Therefore, Stalin acted differently. Through the Soviet Foreign Ministry, he accused the UN Security Council (that is, in fact, the United States) of illegal actions and did not demand that Kim Il Sung end the

war. But this can already be seen as a thrown foreign policy glove. But there were no Soviet troops in Korea at that time, and the Americans could have the illusion of an early victory by military means. And they were allowed to reach the borders with China. But then divisions of Chinese "volunteers" and Soviet military assistance in the form of an air defense corps appeared at the front. For the Americans, the timing of military victory began to be pushed back. The conflict has taken on a protracted character, the international situation is increasingly

complicated.

This is where we stop the review of the development of events and ask ourselves a question on the topic of the chapter: "Who

was the main provocateur?" Minor (on an international scale) provocations were organized by the South Korean authorities. Their termination was

perhaps in two ways: through negotiations or as a result of hostilities. And the actually implemented second

path turned out to be in close proximity to the outbreak of a new world war. And if you remember who proposed to divide Korea, then the conclusion suggests itself that the then leadership of the Soviet Union (that is, the "great fighter for peace", Comrade I.V. Stalin) was interested in such a development of events. Otherwise, it will be necessary to recognize Lee Syngman as the main provocateur, who by his actions persistently sought his own overthrow at the hands of the North Koreans. Could Stalin have planned such a course of events after such a devastating war? Soviet ideologists categorically denied this. But after all, any war is a

continuation of politics by other means. Therefore, it makes sense here to consider in more detail the actions of the Soviet Union in foreign policy over a longer period of time, for example, since 1939. However, before proceeding with such a review, it is useful to clarify knowledge of the theory of provocations. We have already familiarized ourselves with some practice on the example of the development of the situation around Korea in 1950. When getting acquainted with

other events, we will need a classification that official science does not even suspect.

I offer three classes (sorts) of provocations. The

first class, of course, should include "real", 100% provocations. For example, like the entire Korean War with the prehistory of its occurrence. Those. such provocations, where one can observe how one side (one country) incites (encourages) the other to certain actions that entail difficult

consequences.

I propose to classify the second class as real events, the perpetrators of which were not incited by some other side (country), they themselves achieved some of their own goals. But the enemy was free in interpretation and in the methods of counteraction (the so-called "second-rate" provocations). Examples: Lee Syngman's "initiatives" before June 25, 1950, or the actions of the Japanese in the late 1930s on the borders of the USSR and Mongolia ("Khalkhin Gol", "Khasan"). But you can see that all the examples listed do not fully fit the explanation of the terminal itself.

"provocation" from the dictionary. The actions of the Japanese can be attributed to reconnaissance in force to clarify their own plans. Lee Syngman's actions are to try to keep the Americans in South Korea. But all the same, both those and other Soviet officials called "provocations", although the side that should have severe consequences for itself is either not visible here at all, or is implied in the image of the "provocateurs" themselves. But then who provoked them? Themselves? Or is it not "provocation"? Maybe they should be called something else? But to simplify further analysis, I propose to leave this term to them, but with a clarification: "second class". And in

the third I propose to place provocations recognized by one side, but denied by the other and not confirmed by "independent experts" or questioned in the future ("planned-fictitious"). For example, the Finnish provocations at the end of 1939, which were the pretext for the Soviet-Finnish war.

For many years, the sharp aggravation of the situation in Soviet-Finnish relations in 1939 on the Soviet side was explained by the provocative and aggressive preparations of the leaders of Finland, who allegedly wanted to create a "Great Finland" at the expense of the territory of the USSR, and for this they built a powerful defensive zone on their land (the "Mannerheim line"). But firstly, any

military strategist will notice that the presence of a powerful system of fortifications in front of the advancing troops is a very strong obstacle to the offensive. Barrier structures before the offensive, on the contrary, are removed (so as not to interfere). Secondly, Finland could put up no more than 300

thousand troops. Such an army can indeed be attributed to a large grouping. But who was she to fight? With an army that lost more than 10 times more prisoners the next year alone. In addition, the offensive requires special means of breakthrough - tanks. Finland had as many as 60 of them. How many offensive battles could they be designed for if, for example, in just one day on November 16, 1941, the Germans lost 32 tanks only on one of the sectors of the Soviet-German front at the Dubosekovo junction.

In other words, if you soberly assess the situation, then the chances of a successful offensive against the Soviet Union in Finland

didn't exist at all! Then what sense could lie in the Finnish provocations? To call (induce) the Soviet leadership to organize an offensive through the "Mannerheim Line" and thereby prove the correctness of the costs incurred for its construction? Did someone inside Finland doubt the need for this system of fortifications? These questions will not be answered here. I don't even see the point in discussing them. Let's take a look at the dates. According to an employee of the Soviet

General Staff at that time, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky A.M., ("THE MATTER OF ALL LIFE", book 1st, 6th ed., M., 1989 p. 96), the first provocations from the Finnish side occurred on November 26, 1939 near the village of Mainila (fire was opened on Soviet border guards). Let's imagine: three soldiers with a dog are walking along the control and trail strip in the Karelian forest. Suddenly, someone fired at them. Could this be? Maybe! What were they shooting from? According to the "BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION" (M., 1965) "it came to the shelling of Soviet territory" (p. 46). On three border guards from cannons? Or from one? Maybe the gunner made a mistake, set the wrong sight or turned it in the wrong direction? (By the way, this happened to me personally once during training shooting in February 1983, I confess. But then no one was killed. And only one 120 mm tank-caliber mine turned out to be "erroneous"). In addition, large forests are the most unfortunate natural conditions for artillerymen: direct fire cannot shoot far, and shooting from closed firing positions cannot be corrected (i.e., it is useless, especially at small targets). And what happened in the days following November 26, 1939? According to Vasilevsky's memoirs, "these provocative actions were

resumed." But there were only three "following days": 27, 28 and 29, because on November 30, 1939, units of the Red Army, consisting of two corps, consolidated into the 7th Army, launched an attack on the "Mannerheim Line". Moreover, on November 28, the USSR unilaterally broke the non-aggression pact with Finland and severed diplomatic relations with it.

Let's think: well, someone shot from rifles, machine guns or cannons in a snowy forest. And in response to this it is necessary to send through

border personnel troops in the amount of up to 10 fully equipped divisions with full weapons! To find and punish those responsible? Yes, and break off diplomatic relations?

And by the way, how did the sent corps fight - how will it turn out or according to a certain plan? It turns out that the Red Army began to advance according to a previously developed plan, which, moreover, was revised twice. This was openly written in various sources devoted to that war, for example, in the "BRIEF HISTORY OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF THE SOVIET UNION" and in the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky, who remarked (p. 94): "We [the staff of the General Staff] had to do a lot of work in connection with the brewing military conflict between the USSR and Finland and during it. In particular, "The Main Military Council of the Red Army considered the issues of the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces in the event of a military conflict provoked by Finland. [Knew in advance!] The General Staff proposed that it had developed even earlier ... a private plan to repel aggression ... [No-no! Only for the case of repulsing aggression! The USSR just doesn't attack anyone!] However, the Main Military Council did not accept this plan and instructed the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, commander of the 2nd rank K. A. Meretskov to develop a new version of the plan to cover the border in the event of a conflict [Yes, why bother with this Finland! She only has 60 light and outdated tanks! In addition, she will be the first to attack (or arrange provocations)!]. Stalin approved the deadline [I wonder what was the name of the Finnish "Richard Sorge" who reported the exact date of provocations from Finland? And was he?].

Well, on November 26 (isn't it in accordance with the plan?), there were some provocations, from which the countdown of the military conflict began. It was no coincidence that I dwelled in detail on some of the events of 1939, although they occurred long before 1946 and have no direct connection with the Korean War. But I want to note that some of the actors from the Soviet leadership in 1939 and 1950 turned out to be the same: I. Stalin, A. Vasilevsky, V. Molotov and others.

They were in the highest government positions in August 1939, when the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed (which can be attributed to a class 1 provocation that pushed Hitler to attack Poland. And this is already a fact that is documented - in the Ukrainian The State Museum of the Great Patriotic War on the banks of the Dnieper even has a special room with secret protocols to the Soviet-German treaties showing how Stalin and Hitler divided Poland).

And they were among the top Soviet state leaders on June 22, 1941. But there are still disputes about this date. More precisely, now sometimes there are discussions that did not exist before. And the disputing parties have not yet come to a final, officially confirmed conclusion. And although this is not my topic, but a strange fact fell into my hands, which had not yet been discussed by anyone. But it is directly related to the topic of this chapter. And it concerns the date June 19, 1941. Here it could be discussed immediately. But its reality is so incredible, and its importance is so great, that it is undesirable to consider it in isolation from other events of those days. And it's better to start with reasoning about the logic of explaining the events of the

beginning of the war. Every year the memory of that war more and more passes into the category of theory considered by historians - it is natural that the place with the passing generations dulls the bitterness of nightmarish losses and terrible circumstances. But the newly coming generations still need to explain the past. And here the problem arises - how to do it? Or base explanations on previously recognized conclusions, or make changes to them on the basis of "newly discovered circumstances." You can change nothing in them only in one case - if they are logically connected and do not give rise to additional questions. As for the

causes and course of the Great Patriotic War, they are usually stated in such a way that additional questions are indispensable. For example: on the one hand, they are sure that the Soviet leadership saw the threat of a military danger from Germany and carried out all the maximum possible preparations. But at the same time, many of its details are usually not specified. And the question arises - if they were preparing, then why did the preparation turn out to be so ineffective? A

if we turn to the details, which are nevertheless sometimes given in the explanation, they do not so much remove, as they give rise to new questions. For example, the reason for the appearance of Directive No 1 of the High Command about a possible German attack on June 22-23, 1941 is called "irrefutable evidence" that appeared on the evening of June 21. Here is a quote from "A Brief History (of the War)" (Moscow, 1965, p.

59): "The directive on bringing the ground and air forces to combat readiness was handed over to the military councils of the western border military districts of the Red Army only at half past one in the morning 22 June, after irrefutable information was received about the impending perfidy of fascist Germany against our country. Or a quote from the textbook "History of the USSR" for

grade 11 (Moscow, 1990, p. 18): "On the night of June 22, when the Soviet

command no longer had doubts that a German attack on our country was possible, a telegraph was sent to the western districts issued a directive to put the troops on alert." Marshal G.K. Zhukov in his "Memoirs and Reflections"

specifies that he compiled the text of this directive in Stalin's Kremlin office on the evening of June 21 together with General Vatutin and after discussing it with Stalin himself. On the one hand, the actions are quite logical and such that they should have been. For it is

practically impossible to completely hide the advance of a mass of enemy troops to the initial areas for an offensive along the border. Information about this MUST go to the leadership of the country. And according to the explanations of historians, they did. But none of the historians paid attention to the obvious absurdity - to how inadequately this leadership (i.e. Stalin) behaved - after considering the "irrefutable evidence" of the beginning of the war with the generals: HE QUIETLY WENT TO SLEEP !!!

Here is a quote from the same textbook on the History of the USSR for grade

11. (1990, pp. 14-15): "There are still no convincing explanations for Stalin's behavior in the last days before the war. ... It seems that time will lift the veil over this mystery as well. But one way or another, misjudging

situation, Stalin was captured by a mistake that cost the Red Army and the Soviet people dearly. Stalin calmly went to bed on the tragic night of June 22. He was sure that the war would not start." Marshal Zhukov himself writes about the same ("MEMORY AND

REFLECTIONS", volume 2, Moscow, 1986, p. 8):

"The People's Commissar ordered me to call I.V. Stalin [at about 4-00 in the morning]. I'm calling. No one answers the phone. I'm calling continuously. Finally I hear the sleepy voice of the duty general of the security department. - Who's talking? - Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. Please urgently connect Comrade Stalin and me." "What? Now?!" the chief of security was astounded. "Comrade Stalin sleeping.

- Wake up immediately: the Germans are bombing our cities! There is silence for a few moments. Finally, the tube is deaf answered:

- Wait. About three minutes later I.V. approached the apparatus. Stalin. I reported the situation and asked for permission to begin response fighting. I.V. Stalin is silent. I can only hear his breathing. - Do you understand me? Silence again."

In other words, it is officially recognized that on the morning of June 22, Stalin did not have irrefutable evidence of a German attack and did not give permission for retaliatory actions for a long time. And this fact is considered as one of the reasons for the nightmarish losses.

And not a single historian paid attention to the obvious absurdity SUCH explanation of events.

It turns out that on the evening of June 21, Stalin had irrefutable evidence of the German attack, discussed it with the generals, signed the directive, and then calmly went to bed, confident that the war WILL NOT START!?!?. And on the morning of June 22, when he was awakened and informed that the attack had taken place, he did not believe it for a long time, completely forgot about yesterday's irrefutable evidence and for some time did not know what to do, until the number of messages turned into a new quality - the understanding that that the war had begun. INCREDIBLE!!!

Could this be? If

you follow normal logic - never! Following

normal logic, two explanations arise from such explanations.

output:

1) or irrefutable evidence really was on the evening of June 21, but then the top leadership of the country should have acted in a completely different way;

2) or there was no irrefutable evidence on the evening of June 21. But then the meaning of Directive No. 1 becomes incomprehensible. Why was it sent? Although, of course, one can immediately object to such a "brazen" statement of the question; the reason is indicated in the directive itself:

"1. During 22-23.6.41, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may begin with provocative actions. 2. The

task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that might cause major complications [in other words, do not open fire!]. At the same time, the troops of ... [listed] districts should be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies ... "

Yes, it talks about a possible attack. But in the presence of really irrefutable evidence of the outbreak of war, such directives are not transmitted. In the remaining few hours, the only thing that can still help is the issuance of an order for a combat alert by phone. But this was not done. It turns out that the generals who issued such a directive by TELEGRAPH (well, at least not by messengers) did not really believe in the beginning of the war and were sure that there was still time. Moreover, questions are generated by

another oddity of Directive No. 1, the mention of some kind of provocation. If you follow normal logic, it is almost impossible to imagine what they could look like.

The fact is that provocations are usually organized by the side that plans the attack. Moreover, they (provocations) are carried out ON YOUR TERRITORY! Otherwise, all their meaning is lost. Suppose the Germans really would have started the war with some kind of provocation. Can you imagine what they could be like (given that they were supposed to take place on Soviet territory)?

For example, this way: the Germans, having rolled out hundreds of artillery batteries to firing positions, ordered to shoot one gun with several shells. And then they would have waited to see how the Red Army would react to this? Or like this: having brought hundreds of "armed to the teeth" battalions to the initial areas for the offensive, they ordered one platoon to go on the attack, to shoot a little. And then they would wait again, what would

be the response? Is there any

logic in such reasoning? Any person who has experience of serving in the army will answer - "bullshit." If the troops are withdrawn to the initial areas for the offensive in the evening, this means that in the morning they will all IMMEDIATELY go on the attack. No "provocations" are absolutely necessary here, even harmful. That is why these areas are called "original", because "combat work" begins with them, i.e. attack with all available forces and means located in these areas in a state of readiness for battle. It's like a grenade with the pin pulled out. It's like a compressed spring or a stretched string with an arrow in the bow. It is impossible to keep them for a long time. The withdrawal of a mass of armed troops to the initial areas near the border with another state means that not even a day, but a few hours remain before a massive offensive. In this situation, the only correct decision is an order by telephone to all daily duty officers of all units and formations: "Combat alert!" And

then the military themselves know what to do. But history cannot be changed. And if the official explanations are just that, then one of two things remains: either close your eyes to the logical inconsistencies in them, or try to jointly consider the maximum possible number of facts in order to search for other explanations that have a logical

connection and consistency. The first method is followed by official historians to this day. The second method is more complicated and its minimum implementation should concern the actions of the Soviet leadership for at least the pre-war month from May 21 to June 22, 1941. And there is such a possibility if we take as a basis the entries in the journal of visitors to the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin for May-June 1941 (archive of the President of the Russian Federation, fund 45, inventory 1, file 413), published in the Moscow journal "HISTORICAL A

other sources and other events. (By the way, the authors of the publication of the journal of visitors to Stalin's office in the Kremlin themselves urged historians to use these records to clarify various events, including by hours and minutes, however, there were no people who wanted something in particular). And it is best to consider all this within the framework of a "report" by day from the pre-war month in the form of a separate chapter. 6. [Not] A secret report from May-June 1941. "However, I

would like you not to forget something else: the causes of failures, mistakes in the first days of the war should be analyzed more seriously, deeply, with all responsibility ... These mistakes largely on our conscience, on the conscience of leaders of all levels. And so that they do not repeat themselves, they should not be hushed up, not shifted to the souls of the dead, but courageously, honestly admit them. For the repetition of the past will already be called a crime. " Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov "Before the

war" (magazine "OCTOBER", 1965, No. 8, 9, 11) May 21, 1941 (Wednesday)

On this day, Stalin's guests were late. The first to come was his 1st deputy and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. He stayed all evening and was the last to leave at one in the morning. At 22-30 for 25 min. appeared 1st deputy. People's Commissar for Construction P.A. Yudin. After 5 min. after him, another of his deputy and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs P.L. Beria. He also stayed the whole evening and left with Molotov. But Beria did not come to Stalin alone, but with his first deputy for the NKVD V.N. Merkulov, who left after 50 minutes. (at 23-50). Exactly at midnight, two people appeared in Stalin's office - aviation designer A.I. Mikoyan and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G.M. Malenkov. Mikoyan stayed with Stalin for 45 minutes, and Malenkov left with the last ones at one in the morning.

With Mikoyan, Stalin could discuss only one topic - the production and development in the troops of his fighter-interceptors MiG-1 and MiG-3, which entered service in the border military districts and fleets, as well as in the air defense forces. And it is quite logical that during the conversation the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Malenkov, who at that time had several other positions: candidate member of the Politburo, member of the Orgburo and head of the personnel department

Central Committee. But his main occupation, apparently, was membership in the predecessor of the Headquarters - in the Main Military Council (GVS), which was created on March 13, 1938 under the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and was engaged in improving weapons, as well as issues of strategy and tactics of the use of troops. The composition of the GVS changed, most often due to repression. Since July 1940, according to the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of

Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, it included: 1) marshals of the Soviet Union: S.K. Timoshenko (chairman), G.I. Kulik (issues of artillery), B.M. Shaposhnikov (apparently, strategy and tactics), S.M. Budyonny (Deputy People's Com

2) generals: K.A. Meretskov (strategy, tactics and combat training of troops), G.K. Zhukov (former commander of the Kyiv Military District and chief of the General Staff), D.G. Pavlov (commander of the Belarusian Military District).

3) secretaries of the Central Committee: - A.A. Zhdanov (member of the Politburo) and G.M. Malenkov (candidate member of the

Politburo); 4) aviation specialist: - Ya.V. Smushkevich (replaced by P.V. Rychagov);

5) specialist in ideology: - People's Commissar of State Control, future head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (1941 - 1942) - L.Z. Mehlis. Since the 1980s,

several pre-war directives from the people's commissar of defense have been published. Usually they had two signatures: the people's commissar himself (Tymoshenko) and the chief of the General Staff (Zhukov). And some have another signature - Malenkov. From this we can conclude that for him membership in the GVS was a very important occupation. And it turns out that purely military issues were connected through it with the problems of arms production. This is also indicated by the fact that Malenkov visited Stalin more often precisely with specialists from the military industry, primarily aviation. Thus, he can be called the curator of the production of weapons from the Central Committee. And if we analyze the entire composition of the pre-war visitors to Stalin's office, we can conclude that the problems of military aviation

worried him very much. This observation is interesting in itself. The fact is that any military issues are not of particular importance in peacetime if war is not expected in the near future. But if the war is being prepared, then the preparation of a big

quantity of the most modern military equipment becomes a very important task. Moreover, this can turn into a serious problem if any technical industry is experiencing rapid progress - which happened with aviation in the 30s and 40s. Progress in it turned out to be so fast that prototypes used to become obsolete before they reached mass production. It remains to consider the question - was the Soviet leadership preparing for a big war? The answer to it is unequivocal: yes, it was being prepared. Here, for example, is what A.I. Shakhurin in his

book "WINGS OF VICTORY" (Moscow, 1983, p. 42): "By the time I was appointed people's commissar of the aviation industry [January 1940], it was quite clear that we could not avoid war. No one was wrong about the alleged enemy. It could only be Hitler's Germany." Moreover, on many pages of his book, he repeatedly emphasizes the enormous, from Stalin's point of view, the importance of rearming military aviation, and even in a very short time. In particular, such facts are cited as the transition of brigades for testing new aircraft to round-the-clock work, the construction of new ones and the transfer to the People's Commissariat of many existing factories with tens of thousands of employees (which more than doubled the capacity of the aviation industry compared to 1939), a daily (from the beginning of 1941) written report to the Central Committee on the production of aircraft and engines, the transition of the work of all aircraft and engine factories to a daily schedule by the beginning of 1941, the creation of a dispatch department in the people's commissariat that controlled the work of each workshop, etc. Moreover, at the end of 1940, Stalin proposed to Shakhurin to increase the production of new combat (!) Aircraft in June 1941 to 50 per day - this despite the fact that in 1939 and 1940 the People's Commissariat, using overtime work, produced an average of less than 20 per day machines. 50 combat aircraft per day is 1,500 per month (including weekends) or 18,000 per year. And this task was completed. In July 1941, 1807 aircraft were manufactured (60 per day), in September - 2389, and after the evacuation, the production was increased to 100 or more. Or here is what is said on the same topic in another

source - an article

"IL-4: SO IT WAS" (magazine "AVIATION AND TIME", 1, 1998, p.4):

"The country was preparing for a grandiose war, either intending to repel someone's blow, or attack someone. The need for combat

aircraft began to be calculated not in thousands, but in tens of thousands of units. July 17, 1939 People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov sent I.I. Stalin and V.M. Molotov draft resolution "On the development of aircraft factories of the NKAP" (letter N 80692). The document provided for an increase in the capacity of existing factories, as well as the construction of 4 new ones in order to eventually produce in 1941 ... a total of 29,200 combat aircraft, excluding sea ones. Moreover, it was emphasized that the indicated capacities do not fully meet the needs of the Air Force for 1941. These figures are amazing: the production plan for one year alone was almost 8.5 times higher than the total number of all German aircraft that participated in the attack on the USSR on June 22! ". Shakhurin clarifies that the development of aircraft factories was adopted

by the Central Committee of the ~~All-Union Communist Party~~ ^{new} Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in September 1939. It provided for the reconstruction of nine large factories and the construction of nine new ones. the German offensive failed to fulfill the plan in 1941. According to official data, 8,200 combat aircraft were produced in the USSR for the second half of 1941. For the entire year of 1941 (according to Shakhurin) - more than 15,000. In 1942 - more than 25,000. (For comparison: Germany produced 8,400 aircraft in the whole of 1941, and 11,600 in 1942.) So, in 1939-1941, the development of combat aviation for the Soviet leadership was one of the priorities. Shakhurin emphasizes that he visited Stalin's office almost every day, and notes that Stalin was engaged in aviation affairs almost daily.

Moreover, not only did the production of combat aircraft, especially new models, increase sharply, but measures were taken to accelerate their development. To this end, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks held a special meeting in February 1941, at which Stalin spoke. However, Shakhurin notes that "then we still did not know when the war would break out, although preparations for it were in full swing. We worked with great intensity, with incredible tension" (p. 94). But a strange situation arises: on the one hand, according to the plans of the Soviet leadership, hasty preparations were made for a war in which Germany was clearly identified as a possible adversary. A with

on the other hand, it (the Soviet leadership) did not believe at all in a possible attack by Germany itself, which explains the nightmarish losses in the initial period of the war, in particular, 1200 aircraft in one day on 06/22/1941. Moreover, historians usually limit themselves to this number. But if we continue the terrible statistics, it will turn out that by June 27, 1941, the total losses in aircraft reached 3,715 aircraft (an article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Gerasimov "MARITIME AVIATION IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR" - "MARITIME COLLECTION", No 9, 1998). And they continued to grow. In particular, for example, out of more than 1,000 DB-3 (IL-4) long-range bombers alone in the western military districts, by 06/22/41 by the end of July (taking into account the replenishment of losses), 75 serviceable vehicles remained. Thus, it turns out that in the first week alone, Soviet aviation lost over 4,000 aircraft - more than all the German aircraft that attacked the USSR on 06/22/41.

But not only planes had to be lost. Here is what Shakhurin writes about the loss of factories: "Immediately before the war, a huge number of decisions and resolutions on aviation issues were made: in 1940 there were more than 300 of them, and in 1941 - 488. Not all of us had time. Not all factories were built far from the western borders ; there were objects in Belarus, and in the Baltic states, and other places, in the first weeks and months of the war, occupied by the enemy. We did not manage to transfer everything later. Something was left to the enemy ... "(p. 80). There are, for example, photographs of Mikoyan fighters that the

Germans got in their original packaging. The losses include the non-production of aircraft due to the fact that many factories had to be urgently evacuated from the European part of the country to the east. Often the evacuation took place under bombing or even under fire from approaching German troops. In addition, the only places for the production of certain types of materials at that time fell under the German occupation, for example, aviation wood, air plywood and delta wood before the war were supplied mainly by enterprises in Belarus and in the Leningrad region. It was necessary to evacuate all the factories that produced section steel, bearings and pipes, and therefore, in the first weeks and months of the war, their production ceased altogether. In other words, the preparations for the war turned out to be largely not what was needed

and he himself is surprised; "Why did some questions raised at a meeting in the State Planning Committee of the USSR and in the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry arise only when the war had already begun?" But he answers it too evasively: "None of us imagined that the war would break out so suddenly. No one could have imagined that very soon we would lose almost half of the European part of the country, which is economically important. The mood was completely different ... "But he does not specify what the mood was, although he had to guess why the national economy urgently needed tens of thousands of combat aircraft, which could become obsolete in a short time. And other leading participants in their memoirs also did not want to touch on this topics, especially generals and marshals. As it turned out, it can be clarified only bit by bit and for some reason with great difficulty. Therefore, it is time to return to the entries from the journal of visitors

to Stalin's Kremlin

office. May 22, 1941 (Thursday) Like May 21, visitors to he was not enough and they were late. The reception began at 21-50 with military aviation issues, which he considered for almost two hours (until 23-35) with the deputy people's commissar of the aviation industry and chief designer A. S. Yakovlev. 15 minutes after his leaving (at 23-50) three appeared - Malenkov, Beria and Merkulov. They talked about something with Stalin until one in the morning. Perhaps they discussed the measures

taken on yesterday's

conversation. May 23, 1941 (Friday) Unlike the previous two days, On May 23, Stalin had much more guests - 14. And the reception began much earlier - at 17:05. between 17-20 and 17-40, for which he went somewhere). The first big topic of discussion for Stalin, apparently, was some problems of the Moscow economy,

which he solved from 17-50 to 19-00 with the party (L.S. Shcherbakov) and economic (V.P. Pronin) leaders of Moscow. In addition, from 18-15 to 18-45 Beria and Merkulov (NKVD) joined the conversation. At 19:00, for an almost three-hour (until 21:55) conversation with Stalin and Molotov, top military

leaders, the people's commissar of defense, appeared

Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Army General G.K. Zhukov. Among the various military topics, military transportation, as well as the design and production of weapons, were to be discussed. an hour later, seven more specialists of a very specific profile came to Stalin's office: - People's Commissar of Railways (and other positions) L.M. Kaganovich (20-00 - 21-20) and the head of the main artillery department of the Red Army, Marshal of

the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik (20-20 - 21-55) From 21-20 to 21-45 Stalin, Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov and Kulik hold a short meeting on the production of some kind of weapon manufactured by the People's Commissariat of

Arms Plant No. 8. The meeting was attended by: G.V. Avtsin - director of the plant No. 8 named after. Kalinin; I.A. Komaritsky - designer of plant No. 8; E.V. Charnko - weapons designer; M.S. Shelkov - head of the fuel industry department and deputy.

head of the GULAG (Main Directorate of Camps) of the NKVD of the USSR. Of these people, Komaritsky is the most famous - his name is in the name of the ShKAS machine gun - "Shpitalny, Komaritsky, aviation, rapid-fire." It can be assumed that plant No. 8 produced weapons for combat aircraft. But on May 23, 1941, representatives of the plant visited Stalin for less than half an hour, and Stalin talked with the top military leaders for the longest time. And the speech in the conversation, of course, should have been about military plans. Moreover, their discussion on May 23 was bound to be due to the fact that the next day, May 24, it was planned to hold a large military conference in Stalin's office with the participation of the commanders of the western military districts. The question arises: is there any information about the pre-war plans? You can answer that yes, there is. In the MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL (No. 2, 1992) in the article "The STRONG FACTS OF THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR", fragments of the last version of the plan were published, which had the code name:

"Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and her allies." Sul

"DID STALIN PREPARE AN OFFENSIVE WAR AGAINST HITLER?" (Moscow, "AIRO-XX"). These include: 1. V.

Danilov (Colonel, Candidate of Historical Sciences): "Did the General Staff of the Red Army prepare a preemptive strike against GERMANY?"

2. M.I. Meltyukhov "DISPUTES AROUND 1941: EXPERIENCE CRITICAL REFLECTION OF ONE DISCUSSION".

The general conclusion of both these articles is almost the same. In particular, Colonel Danilov considers "THE CONSIDERATIONS..." to be the main document that gives grounds to assert the intention of the Soviet leadership to launch a preemptive strike against Germany. And although the date of the development of the document is not indicated, the analysis showed that it was prepared between May 7 and 15, 1941. And measures were begun to implement it, that is, the well-known events to strengthen the troops of the Red Army on the western borders in the spring and summer of 1941 converge with the list of measures given in this plan. In particular, after describing future tasks for future fronts, it says the following: "In order to ensure

the fulfillment of the above plan, it is necessary to carry out the following measures in advance, without which it is impossible to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy both from the air and on the ground: 1. secretly mobilize troops under the guise of

reserve training camps; 2. under the guise of going to the camps, make a covert

concentration of troops closer to the western border, first of all, concentrate all the armies of the reserve of the High Command; 3. covertly concentrate aviation on field airfields

from remote districts and now start deploying aviation rear; 4. gradually deploy rear and hospital base under the guise of training camps and

rear exercises." It is believed that "Considerations ..." were prepared by Major General A.M. Vasilevsky with

clarifications and corrections made by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin. The main purpose of the plan was stated as follows:

“Considering that Germany currently keeps its army mobilized with deployed rears, it has the ability to warn us in deployment and deliver a surprise strike. in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches" (archive of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, fund 16, inventory 2951 case 237, sheets 4-5). Colonel Danilov gives the name of the plan - "Thunder". According to him, it was believed that the advantage was on the side of the Red Army (152 divisions against 100 German). The main blow was

supposed to be delivered by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cutting off Germany from her allies. An auxiliary strike was planned by the forces of the Western Front in the direction of Warsaw. On the remaining sections of the state border from Finland to Romania, it was ordered to conduct an active defense with the readiness to strike against Romania. And if such a plan was accepted for implementation, then before the conversation on its implementation with the commanders of the future western fronts on May 24, Stalin was obliged to first discuss it with top military leaders. Which, apparently, was done a day earlier, i.e. May, 23rd.

By the way, there is another source of information about pre-war army planning, repeatedly published in mass circulation - the memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky "THE MATTER OF ALL LIFE" (quotes from the second edition of 1976), who in May-June 1941 was a major general and worked as deputy chief of the operational department of the Soviet General Staff.

Firstly, he explicitly states that for the last few years before the war, one of the tasks of the General Staff was to develop a plan for a war with Germany (pp.

99-106): “From mid-April 1940, I got involved in the responsible work of the General Staff - to repulse possible aggression. It is fair to say that the main thing had already been done by that time. During all the last years, the preparation of the plan was directly supervised by B. M. Shaposhnikov, and

By that time, the General Staff was completing its development for submission to the Central Committee of the Party for approval. The main guidelines for compiling the report were given to us by B.M. Shaposhnikov. May 7, 1940 he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. We worked on the draft report together with N.F. Vatutin and G.K. Malandin. ... We worked very friendly and hard. The operational plan occupied all our thoughts in those months. Hitler's Germany was called the most likely and main enemy in it. It was assumed that Italy, ... Finland, ... Romania, ... and Hungary could come out on the side of Germany. B.M. Shaposhnikov believed that the military conflict could be limited to the western borders of the USSR. ... The plan proposed to deploy in the sectors of the North-Western and ... Western fronts. The southern direction was supposed to be provided ... also by two fronts, but with fewer say anything our main strength... forces and means The report did not about the possible timing of the start of the war. These are its general contours. This project and plan directly I.V. Stalin in September 1940." [Stalin reoriented the main direction to the southwest]. "In accordance with this, the General Staff was instructed to revise the plan, providing for the concentration of the main ... reported grouping of our troops in the southwest direction." Further, Vasilevsky notes that the timing of the revision of the plan All issues had to be resolved by December 15, 1940, so that from January 1, 1941, the command and staffs of the western districts could begin to develop district plans.

Work on the plan "with unrelenting tension" continued at the General Staff throughout the peaceful months of 1941. Directives were sent to the leadership of the Red Army with the tasks of practicing offensive operations. And adjustments were made to the previously developed plan. In conclusion of the review of pre-war planning, Vasilevsky specifically notes (p. 113):

"It was also assumed that our troops would enter the war in all cases fully prepared and as part of the groupings envisaged by the plan, that the mobilization and concentration of troops would be carried out in advance. The operational plan for repelling aggression was carefully linked with the mobilization plan of the Red Army and the country as a whole; and transportation schedules

troops and everything necessary for them from the depths of the country to the areas of concentration and appropriate measures have been taken to ensure transportation through the People's Commissariat of Railways. The plan was worked out not only by the General Staff but also with the command of the troops of the border military districts. For this purpose, in February-April 1941, commanders of troops, members of military councils, chiefs of staff and operational departments of the [western] military districts were

summoned to the General Staff.

attention:

"At the same time, it was envisaged that by the beginning of enemy operations, being fully staffed according to wartime staff, the troops of the covering echelons would deploy on prepared defensive lines along the border and, together with fortified areas and border troops, would be able, in case of emergency, to cover the mobilization of troops of the second echelon of border districts, which, according to the mobilization plan, were assigned from several hours to one day for this.

In order to mobilize the troops of the second echelon of the emerging fronts in a matter of hours, strategic stockpiles of weapons, uniforms and ammunition must be concentrated in the same areas in advance. But this is a very important undertaking - to bring strategic reserves to the borders in advance. And if the war does not take place? Return inventory? And the national economy will be paralyzed by the transportation of military (unprofitable) cargo back and forth? It makes sense to carry out such measures only in one case - if a war is really being prepared. Colonel Danilov notes that the measures from the plan were carried out, and this proves that the war was being prepared for 1941. And Vasilevsky himself confirms this (p. 113): "The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff not only made adjustments to the developed operational and mobilization plans to repel an inevitable attack on our country, but, on the instructions of the Central Committee of the party and government, carried out a number of very important activities from these plans. And then he cites some of them. Some of them, of course, can be attributed as preliminary "just in case" - such as the transfer to the western borders in May-June 1941 of the 16th, 19th, 21st, 22nd armies and the 25th

rifle corps. But then measures began to be taken that clearly indicated the very close start of the war, in particular, the creation of front-line command posts. But this will be discussed further. And here it makes sense to discuss the contradictions in the revelations of Vasilevsky. On the one hand, the Soviet General Staff and the Ministry of Defense in 1940 - 1941 devoted all their vigorous activity to the creation and implementation of a war plan on the western border. Moreover, the "inevitable attack" of Germany on the USSR was considered the reason. Moreover, judging by the words of the marshal, it was supposed to take place in 1941 (p. 112): "From February 1941, Germany began the transfer of troops to the Soviet borders. the threat of aggression."

However, a strange situation arises: how could it be possible to create and implement a plan to repel "inevitable" aggression in such a way that, at its actual beginning, it turned out to be completely unrealistic and was never applied for its intended purpose. Since June 22, 1941, the troops have acted not according to pre-developed plans, but according to a greatly changing situation, creating impromptu battle plans. And this is provided that the "inevitable aggression" that was supposed in advance for some reason began quite unexpectedly. In other words, not as planned? And in general, how can you plan the aggression of someone else's (uncontrolled) enemy? You can only plan the actions of your troops. But since at the head of the entire national economic plan for 1941 was army planning for a war on the western border, this leads to the conclusion that all talk of "inevitable aggression" is a verbal cover for their own military plans, and no one believed in a real attack by Germany. Only in this case everything becomes logical. And this is confirmed by an analysis of the events of the pre-war month. May 24, 1941

(Saturday) This day

can be called the day of a large military conference, which took place in Stalin's office for two and a half hours from 18-50 to 21-20, and at which the issues of combat training of five western military districts were to be considered. Moreover, the topic of combat aviation tasks was highlighted. From the administration of each district, their commanders, members of the military councils arrived at the meeting

(corps commissars) and district aviation commanders. As mentioned above, the meeting started at 18:50. But in front of him, the Stalinist office entered: at 18-00 - Molotov and Timoshenko, at 18-10 - Zhukov and his first deputy, General Vatutin. All the military left Stalin at 21-20, Molotov remained. At 21-25, for about an hour, the head of the department of the Balkan countries of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Lavishchev. And from 22-20 to 22-45 Stalin summed up the day with Molotov.

The fact that issues related to the preparation and conduct of a preemptive strike could be discussed at a meeting on May 24 was noted in their articles by Melnikov and Colonel Danilov. But there is no commentary on Stalin's hour-long conversation that day about the Balkan countries, about whether this could be connected with a military plan? There is information from other sources that could.

In the collection already mentioned above "DID STALIN PREPARE AN OFFENSIVE WAR AGAINST HITLER?" there is an article by M. Nikitin "THE EVALUATION OF THE EVENTS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP", in which the author touched upon the direction of the pre-war Soviet policy towards Finland, Romania and the Middle East. In particular, it is alleged that the Soviet leadership tried to split off its Eastern European allies from Germany: "At the end of May 1941, Moscow informed the Romanian government that it was "ready to resolve all territorial issues with Romania ... if Romania joins the Soviet peace policy, i.e. e. withdraw from the Tripartite Pact. May 24 refers specifically to the "end of May", and such a statement could not exist without Stalin's approval. Therefore, it is quite possible that he discussed it on the evening of May 24 in a conversation with a specialist on the Balkan countries. In addition, (as M. Nikitin notes), some authors believe that the Soviet leadership was counting

on the German offensive in the summer of 1941 in the Middle East. And not just counted, but tried to assure Berlin that in this case there would be no opposition from the Soviet Union. Within the framework of this hypothesis, it becomes the meaning of the Soviet-German consultations on the Middle East held in May 1941, which were conducted in Ankara on behalf of their governments by the Soviet ambassador S.A.

Vinogradov and the German ambassador F. von Papen. At them, the Soviet side emphasized its readiness to take into account German interests in this region. The same goal, according to M. Nikitin, was planned to be achieved in direct Soviet-German negotiations, which were strongly proposed by the Soviet side from mid-June 1941. On June 18, Molotov notified Berlin of his desire to come for new negotiations. And he repeated the proposal to the German ambassador in Moscow, F. von Schulenburg, on the evening of 06/21/41. But on June 22, all these attempts lost all meaning. And their goal could be the only thing - to "push" Hitler to "get stuck" in a war with the British in the Middle East and thereby weaken their grouping on the western borders of the USSR. There are suggestions that the Soviet leadership was counting on something similar in the spring of 1940, expecting that France and England would put up good resistance to the Wehrmacht, which would lead to a favorable situation for the offensive of the Red Army in the summer of 1940. The fact that such plans could exist, indirectly indicates the fact of the execution in the USSR in April - May 1940 of a large group of Polish officers and other specialists who could turn out to be undesirable persons in the event of the "liberation" of Poland. But the Wehrmacht, contrary to expectations, quickly coped with the armies of France and England, because of which Moscow had to revise the war plan on the western border (information from the article by Ph.D. B.V. Sokolov in the above

collection). Considering the issues of Soviet policy in the Balkans and the Middle East at that time and in their light the Soviet-German problems, one cannot pass over in silence the principled position of the Soviet leadership, outlined by Molotov to the German ambassador Count Schulenburg on November 25, 1940, which Schulenburg set out in detail in his telegram in Berlin to Ribbentrop the next day. It was first published in 1948 by the US Department in the collection "National Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union. 1939-1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office". They were published in Russian in 1991 by the Moskovsky Rabochiy publishing house under the heading "SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION (USSR-GERMANY, 1939-1941)". Moreover, the text of many documents of the first half of 1941 suggests that the relevance of the "statement of November 25" remained until 06/22/41.

Due to its importance, Schulenburg's telegram dated 11/26/1940 should be read in full. (Note: Explanatory words in square brackets have been added to the text): Ambassador Schulenburg
to Ribbentrop Moscow, 11/26/1940
- 5.34 telegram No 2362
of November 25 Urgent! Top
secret! To the Imperial Foreign
Minister in person! Molotov invited me to his
place tonight and in the presence of Dekanozov [USSR Ambassador
in Berlin] stated the following: The Soviet government
has studied the content of the statement of the Reich Foreign
Minister [i.e. Ribbentrop], made by the Reich Foreign Minister during
the final conversation on November 13 [at the negotiations in Berlin],
and took the following position:

The Soviet government is ready to accept the draft four-power pact [Germany, Italy, Japan (i.e. "Axis") and the USSR] on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance, outlined by the Imperial Foreign Minister during a conversation on November 13, 1940, on the following conditions :

1. It is envisaged that the German troops will immediately leave Finland, which, according to the [Soviet-German] treaty of 1939, is included in the Soviet zone of influence. At the same time, the Soviet Union guarantees peaceful relations with Finland and the protection of German economic interests in Finland (export of timber and nickel).

2. It is

envisaged that during the coming months the security of the Soviet Union from the [Black Sea] Straits is guaranteed by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which is geographically located within the security zone of the Black Sea borders of the Soviet Union, as well as by the construction of a base for land and naval Soviet forces in the area of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease.

3. It is envisaged that the zone south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction towards the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union.

4. It is envisaged that Japan will waive its rights to coal and oil concessions in Northern Sakhalin.

In accordance with the above, the draft [secret] protocol on the delimitation of spheres of interest, outlined by the imperial foreign minister, should be modified in such a way that the center of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union is moved south of Batumi and Baku in a general direction towards the Persian Gulf. Likewise, the draft [secret] protocol or agreement

between Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union regarding Turkey should be amended in such a way as to guarantee a base for a certain amount of naval and land forces of the USSR in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles on a long-term lease. It is proposed that, in the event that Turkey declares its desire to join the Four Power Pact, the three powers (Germany, Italy and the USSR) will guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey. The protocol should state that if Turkey refuses to join the four-power pact, Italy and the USSR will jointly develop and practically apply

military and diplomatic sanctions. Regarding this, there should be

entered into a separate agreement.

In addition, it is necessary to agree

on: a) a third secret protocol between Germany and the Soviet Union with respect to Finland (see paragraph 1);

b) the fourth secret protocol between Japan and the Soviet Union on Japan's refusal of oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin (in exchange for appropriate compensation);

c) the fifth secret protocol between Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy, recognizing the fact that Bulgaria is geographically located within the security zone of the Black Sea borders of the USSR and that the conclusion of the Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assistance treaty, which will in no way affect the internal regime of Bulgaria, will sovereignty and independence is politically necessary; Molotov concluded by stating that the Soviet proposal provided

for five [secret] protocols instead of two,

planned by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. He (Molotov) would be very grateful to the German side for a reply statement. Schulenburg.

Reading

this document leads to terrible fantasies, for example - Soviet troops, together with Mussolini's army, "bring to life" Turkey. Or else: the main participant in the "Comintern" the Soviet Union is an active participant in the "Anti-Comintern "Axis"! And as an ally of Japan, it helps its government to "develop" Southeast Asia! And what does "the center of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union in the general direction towards Persian" mean? Gulf "? War with England? Were these aspirations worked out by the future Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General Shtemenko, at a command-staff game in the Transcaucasian Military District a few days before June 22, 1941?

Stalin's "flirting" with the Axis powers continued until the very beginning of the war on June 22. In particular, in April 1941, the Japanese representative Matsuoka visited Moscow. On April 13, 1941, Schulenburg sent telegram No. 884 to Berlin, in which he noted the following: "2. To the question of the Italian

ambassador whether the question of the relations of the Soviet Union with the Axis was raised during Matsuoka's negotiations with Stalin, Matsuoki replied that Stalin had told him that he - a staunch supporter of the Axis and an opponent of England and America."

However, the German government was in no hurry to agree with the proposals of the Soviet Union of November 25, 1940. Moreover, it was in December of the same year that Hitler signed the Barbarossa plan for war with the USSR. And as the deadline for its start approached, Berlin's opposition to the directions of the Soviet proposals became stronger and more active. In particular, the German government:

- did not withdraw its troops from Finland, but, on the contrary, strengthened its grouping there;
- sent his troops to Bulgaria;
- was in no hurry to help Stalin in putting pressure on Turkey;
- etc.

The Soviet leadership, of course, saw Berlin's disagreement with its proposals, but it did not refuse them and did not undertake

serious steps to reach a compromise. And also periodically reminded Berlin of the unresolved proposals on 11/25/40.

It can be assumed that this was done on purpose, since during the same period (the first half of 1941) the Soviet government carried out a number of measures for the strategic deployment of troops on the western borders. In May-June 1941, this process continued intensively, as evidenced by the journal of visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office. May 25, 1941 (Sunday) Stalin did not receive anyone in his office in the Kremlin.

Four weeks remained before the German attack. On this day, the German command began the most massive transportation of troops to the east.

Quote from the memoirs of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, who at the beginning of the war was the commander of the 9th mechanized corps ("SOLDIER'S DUTY", Moscow, 1988, pp. 8-9):

"During the district field trip [of the district commander, General Kirponos in May 1941], I talked with some comrades from the senior command staff. These were generals I.I. Fedyuninsky, S.M. Kondrusev, F.V. Kamkov ... They had, like me, the opinion was formed that we were on the eve of the war with Nazi Germany. Once I spent the night in Kovel with I. I. Fedyuninsky. He turned out to be a hospitable host. The conversation was all about the same: a lot of carelessness. From the headquarters of the district, for example, followed order, the expediency of which was difficult to explain in that alarming situation. The troops were ordered to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone. Our corps managed to defend its artillery ... And this helped us out in the future."

Indeed, from the point of view of the preparation of the defense, such a decision is completely incomprehensible, but from the point of view of the secret preparation of the offensive ... the preliminary concentration of cannons, which are transported slowly, is very useful.

May 26, 1941 (Monday) The reception schedule on May 26 turned out to be similar to the previous Wednesday or Thursday. There were few visitors (seven) and they were accepted by Stalin late - from 21-15. On this day, he held, as it were, two mini-conferences: one a little over two hours (from 21-15 to 23-25); the second - less than an hour (from 23-25 to 0-15) The topic of the first was questions again

military aviation. It was attended by: Malenkov, People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry V.I. Shakhurin and two of his deputies A.S. Yakovlev and P.A. Voronin. At 23-25 aviation specialists left, Malenkov remained. Beria, Merkulov and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks P.K. came to the second meeting. Ponomarenko.

May 27, 1941 (Tuesday)

Stalin had few visitors and all, as usual, late. Molotov was the first to arrive at 8:40 p.m. and stayed until the very end of the reception at 1:50 a.m. At 9:30 p.m., Stalin got his deputy for economics, chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee N.A. Voznesensky. In 5 minutes - Beria. The four of them discussed something for less than half an hour. At 22:00 Voznesensky left the office, and 15 minutes later, Beria. At 22-45 Stalin was visited by People's Commissar for the Oil Industry I.K. Sedin. At 23-20 Kaganovich joined them. It can be assumed that the conversation was about the production and supply of petroleum products, incl. - about their transportation, especially military ones, because at 0-20 at night, the head of the military communications of the Red Army N.I. entered the office. Trubetskoy. He stayed with Stalin for 15 minutes. After him, Sedin and Kaganovich left the office. Molotov came out last.

There is information that in 1940 - in the first half of 1941, the Red Army lacked high-octane gasoline, which was used in aviation and for the bulk of tanks. The shortages arose due to the embargo that the United States established after the start of the Soviet-Finnish war at the end of 1939. It is believed that it was this that forced the People's Commissar of Defense to reduce the training of tank drivers and pilots to 10 hours (which later was one of the reasons for the large losses of tanks and aviation).

Other events: On May 27, the General Staff instructed the western border districts to urgently build field front command posts. At this time, the transfer of additional troops to the western border continued. May 28 - 29, 1941 (Wednesday - Thursday) Non-reception

days in the Kremlin office. Military

printing houses began mass production of the "Russian-German Phrase Book" for field troops (soldiers and commanders). May 30, 1941 (Friday)

Three people visited Stalin within two hours - Molotov, Finland's envoy to the USSR Yu.K. Paasikivi and People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A.I. Mikoyan. Stalin talked to the Finnish envoy for 17 minutes. There is information (from an article by the already mentioned M. Nikitin) that in a conversation with Paasikivi, he started talking about friendly Soviet-Finnish relations, which he intended to back up with the supply of 20 thousand tons of grain. The goal was the same as in relations with Romania - to split Finland from Germany, but this attempt failed. From 16-50 to 20-10 Stalin holds the next military aviation meeting, in which: P.F. Zhigarev - head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army; A.M. Shakhurin - people's commissar of the aviation industry; A.S. Yakovlev - his deputy; P.V. Dementyev is another of his deputy; A.T. Tretyakov - director of the aircraft factory No 3; M.I. Gurevich - aircraft designer; F.F. Petrov - designer of artillery weapons. In addition, Malenkov, who came to Stalin for 5 minutes, was at the meeting. earlier (16-45). Molotov appeared at the end of the meeting. He and Malenkov for 10 min. delayed and left at 20-20.

June 1 - 2, 1941 (Sunday - Monday) Non-reception days in the Kremlin office. Before the German attack 3 weeks. June 3, 1941

(Tuesday) It seems that a series of military, military aviation and internal affairs with a military bias was diluted with purely peaceful problems: for an hour and a half (from 18-00 to 19-30) Stalin received the People's Commissar of Education of the RSFSR V.P. Potemkin and historian Academician E.V. Tarle. Although, there is a suspicion that changes in ideological work could be discussed in connection with upcoming events in foreign policy. At that time (in June) intensive work was going on to restructure propaganda in the Red Army in order to explain military operations against Germany in order to liberate the European countries from its occupation. And in this regard, it was necessary to make changes in the ideological work with the entire population, incl. to school education.

At 19-45 for 10 minutes. Stalin was visited by the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A.I. Mikoyan. Then the topics of conversations began to smoothly switch again to military issues. At 20-05 for 20 min. Malenkov came in, followed by Khrushchev (20-25 - 21-00) And at 20-45 purely military specialists appeared - Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. They talked with Stalin for almost three hours - until 23-30. Moreover, for the last 50 minutes. They were joined by People's Commissar for the Aviation Industry Shakhurin, who stayed at Stalin's for 15 minutes. (until 23-45). June 4 - 5, 1941

(Wednesday - Thursday) Stalin did not receive anyone in the Kremlin office. But there is information that on June 4 a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee was held, at which, in particular, it was decided to create by July 1, 1941 in the Red Army "one rifle division, staffed by personnel of Polish nationality and knowing the Polish language" (total number 10 298 people) (paragraph 183 of the protocol, source - "NEW AND NEWEST HISTORY", 1993, No 2, p. 24). The author of the journal cand. ist. Sciences B.V. Sokolov insists that this fact is clear evidence of the very close start of the war of the USSR in the western direction (ie with Germany).

There is information that on June 4 a meeting of the Main Military Council was held, at which a draft directive on the tasks of party political work in the army was considered ("Brief History (Wars)", Moscow, 1965, p. 58). Malenkov allegedly did not like that "the document is primitively presented, as if we were going to fight tomorrow." This opinion can be viewed in different ways. It is also possible that about a month before the scheduled start of the war, it was still too early to state these goals directly. And the document was sent for processing.

Date "June 5, 1941" stands on a top secret document of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Special Military District. The document was signed by the deputy head of the department, Lieutenant Colonel Mashkov, and the head of the 3rd department of this department, Major Samoylovich. "SUMMARY OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE WESTERN SPECIAL MILITARY DISTRICT ON THE CONCENTRATION OF GERMAN TROOPS IN THE BORDER REGIONS WITH THE USSR". (Published in the collection "HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941", Moscow, 1992, pp. 42 - 48). IN

The document has the following sections:

- About military units; -
- Military transportation and movement; -
- Observations of the Soviet territory (according to military observation data); -
- Intensive preparation of the theater [of military operations];
-

Miscellaneous; - Conclusion. Some quotes from the document: "The intelligence and other data received during the specified period [May 25, June 5] confirms the deployment: in Ostroleka - the 903rd infantry regiment and up to the artillery regiment; in Rozhan - 203rd, 512th and 513th infantry regiments; in Tsekhanov and Mlawa - battalions of assault detachments; in Sedlec - the 537th cavalry regiment, in Warsaw - the 478th division, stationed in Wloclawek, the transfer of German troops to our borders continues. From Warsaw along the highway to Vyshkov, Ostrov, Brok, infantry, artillery and tanks move daily at night. shelf....

According to the defector, a soldier of the cavalry squadron of the 478th division, stationed in Wloclawek, the transfer of German troops to our borders continues. From Warsaw along the highway to Vyshkov, Ostrov, Brok, infantry, artillery and tanks move daily at night.

...

Based on a number of undercover and other data, the preparation of the theater in the anti-ZapOVO band, especially since May 25, is being carried out more intensively and is characterized by the following:

...

The movement of civilians in the border strip has been reduced to a minimum. The entire strip in the immediate vicinity of the border was reinforced with artillery and machine-gun positions, with the organization of telephone communications between batteries and command and observation posts completed.

Recently, artillery exercises with live firing have become more frequent. The population of the border strip ... was evicted to the hinterland.

...

The population of villages and cities received official instructions that if anyone panicked during the war, they would be shot on the spot.

All civilian medical institutions... are occupied by hospitals.

...

The covert mobilization of officials for future positions in the western regions of the USSR is coming to an end.

...

In Warsaw, Malkinya, Ostroleka there are several thousand German railway workers sent from France, Belgium and Germany, who, after the entry of German troops into Soviet territory, are intended to work in various cities and railway stations June 6, 1941 (Friday) The reception began with a conversation with

Stalin's economic

deputy Voznesensky (17-35 - 18-35). And then there were two regular

military meetings.

The first one (from 18:40 to 20:35) was devoted to military aviation. It was attended by: Malenkov, Zhigarev, Petrov, Head of the Housing Construction Department of the Moscow City Council V.F. Mosolov, Director of Plant No. 752 of the People's Commissariat for Armaments E.A. Demin, as well as unidentified persons Schenkman and Vostrov. The last four left the meeting 25 minutes earlier (at 20:00), while Malenkov, on the contrary, was late and left at 20:35. At

20-50 for 5 minutes, People's Commissar for Finance A.G. came to Stalin. Zverev. And after it, a second, now purely military meeting took place with Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin (20-35 -

23-00). June 7, 1941

(Saturday) It seems that this day turned out to be more nervous for Stalin than the previous ones. This is indicated by the fact that Beria and Malenkov visited him three times: at 20-45 21-00, at 22-05

- 22-35 and at 22-40 - 23-25. All this time (from 20-45 to 23-35) Molotov was with h other faces appeared briefly: deputy.

Beria B.Z. Kobulov (20-45 - 21-00); 1st

Deputy NKID A.Ya. Vyshinsky;

People's Commissar for the Oil Industry I.K. Sedin (21-45 - 22-50);

Commissar of the Navy N.G.

Kuznetsov; Timoshenko and Zhukov

(22-25 - 22-50). June 8,

1941 (Sunday) Day off. Two weeks

before the war. Quote from the book of Marshal I.Kh. Baghramyan

"THIS IS THE WAR BEGIN" (Kyiv, 1984, p. 65), who at that time served as the head of

of the operational department by the deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District: [In early June]

"information began to arrive in the intelligence department of the district, one more disturbing than the other. Our intelligence officer, Colonel G.I. Bondarev, became almost the commander's most frequent visitor. We noticed that after each conversation with him, MP Kirponos became more and more gloomy. There were enough grounds for alarm. Bondarev daily informed the operational department about information coming

from various sources. At the end of the first decade of June, the commander convened a Military Council, at which the head of the intelligence department reported everything that he had it is known...

Now up to two hundred echelons with troops and military equipment arrive daily in the

"We have verified information," Bondarev reported, "that the Germans evicted all civilians from the border zone on the territory of occupied Poland. At the same time, the German commandant's offices warned the local Polish authorities: if hostilities begin, the population should not create panic, otherwise they will be shot on the spot. The Germans occupied all civilian medical institutions on the territory of Poland for military hospitals, sent their medical personnel there ...".

The commander of the district, General Kirponos, ordered the army commanders to take up field positions prepared in the forward zones of the fortified areas (in the "foreground") with small subdivisions of troops. And he reported it to Moscow. And in accordance with the directive from Moscow, the corps of the second echelon of the district are waiting for an order to advance directly to the border. But the order has not yet arrived. Regarding the initiative of the commander, a telegram from Zhukov will arrive in a day with a demand to cancel it. A similar initiative to occupy the foreground was carried out in the Odessa military district. Moscow did not have time to cancel it.

June 9, 1941 (Monday)

Another meeting with the military. First (from 16-00 to 17-00) only with Tymoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. An hour later (at 18-00) Tymoshenko and Zhukov returned to Stalin for a large meeting until 23-35, in which, in addition to them, military and economic leaders took part:

Marshal K.E. Voroshilov - Chairman of the Defense Committee under the government;

Marshal G.I. Kulik - head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army; Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks G.M. Malenkov - representative

of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the Main Military

Council; G.N. Safonov - Deputy Prosecutor of the USSR; K.A. Voznesensky - head of the State Planning Committee of the USSR. At 19-40 they were joined by two more: People's Commissar for Medium Machine Building and the future People's Commissar for Tank Industry V.A. Malyshev and People's Commissar of Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin, Malyshev left earlier - at 20-40. Apparently, the situation with Stalin's tanks did not bother him. At 20-40, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army P.F.

appeared. Zhigarev. Voroshilov, Malenkov and Zhigarev were the last but one to leave Stalin (at 23-25). The last ones left

at 23:35. June 10, 1941 (Tuesday) Stalin's

reception began late (at

22-15), there were few visitors

(seven) and you can add

the phrase: "all the same":

Molotov (remained until

the end of the day at 0-15); Mikoyan (22-15 - 23-20); Beria and Malenkov (22-30 - 0-15); Kobulov (22-35 - 23-05); Shakhurin (23-00 - 0-15); Kaganovich (23-25 - 0-15). Other events: The General Staff demanded that a withdrawal plan be urgently developed in the

western military

districts and that parts of the fortified areas (UR) be engaged in the military installations of the UR, and the field troops - the foreground installations. June 11, 1941 (Wednesday) Again, the reception time began late (at 21-00) and again with a military

and military-aviation bias. First, three people came to Stalin - Molotov, Mikoyan and Beria's deputy V.N. Merkulov. The first two left at 21-50, Merkulov - at 22-15. From 9:55 pm to 10:55 pm, Stalin holds an hour-long

meeting with top military officers consisting of: Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kuznetsov and two to

Military Council of the Baltic Military District P.L. Dibrov. It is possible that, among other issues, the progress of work on the revision of the draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" was discussed, which was supposed to send troops to military operations against Germany in order to liberate European countries from its occupation. (The draft directive Malenkov handed over to Stalin for approval on June 20, 1941)

At 23:00 Malenkov appears in Stalin's office, and from 23:05 another large military aviation meeting begins, in which Zhukov, Petrov, aircraft designer Mikoyan

take part; test pilot P.M. Stefanovsky (from 23-15); Zhigarev (from 23-20); test pilot K.K.

Kokkinaki (from

23-35). Zhukov, Mikoyan and test pilots left at

0-15, the rest from 1-15 to 1-30. June 12 - 13, 1941 (Thursday - Friday)

Non-

reception days. Just over a week before

the war. Other events: On June 12, 1941, with the

permission of the government, the People's Commissar of Defense

ordered the military councils of the border districts to begin moving troops from the deep rear closer to the state border. The actions of the Germans according

to the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan (p. 75): "General D.S.

Pisarevsky, chief of staff of the 5th Army, flew to Kiev. ... Pisarevsky reported that the Germans were strengthening their grouping every day. It is especially alarming that the fascists began to remove all the engineering barriers installed on the border. Now they are feverishly accumulating shells and air bombs, and stacking them directly on the ground, which means they do not count on long-term storage. Attacks can be expected any minute Your report on the situation the chief of staff of the army ended with a question: isn't it time to announce a combat alert to the troops covering the state border? ...

On the same day, a report was received from the Chief of Staff of the 26th Army, I.S. Varennikov. The colonel reported: "The Germans are preparing the starting position for the

offensive." June 14, 1941 (Saturday)

The reception is late, there are few visitors - five, among them there are aviation specialists:

Malenkov (20-45 - 22-35);
Kobulov (20-55 - 21-00);
Shakhurin (20-20 - 22-35);
his deputy Dementiev (20-20 - 22-35);
Khrushchev (23-00 -

23-20). Other events: General Zhukov allowed the command of the Odessa Military District to separate the army command (9th Army) and withdraw it to Tiraspol by June 21. In addition, the General Staff ordered the withdrawal of front control (North-Western, Western and South-Western) to field front command posts by June 23 (South-Western - by June 25). On that day, the famous "TASS Statement" was published stating that neither Germany was preparing a war against the USSR, nor the USSR was preparing a war against Germany. Relations between the countries are assessed as very friendly and peaceful. There is a recollection of June 14 in the memoirs of

Marshal Zhukov (volume 1 of the indicated edition, pp. 297-298): "On June 13, S.K. Timoshenko called I.V.

districts on combat readiness and deployment of the first echelons according to cover plans.

- Let's think, - answered I.V. Stalin.

The next day we were both at I.V. Stalin and reported to him about the anxious mood and the need to bring the troops to full combat readiness. - Do you propose to

mobilize the country, raise troops now and move them to the western borders? This is war! Do you both understand this or not?... During our conversation with I.V.

Stalin, his secretary A.N. entered the office. Poskrebyshchev and reported that N.S. was calling. Khrushchev from Kyiv. I.V. Stalin picked up the phone. From the answers we understood that the conversation was about agriculture. - Good, - I.V. said smiling.

Stalin. Apparently, N.S. Khrushchev in rainbow colors reported on good harvest prospects...

We left the Kremlin with a heavy feeling. "Note:
judging by the entries in Stalin's visitor's log in the Kremlin on June 14,
Timoshenko and Zhukov did not visit him, and Khrushchev visited him personally.
As for the advance of troops to the western border, Timoshenko, according to some
reports, gave an order of approximately the same meaning two days earlier.
Conclusions are still being skipped... June 15, 1941 (Sunday) The last Sunday
before the war. Stalin has a day
off. From the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan (p. 75): June advance of all
five rifle corps of the second echelon to the border.
Everything was already prepared for this in our country: back in early May, by
order of Moscow, we carried out significant work - we prepared directives for the
corps, carried out reconnaissance of movement routes and areas of concentration.
Now it only remained to give the command to the performers. We didn't hesitate to
do it."

June 16, 1941 (Monday) Stalin
received two - Voznesensky (17-05 - 17-20) and Khrushchev (17-40 17-55).
June 17, 1941
(Tuesday) Again the
reception began late. Molotov appeared first (at 20-15) and stayed until its end
at 1-50. From 20-20 to 21-00 Stalin
confers with three representatives of internal affairs and security: Merkulov,
Kobulov and Deputy People's Commissar of the State Security for Personnel M.V.
Gribov.
At 21:45 Kaganovich arrived (and stayed until the end at 1:50).
From 22-00 to 22-30 Stalin was visited by General Vatutin, from 22-50 to 23-10
People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR I.T. Peresypkin. And from
23-10 military aviation specialists come to the office: Shakhurin, Petrov, Yakovlev (at
24-00), Zhigarev (at 0-45). All of them stayed until the end of the reception at 1-50.
Other events: German ships began to leave the Soviet
ports.
Somewhere in these days, the command of the Baltic Military District decided
to send the families of the commanders away from the border and reported this to
Moscow. June 18, 1941
(Wednesday)

Before the German attack a little more than three days. Stalin talks with military and military aviation leaders, holding two meetings, moreover, the second becomes a continuation and development of the first. But first, Molotov (20-00 - 0-30), then Timoshenko and Zhukov (20-25 - 0-30), Malenkov (20-45 - 0-30), Kobulov (22-25 - 23-00). And at 23-10 five appear at once: Zhigarev, Shakhurin, Yakovlev, Petrov and Voroshilov. Apparently that evening it was decided to postpone the occupation of the front-line command post by the headquarters of the Kiev OVO from June 25 to June 22 (for the rest, the deadline remained the same - by June 23). June 19, 1941 (Thursday)

There is no reception in

Stalin's Kremlin office, but many events took place on this day, indicating the imminent approach of the war. According to the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan

(p. 81), on the morning of June 19, "a telegram from G.K. Zhukov arrived from Moscow stating that the People's Commissar of Defense ordered the creation of a front-line administration and transfer it to Tarnopol [now Ternopol] by June 22]. in "the strictest secrecy about what to warn the personnel of the headquarters of the district." We already had everything thought out in advance ... "

The headquarters of the western military districts received a directive from the People's Commissar of Defense to mask airfields, military units, warehouses, equipment parks and disperse aircraft at field airfields.

The fleets and flotillas received an order from the People's Commissar of the Navy to switch to

operational readiness No 2. The command of the Leningrad, Baltic and Odessa military districts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense to work out interaction with the Baltic and Black Sea fleets within two days. From the

memoirs of the former commander of the Soviet naval base on the Finnish peninsula Hanko S.I. Kabanova (garrison size - 25,000 people) (source - Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov's memoirs "ON THE FLEET BATTLE ALARM", Moscow, 1971, p. 64):

"Late on the evening of June 19, the Soviet plenipotentiary [ambassador] in Finland S.I. Zotov arrived across the border in Hanko. He said that we should expect the outbreak of war with Germany and Finland ... Within 20

On June 21 and on the night of June 22, all the forces of the base, by order of the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, were brought to full combat readiness ... "

But this fact is very strange from the point of view of the hypothesis of an "unexpected" German attack. If we take into account the fact that Stalin did not expect him, then the People's Commissar of Defense (whether he guessed something or not) could not independently ask the ambassador in Finland to go to the commander of the military base. And if he knew and asked without telling Stalin about it, then why didn't he give a similar order to all other units and formations of all the western military districts? And since the rest of the units and formations did not receive such an order on June 19, it turns out that the ambassador in Finland was carrying out some kind of special mission on orders from Moscow. For he himself, on his own initiative, also could not go to the commander with a warning about an attack, which was not expected in Moscow. The commander of any military unit is in no way subordinate to civilian officials. He obeys only the orders of higher commanders. But the military base in Hanko was in a special position - far from its own on the territory of a country that could turn out to be an enemy in a war. And if in Moscow they planned to start a war in the near future, then it was absolutely necessary to warn the commander of a distant military base about this. Moreover, it was dangerous to use radio communications for this purpose. The most reliable method is to send a messenger with verbal information. Moreover, it is logical that the ambassador warned not about the German attack, but simply about the war with Germany and Finland. Because it can start in different ways. And since June 19, a strange story is connected with one very important

decree - on the announcement of mobilization in the USSR from June 23, 1941

As officially recognized, the decree on mobilization in the USSR was adopted on June 22, but the beginning of mobilization was announced from the next day - June 23. This moment is incomprehensible from the point of view of the normal logic of an unexpected enemy attack. The fact is that mobilization for combat units is usually planned in a matter of days. As mentioned above, according to the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky, for example, according to the mobilization plan, the mobilization of the troops of the second echelon of the border districts took from several hours to one day (according to other sources - from three to five days). Moreover, according to normal logic, in the event of an unexpected

enemy attacks, mobilization must be announced immediately. And in June 1941 in the USSR it was postponed for a whole day! Incredible! And this oddity drew the attention of some authors. And there

is one strange document on this event - a leaflet with the text of the Decree. Her photograph was published in various books about the war, but not a single historian paid much attention to her.

On the one hand, everything seems to be logical and understandable. There is such a photograph in the very famous book "The GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. ENCYCLOPEDIA" (Moscow, 1985, circulation 500,000 copies. p. 452, editor-in-chief of the publication - army general, professor Kozlov M.M.). Previously, thousands of people had seen it, including myself, but only now I accidentally focused on the date of the Decree and read it as: Moscow, Kremlin June 19, 1941. I

sent news of this
fact to Viktor

Suvorov, I thought it would come in handy, this his theme (however, he did not indicate the name of the source). He faxed back:

I installed a leaflet with the Decree on mobilization [inaudible] - "The GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. ENCYCLOPEDIA", Moscow, 1985, p. But the picture is so small that it is impossible to see the date. You paid attention to the date, and this is a real discovery. I gave your copy for electronic examination. Result: the first digit is "1", there is a 100% guarantee. The second digit is "3" for a 73% chance, or "9" for a 97% chance. In any case, the leaflet was signed for printing before June 20, 1941. Please don't give up on this...

For the second digit, I tend to consider "9", because from the 13th to the 23rd is a long time. "19" number is more logical. But when I gave the Xerox pages to other people to look at, they used to say the number "13". I think it's because the photo is implemented using the method of dots and the extra dot "blurs" the number "9", turning it into a "3". But it doesn't matter anymore. The important thing is that the first number is not "2", but "1". But why is the date June 22 given in the exposition of this Decree? Although, on the other hand, it is she who is more correct, as the day the aggression against the USSR began.

It turns out that leaflets about mobilization were prepared in advance and a decision was made in advance to start mobilization from June 23! Oddly enough, but this small number, in principle, logically explains almost everything. But first it is useful to discuss the situation with this leaflet in general. Firstly, there is

no image of her in large serious works devoted to that war - neither in the multi-volume History of the Great Patriotic War, nor in the multi-volume History of the Second World War. Moreover, there is no mention of this leaflet in the special catalog of the Central Museum of the Revolution of the USSR, which is called "LEAFLETS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1941-1945" and was published in Moscow in 1985. For June 22, 1941, there is a leaflet with the text of Molotov's speech.

There is no information about this leaflet in another catalog: "HEROES GREAT SOVIET LEAFLETS AND FEATS OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR 1941 - 1945." (Moscow, 1958, 553 pp.).

Strange situation. This is approximately as if a painting, for example, Leonardo da Vinci's "Monna Lisa" was shown everywhere, and there would be no information about it in any catalog. That's the question, that paintings begin to be appreciated if the data about them gets into the catalogs. But you can

see that if the image of the leaflet is in other publications, then just look at the date on them. Indeed, such images exist. For example, in the book "SOVIET UKRAINE DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS ..." in 3 volumes, volume 1) - but the date is blurred! There is a leaflet itself in the Ukrainian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War on the banks of the Dnieper. But firstly, the leaflet's paper is suspiciously very white, especially against the background of nearby documents on strongly yellowed paper. And secondly, the signature on it with some line: Moscow, the Kremlin on June 22, 1941. Another

oddity is the very fact of the

presence of leaflets on the announcement of mobilization. What are they needed for? It has already been said above that mobilization should be carried out very quickly - in a few days. Moreover, this period includes not only the arrival of storekeepers at military enlistment offices or collection points (hours are allotted for this according to the plan),

but also their movement to assigned units, dressing in uniform, receiving weapons, conducting combat rallying (so that members of crews, crews, squads get to know each other and can do combat work), as well as basic training if necessary (for example, show "charger" how to snatch shell cases and throw away extra charges). And what did the Soviet leadership do on June 22, 1941? It

decided to postpone the start of mobilization for 1 day. Incredible!

And how could leaflets help? Maybe they decided to move the dates precisely because of them, in order to have time to collect them, multiply them, deliver them and stick them up? But by lunchtime on June 23, 1941, their relevance and necessity will decrease to zero. It's like a football match poster, for example, on June 23 at 12-00. At 12-10 on June 23, they will turn into waste paper. And besides, throughout the second half of June 22, 1941, information about the German attack was a constant topic on the radio. Why are flyers needed? And how can they be typed, printed, transported and posted in the

remaining half day of June 22? If there is a desire to use leaflets, then they must be prepared in advance, but do not indicate the date. The text should be general, for example: "Attention! By decree [of the country's legislature] mobilization has been announced today!" And there are no specific dates on which day to start and on what day the Decree was adopted. "Today!" - that says it all. In extreme cases, the day can be added by hand, or

slapped with a stamp. In short, the whole situation with leaflets about the mobilization of June 23, 1941 somehow does not fit into the normal rules for repelling

unexpected aggression. But let's imagine that (it's scary to say) the Soviet Union was still preparing an attack on Germany, as some researchers assure. In this case, the General Staff had to (obliged) to develop plans in advance. Was something similar done in 1939-1940 in the USSR? Answer: done! And this is openly written in the same memoirs of an employee of the General Staff, Marshal Vasilevsky (which is discussed above).

By the way, there is official confirmation that the deployment of the Red Army in wartime states was indeed planned for the summer of 1941. This is stated in the operational summary

No. 1 of the General Staff for June 22, 1941, at the end of which the phrase was used: "The enemy, having forestalled our troops in deployment, forced the Red Army units to take up battle in the process of taking up their starting position according to the cover plan" ("Military History Journal", No 8, 1992, page 30). But excuse me, you can only "preempt" what should have taken place. So, in the summer of 1941, the Soviet command planned mobilization! What for? For planned exercises? At the borders with a possible enemy? Did you find another place?

Some researchers name the start date of the Soviet offensive according to the Grom plan - July 6, 1941. But if this is true, then the deployment of troops with the announcement of mobilization should have passed earlier. It has already been said above about the need for at least 3-5 days for its implementation. But we still need to bring the regiments deployed in wartime states to their starting lines and make more thorough preparations, check equipment, and so on. This may also take several days. As a result, from the beginning of mobilization to full readiness, it should take from a week to two. If the offensive was planned for July 6, 1941, then the start of mobilization could well have been scheduled for June 23. And knowing the specific dates, you can print leaflets

in advance. But again there is a contradiction. It has already been said above that on the day they are posted, this news will become No. 1 in the whole world. How, then, to explain its cause

to the neighbors (the same Germans?). There can be only one reason - provocations at the border. If provocations of the second class are not found by

the right time, then the third can be used. By the way, when one reads the numerous descriptions of the pre-war days, Stalin's strong fear of giving the Germans a pretext for provocations is striking. Very, very strange! He was not afraid of the German attacks! He attributed all reports of Soviet intelligence about the date of this event to disinformation. But information about the imminent start of the war came not only from intelligence. In early June 1941 (according to other sources - May 5) ("BOOK OF HISTORICAL SENSATIONS", Moscow, "Raritet", 1993, p. 54) the head of the foreign department of the OGPU, Vladimir Dekanozov, was informed by the German ambassador Count von der Sch

words that the history of diplomacy has not yet known such a case! But Stalin did not believe this time either and declared at a meeting of the Politburo: "Disinformation is already spreading at the level of ambassadors." (Information, for example, from the article by Viktoria Galuzinskaya "STALIN "HANDED" ZORGE?" in the newspaper "KIEVSKIE NEWS", No. 44, 25.10.1996). It turns out that Stalin, categorically denying the large-scale attack of the Germans, was very afraid of

some kind of provocation! What does it mean? Maybe he was afraid not of provocations as such, but of UNTIMELY provocations? Provocations of the 2nd class not according to plan? Then what should have taken place? Third class? Arranged by

their own? But strictly according to plan? Let's do an experiment. Let's assume that leaflets were pre-printed in the USSR with the beginning of mobilization on 06/23/1941. This means that at least June 22, 1941, provocations (apparently, the 3rd class) should have happened on the Soviet-German border. Stalin went to bed late. Falling asleep on the night of June 22, 1941, he should have known that sometime in the morning, perhaps after 7 o'clock, he should be awakened with information about provocations. But they woke up earlier, according to Zhukov - at 3 hours 25 minutes (according to other sources - about 4 in the morning). The Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, who reported that the Germans started the war, bombed airfields and opened fire on the Red Army. And he asked for permission to respond.

If he feared an attack, waited and prepared for it, then he would have to immediately agree, and even hurry Zhukov. But strictly speaking, if he really expected an attack, then he would not have gone to bed at all that night. If he expected that day

not an attack, but provocations, then he should have thought, and the course of his thoughts could be something like this: "What happened? What time is it? Around four in the morning? Have they ["provokers"] gone crazy? Maybe "someone went crazy" and they had to start earlier? But why on such a scale? What other bombings? Always this Beria [or whoever was the head of the "provocateurs"] arranges excesses! It will be necessary to hit him on the first number! But attack the Germans No troops deployed!... Devil! But nothing can be changed! We'll have to start the "game"

diplomatic channels. It is urgent to call Molotov, Malenkov, "besiege" the military ...
".

While he was thinking all this, Zhukov, who knows the value of minutes in such situation, again began to ask questions. And Stalin answered...

Once again I confess that I invented Stalin's thoughts, and now let's see how he really reacted. His answer to Zhukov is recorded in history, in the memoirs of the famous marshal, who wrote: "To repeated questions [because Stalin was silent for a long time, finally] he answered:" These are provocative actions of the German military, do not open fire, so as not to unleash wider actions, tell Poskrebyshev to call Molotov and Malenkov by 5 o'clock. You and Timoshenko should come to the meeting." Stalin reaffirmed his idea about the provocations of the German military when [I] arrived at the Central Committee. Until 6:30 he did not give permission for retaliatory actions. And only after the report of V. M. Molotov about the fact that the Hitlerite government declared war on the USSR, I. V. Stalin authorized the signing of Directive No. 2, and then with limited effect. (The quote is taken from the article by General Colonel of the Reserve Yu.A. Gorkov and Colonel Yu.I. Semin "STRATEGIC MISTAKES OF THE SUPREME?" in VIZH, No 8, 1992). And the oddities continued. According to the article, by 9 o'clock the General Staff prepared draft Decrees of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the conduct of general mobilization and the formation of the Headquarters of the High Command. But

Stalin, after hearing S. K. Timoshenko (People's Commissar for Defense) and after several consultations, made changes to the draft Decree on mobilization. In particular, he limited the draft age (from 1905 to 1918) and reduced the territories covered by the Decree on mobilization, removing the Central Asian and Trans-Baikal military districts, as well as the Far Eastern Front from the list. The authors of the article explain the decrease in the territory of the mobilization by the fact that their assigned staff was very useful in the battle of Moscow. The explanation is strange.

Firstly, after the announcement of mobilization on June 23, until the end of 1941, several more mobilizations were carried out: in August, those liable for military service in 1890-1904 and conscripts in 1922 and

1923 years of birth. And then the guys born in 1924 in connection with the reduction of the draft age in wartime conditions to 17 years. And the conscripts of 1919 - 1921 had already been drafted into the Red Army earlier, in 1939 - 1940. In addition, volunteers of any age were recruited into the people's militia. And note that no one remembers leaflets on these occasions! Secondly, how could June 22,

1941 think about the winter battles near Moscow? Thirdly, with whom could

Stalin consult, having before his eyes all the top military leaders who prepared the draft Decree on mobilization? (Obviously, it extended to the entire territory of the country with immediate entry into force - that is, from June 22, 1941). He could consult only with that senior military man who at that

time did not hold a large official position, but was privy to all the details of the previous plan. This person could only be Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, who was gently removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff after the war with Finland, but who was the main author of the war plan on the western border (according to Vasilevsky). And if leaflets about the beginning of mobilization from 06/23/1941 were indeed prepared in

advance, then the need for consultation becomes clear.

Shaposhnikov, having the same information about the Red Army as Stalin, apparently decided

that there was no point in changing the pre-prepared text, which he advised Stalin, who made the appropriate changes to the draft Decree of June 22. And he ordered to use the pre-prepared leaflets for their intended purpose. So two versions of one Decree could appear.

June 20, 1941 (Friday)

Big reception day, which began at 19-55, when three came - Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov. All of them remained with Stalin until the end of the reception at 0-45. At 20-15, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade Mikoyan appeared (he left at 0-15). At 20-20 Beria came for the whole evening, at 20-45 - his deputy Merkulov (for 30 minutes). At 22-00 Vyshinsky appeared, who left at 23-20 before a large military aviation meeting. It started at the same 23-20. It was first attended

(together with Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and Beria): aircraft designer Mikoyan, director of aircraft factory No. 1 Tretyakov, Shakhurin, Malenkov, Zhigarev, artillery weapons designer Petrov (the last three came to Stalin at 23-45). The meeting (as well as reception time in general) ended at 0-45.

Other events: Malenkov handed over to Stalin a draft directive of the GUPPKA "On the tasks of political propaganda in the Red Army in the near future" on the restructuring of propaganda with a bias towards targeting military operations against Germany. On

June 20, the Main Military Council of the Fleet demanded that commanders and political workers "educate Red Navy men and commanders in the spirit of constant readiness to engage in battle with the enemy." On the evening of June 20, a part of the headquarters of the Southwestern

Front left Kyiv for Ternopol by train. A categorical order came from the People's Commissariat of Defense to the headquarters of the Baltic Military District to immediately return all the families of commanders who were taken out from the border to

their old places (later many of them were captured). June 21, 1941 (Saturday) It is more interesting to start the review of this day with the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov about 06/21/41. In his book, he writes that in the evening of that day, a message was received about a German defector, sergeant major, who stated that "German troops are leaving for the starting areas for an offensive that will begin on the morning of June 22." For some reason, Zhukov immediately believed this message and reported to Marshal Timoshenko and Stalin. Stalin offered to visit him in the Kremlin. Further, the marshal writes that he went to the Kremlin together with Timoshenko and General Vatutin. Stalin asked them what to do? They offered to send the directive to the troops and read its draft. However, Stalin suggested that changes be made. Because of this, Zhukov and Vatutin had to rewrite the draft directive in the next room. The marshal has the following words in his memoirs: "Without wasting time, N.F. Vatutin and I went into another room and quickly drew up a draft directive of the people's commissar. Returning to the office, we asked permission to report. I.V. Stalin, having listened to the draft directive, himself After reading it again, I made some corrections and

After that, General Vatutin took the directive to the General Staff in order to transfer it to the headquarters of the border districts (by teletype).

So, the main characteristics of this event are as follows: - scene:

Stalin's Kremlin office; - time of action: the evening

of June 21, 1941; - Characters: Stalin,

Marshal Timoshenko, Generals Zhukov, Vatutin and unspecified members of the Politburo. But now you can return to

the log of visitors to Stalin's office and see if the marshal's information converges with documentary records? On the evening of June 21, Stalin was visited by the following persons: Molotov Voroshilov Beria Voznesensky Malenkov Kuznetsov

Timoshenko

19-05

- 20-15 19-05

- 20-15

Safonov

Timoshenko

Zhukov

Budyonny

Mehlis Beria

19-05 - 20-15

20-50 - 22-20

20-50 - 22-20

20-50 - 22-20

21- 55 -

22-20 22-40

- 23-00

Judging by this list, General Vatutin's leg was not in Stalin's Kremlin office on the evening of 06/21/1941. In other words, Marshal Zhukov refused to tell the truth about the meaning of Directive No. 1.

Other events: on this day, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution on the formation of the Southern Front. However, the formation of its administration was entrusted not to the command of the Odessa military district, but to the Moscow one, from which the operational group

immediately went to Vinnitsa. By the same decree, the army of the reserve of the High Command, advanced to the border of the Dnieper, were united by a single command headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny.

On the Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov was entrusted with the overall leadership of the Southwestern and Southern Fronts, and General of the Army K.A. Meretskov - North-Western. General Meretskov went by train to Leningrad somewhere on the night of June 21-22, so that he listened to Molotov's speech on the radio at 12 noon on June 22 on the road. And there are memories of Meretskov himself about how he spent the evening of June 21, 1941 ("IN THE SERVICE OF THE PEOPLE", Moscow, 1968, p. 209).

"I was summoned to my immediate superior, the people's commissar of defense, who had been in a particularly tense state for the last few days. And although I understood the reason for his nervous state, although I saw with my own eyes what was happening on the western border, the words of the people's commissar entered unusually sharply and anxiously into my consciousness, SK Timoshenko said then;

"Perhaps the war will start tomorrow!" You need to be as a representative of the High Command in the Leningrad Military District. You know his troops well and will be able to help the leadership of the district if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations.

- What are my powers in case of an armed attack? -
I asked. -

Exposure first of all. Be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do."

Strange, again the fear of some kind of "provocation"! (And on which it is impossible to immediately open fire!) If the country was preparing only for defense, then any talk about "provocations" is meaningless. Order

should be simple and short: "The attacking enemy is destroyed!" Or, for example, the one that on the evening of June 21 was given by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, to three fleets and two flotillas: "SF, KBF, Black Sea Fleet, PVF, DRF, operational readiness number one immediately.

Kuznetsov." In the middle of the day on June 21, the first column of vehicles of the created headquarters of the Southwestern Front left Kyiv for Ternopil, and

in the evening the second.

June 22, 1941 (Sunday) Judging by the entries in the journal, something extraordinary happened that no one expected. Reception began unusually early - at 5-45. Five came first: Molotov, Beria, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Mekhlis

At 7-30 - Malenkov and Vyshinsky. It was Vyshinsky who compiled the text of the appeal, which Molotov then spoke on the radio and in which were the words: "The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours!"

At 7-55 - Mikoyan.

At 8-00 - Kaganovich and

Voroshilov. At 8-15 - People's

Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov. At 8-15 the military left the office:

Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kuznetsov, Mekhlis. The rest of the time until 13-05 many different people appeared in the office and left it - G. Dimitrov, D. Manuisky, Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Beria,

Malenkov and others. At 13-15, for the first time in many days, the former chief of the General Staff, Marshal B.M., came to Stalin.

Shaposhnikov. And at 14-00 three top military men appear at once:

Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. At 3:20 pm People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov joins them, and at 3:30 pm - Marshal Kulik. At 3:45 pm Kuznetsov left the office. The final meeting with the military that day ended at 16:00, when Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin and Kulik left Stalin. Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria were the last (until 4:45 pm) with Stalin. The next day

(June 23), the reception began even earlier - at 3-20. The war has begun. Due to

the importance of the events, it would be useful to compare the actions of the country's top leadership on this day with the memoirs of their participants. But Stalin did not leave memoirs, Timoshenko flatly

refused, Vatutin died in 1944, Shaposhnikov died in 1945. And only Marshal Zhukov, the only active person in the highest command of June 1941, prepared memoirs, which, among other things, went through several editions. But they (to put it mildly) for some reason suffer from inaccuracies regarding June 22, 1941. In particular, the marshal recalls (vol. 2, pp. 9-13): "At 4:30 in the morning, S.K. Timoshenko and I arrived at

the Kremlin. All the members of the Politburo who had been summoned were already assembled. The people's commissar and I were invited to the office. .." (Judging by the "records of visitors ...", the reception began more than an hour later).

"At about 9 o'clock in the morning, S.K. Timoshenko called I.V. Stalin and asked permission to come to the Kremlin again to report on the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the mobilization and formation of the Headquarters of the High Command, as well as a number of other

questions. The people's commissar's car and mine covered the short way from the people's commissariat to the Kremlin at extremely high speed. First Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. was with

me. Vatutin... We were met by A.N. Poskrebyshev and immediately escorted I.V. Stalin. Members of the Politburo were already there. The situation was tense. Everyone

was silent ... "(Judging by the" records of visitors ...", Timoshenko and Zhukov were Stalin's office on June 22 at the following hours:

from 5-45 to 8-15 and from 14-00

to 16-00 As for the "members of the Politburo", their simultaneous number in Stalin's office was small. In particular, M.I. Kalinin did not visit Stalin's office at all in June, although he was necessarily shown in films dedicated to that time).

We read the marshal's memoirs further:

"At about 13 o'clock I.V. Stalin called me and said: "Our front commanders do not have sufficient experience in directing the military operations of the troops and, apparently, were somewhat confused. The Politburo decided to send you to the Southwestern Front in as a representative of the Headquarters of the High Command. We will send Shaposhnikov and Kulik to the Western Front. I called them to my place and gave the appropriate instructions. You need to fly immediately to Kiev and from there, together with Khrushchev, go to the front headquarters in Ternopil....

I called home so that they would not wait for me, and after 40 minutes I was already in the air. I just remembered that I hadn't eaten anything since yesterday. The pilots helped me out by treating me with strong tea and

sandwiches." (Judging by the "visitor records ...", Zhukov was in Stalin's Kremlin office from 14-00 to 16-00 at a meeting with other military men (including Shaposhnikov) and could fly to Kiev no earlier than 16-30 - i.e. three hours later than he presents in his memoirs).

Further, Zhukov notes that he and Khrushchev arrived at the headquarters of the South-Western Front in Ternopil in cars "late in the evening", after which he spoke with N.F. Vatutin about Directive No. 3 on the offensive, with which he did not agree, but was forced to agree. After that, this directive arrived at the commander of the Southwestern Front at about 24 hours. About further actions, the marshal writes as follows: "As I expected, it provoked a sharp

objection from the chief of staff of the front, M.A. Purkaev, who believed that the front did not have the strength and means to put it into practice. The current

situation was discussed in detail at the Military Council of the front. I suggested to MP Kirponos that he immediately give a preliminary order to concentrate mechanized corps for a counterattack on the main grouping of armies "South", which had broken through in the Sokal area." These data can be compared

with the already cited memoirs of Marshal I.Kh. Bagramyan, who was at the same time in the same place - at the headquarters of the South-Western Front. Bagramyan gives a different version: after 22:00, a new operational directive of the People's Commissar of Defense (that is, No 3) began to arrive at the front headquarters via special communications. As it arrived, he handed it over to the chief of staff of the front (General Purkaev). Then they began to discuss it together with the commander (General Kirponos) and a member of the Military Council Vashugin. The discussion was lengthy, as a result of which Kirponos proposed to organize a counterattack by mechanized corps. And only after his details were clarified, did General Zhukov and Khrushchev, appointed to replace Vashugin (who shot himself at the end of June), arrive at the front headquarters.

From all this we can conclude: if in 1941 the Soviet side really prepared the defense against the strongest enemy and it was prepared as it should be according to military theory, then there would be no need to hide and twist the facts. It would be enough to state exactly what happened. But "newly discovered circumstances" clearly indicate that the preparation was somehow not like that, and that it is still undesirable to make it public.

details.

In particular, it turned out that it was undesirable to make public the figures for the production of armaments in the USSR for the whole of 1941. For example, in the 12th volume of the "History of the Second World War 1939-1945", on pages 168, 200, some data are given on the production of the most important types of military products in the USSR and in Germany in 1941-1945, but with a note that the

data are given: to 1941 for the USSR - from
July to December to 1945 for the USSR -
from January to August to 1945 for Germany - from

January to April Country
Year Small caliber weapons
Large caliber
weapons Combat
aircraft Rifles and carbines
Submachine guns
(machine guns) Machine guns
of all types
Guns of all
types
and

calibers Mortars Tanks and self-propelled guns USSR 1941 1567.1 89.7 106.2 30.2 42.

1942
4049.0
1506.4
356.1
127.1
230.0
4.4
21.7
USSR
1943
3436.2
2023.6
458.5
130.3
69.4
4.1
29.9
USSR
1944
2450.0
1970.8
439.1
122.4
7.1
9.0
33.2
USSR
1945
637.0
583.4
156.0
72.2
3.0
0.5
19.1
Germany
1941

1359.0

325.0

96.2

22.1

4.2

0.8

8.4

Germany

1942

1370.2

232.0

117.0

40.5

9.8

0.2

11.6

Germany

1943

2275.3

234

.3

263.0 73.7

23.0

0.7 19.3

Germany

1944

2855.7 228.6 509.4 148.2 33.2 8.3 34.1 Germany 1945 665.0

78.0

111.0 27.0 2.8 0.4 7.2 The fact that data for Germany for 1945 are given up to April is understandable. In May, the German military industry simply ceased to exist. But as regards the USSR in 1941, it cannot be said that military products were not produced in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1941. Ignoring these figures is not a scientific approach, but refers to "shuffling" and "falsification". And for what purposes this is being done - this is a very serious question. Such a situation is possible only if the Red Army implemented some plan of its own, the disclosure of which is still undesirable. The elements of this plan were "Directive No. 1", which was discussed above. But not only the meaning of its text indicates the presence of the Soviet plan, the number of the directive itself indicates its presence - the first number in the middle of the year. This happens only at the beginning of the work of a new control structure - in this case, the Headquarters of the High Command. Officially, it was created on June 23, 1941 under the leadership of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko. The General Staff, headed by Army General G.K. Zhukov, became its operational body. Moreover, it was supposed to be created as a command and control body for the headquarters of the fronts, the decision to deploy which was made in Moscow on June 19. And this is a clear preparation for war. And not for some 1942, but for the next few days. And this is evidenced by the situation with all the directives on June 21 and 22, and not just with the first one.

On that day, three directives were sent to the troops (headquarters of the fronts): at night at 00-25, in the morning at 7-15 and in the evening at 21-15. In different sources they are called differently. More specifically, the names are given in the collection "HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941" (Moscow, 1992, pp. 74 - 75). The second and third directives are called Directives of the Headquarters No 2 and No 3. The first is Directive of the High Command No 1. But it is clearly seen that there cannot be Directive No 2 without Directive No 1.

sent on behalf of the Headquarters, and with strange content. According to irrefutable data, a war will begin in a matter of hours, and the Stavka recalls some provocations, which cannot be fired back at. At the same time, it is called upon to meet a possible enemy strike, but apart from bringing the troops to combat readiness and carrying out a number of activities that require at least a day, permission to conduct hostilities was not given, and the phrase "no other activities without special orders can not be carried out" can generally be considered as a ban for military operations. What does it mean? It is impossible to understand such behavior

of the Soviet military command with the help of normal military logic. According to normal logic, when irrefutable information about an impending attack is received, it is necessary, firstly, to make a fuss through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and secondly, to urgently alert the troops, transfer their mode of life to high or full combat readiness and withdraw the most probable enemy strikes. And then the military themselves know how to behave if they shoot somewhere: suppress or destroy the enemy with return fire (otherwise the enemy will suppress or destroy them). Those who served in the army know this very well. Any training period in the troops begins with the development of one topic: "Waking up on alarm" (moreover, in different versions: companies, battalions, regiments or divisions). I can give an example from my own life, as once the commander of the Kantemirovskaya division raised the alarm. According to the action plan for such a case, I, with a group of soldiers, had to run to one of the warehouses and organize the loading of suitable trucks with ammunition. In accordance with the plan, we run to the warehouse, but there is a lock on its gates. I stand, I wait. And three-axle trucks have already begun to drive up to the warehouse. I keep waiting. Suddenly a general appears and asks: - What are you thinking about, lieutenant? - It's a castle, comrade

general! - And if our brothers
bleed, and you feel sorry for the
penny castle?...

- Mounting! I shout to the driver. But then a soldier from the maintenance unit appears from around the corner of the warehouse and opens the gate with trembling hands. My soldiers quickly set up the roller table and

along it they began to feed boxes with shells into the body of the first car and minami...

"BATTLE ALARM!" - that says it all! What further guidance is needed? The main thing is to have time to bring people, equipment and ammunition to the initial area for movement, and there it will be visible - by the noise of firing, firing and the roar of engines or by orders from above, the main of which in wartime is moving to the right place and taking up defense (or preparing to attack). And then whoever is lucky: "either you him, or he you." Every soldier of any combat unit should be ready for this. And now imagine the night of June 22, 1941 at the headquarters of one of

the western military districts. Headquarters Directive No. 1 finally warned of a possible outbreak of war (which the headquarters had long suspected), but then, instead of an order to raise a combat alert and advance in the path of possible enemy strikes, it provides a long list of various measures, the most strange of which is the prohibition on the use of return fire in the case of which the directive warns! (Personally, this is how I understand her words: "do not succumb to provocations" and "do not hold any other events without special orders"). For many years, historians only liked to mention this directive as evidence that something was being done to organize the country's defense. But they refused to analyze

it in detail. Only recently have more real comments begun to emerge. For example, in the already cited collection "HIDDEN TRUTH OF THE WAR: 1941", Moscow, 1992, on page 59 it says:

"The operational decisions of the military leadership on the first day of the war, in fact, turned out to be fruitless. The late directive [of the Headquarters] of the High Command No. 1 was half-hearted and indefinite. It actually prohibited the introduction of the plan for covering the state border. Directives of the Headquarters No. 2 and No 3. By this time, the border troops were either pinned down or dismembered by the initial attacks of the enemy, and the second echelons and reserves of military districts could not yet take part in battles due to their low combat capability. striking back at

to the enemy, which did not at all correspond to the actual situation, introduced disorganization into the combat activities of the headquarters and troops of the covering armies, almost completely disrupting their control.

It was no coincidence that I quoted with a commentary not only on Directive No. 1, but also on the other two. The fact is that Directive No. 3 on a broad offensive once again proves that by June 22, 1941, the Soviet high command did NOT CONSIDER the German grouping as a very dangerous enemy, which at that time had to be greatly feared. It was only later, in order to justify the huge losses, they began to explain what the strongest army was the Nazi Wehrmacht, how everyone was afraid of him and at any cost tried to delay the start of the war. And where, excuse me, did the Stavka's demand on the evening of June 22 to the troops, for example, of the Southwestern Front, "encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol front, by the end of June 24, capture the Lublin region"? (Bagramyan's book, p. 110).

If the Wehrmacht was so strong that they were so afraid of it in Moscow, then at Headquarters it was necessary to think not about the offensive, but about strengthening the defense. But it can be noted that the optimism of the situation in Moscow could be caused by overly optimistic first reports from the headquarters of the fronts. This is right. However, the General Staff is OBLIGED to develop its instructions based on ALL sources, including the obligation to collect data on enemy groupings itself, especially on the basis of intelligence information (GRU for what?). Moreover, intelligence reports were received regularly and in advance. But as already shown above, they were not taken into account in the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense, they did not draw up a detailed picture of the preparing German troops, they did not determine the direction of their main attacks, they did not give instructions to the troops on the places of defense, there were no warehouses with ammunition and property from the threatened areas. evacuated, foreground not prepared, etc. But at the same time there were some other activities. The troops were deployed, but without taking into account the main attacks of the enemy, warehouses were created, but for some reason in threatened areas, directives were given, but some confused and not related to a specific defense task. What does

it mean? This can be understood only in one case - if the Soviet side also implemented some kind of its own military plan. And all

the actions and directives of the Soviet high command until June 22 must be considered only from this point of view. Then many things become clear and logical, including Directive No. 1 on the night of June 22nd. The real sequence of actions is as follows: on June 19, a decision is made in

Moscow to deploy the headquarters of the fronts and the Headquarters of the High Command. From June 23, it is planned to announce mobilization, calculated for 3-5 days. During this time, the size of the army (especially in the western regions of the USSR) should increase by another 5 million people. This completely covers the Wehrmacht troops. But time is needed to conduct combat rallying and withdraw troops to their starting lines for an offensive. Ultimately, the full deployment of the army should take up to a week and a half. Mobilization leaflets are pre-printed and have the date "June 19, 1941". But it needs a reason to justify it. Such an occasion can only be military provocations on the border, which should take place exactly on the 22nd-23rd. But in Moscow they are 100% convinced that the Germans themselves will not attack. Therefore, on June 22-23, there is a need for planned-fictitious provocations of the type carried out before the Soviet-Finnish war.

However, from the morning of June 22, the headquarters of the fronts will begin to function, which are already aware of the imminent start of hostilities. A possible enemy is also known - Nazi Germany. And if planned fictitious provocations are started in conditions when the troops have not yet been fully deployed, then the consequences can really turn out to be grave if the front command takes the planned provocations for a real attack and moves the armies into battle on a broad front. In addition, the participants in the "provocations" themselves can be shot. Therefore, by the morning of June 22, the headquarters of the fronts should be gently warned so that they would not pay special attention to possible firing at the border. But it is necessary to warn them in such a way that they clearly understand that the provocations are real and all the preparations for the war are really being carried out according to plan only to "repel possible aggression." At the same time, the directive must specify a list of the next activities under the program being implemented. In addition, it must be sent at the very last moment, so that there is a reason for excuses through the ministries of foreign affairs, urgent

along whose line they were supposed to arise. However, they will have to be delayed for the period of mobilization, possibly with its formal cancellation. But during this period the troops will be deployed, and the time for the enemy to prepare his defense will be hopelessly lost.

And only from these positions the meaning of Directive No. 1 becomes completely clear and logical. We can say - ideal, albeit creepy, if you delve into the content of the stated hypothesis. It is hard to agree with such a "biased" selection of facts. Moreover, doubts may arise related to the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, to three fleets and two flotillas: "SF, KBF, Black Sea Fleet, PVF, DRF, operational readiness number one immediately. Kuznetsov." Why was he given away? Does it fit into the proposed sequence of events? I can express my opinion fits. First, the order says nothing about waiting for

someone to attack. Secondly, the navy is an auxiliary structure. At sea, battles for territory are not waged. The fleet is transport communications, duels between enemy ships and coastal defense. And the ships are ready for use if the crews are fully staffed. And there were practically no statements about the insufficient staffing of the fleets; the combat readiness of the fleet was much less connected with mobilization than the ground units. During the war, not the infantry was sent to the ships, but, on the contrary, the sailors went ashore and turned into infantry. In addition, naval command is less concerned with controlling the situation on land - there are commanders of the ground forces for this. But if on land the supreme military leadership is up to something very serious, then the navy cannot stand aside. It must be brought to combat readiness, which was done. And specific instructions were handed over to the land commanders. But we will skip a detailed analysis of the situation with the navy - the size of the book does not allow, although there were interesting moments. For example, it turns out that it was on June 21, 1941 that the big maneuvers of the Black Sea Fleet ended together with units of the Red Army to carry out the most difficult landing operation. But the execution of amphibious assaults makes sense only in the event of an offensive by ground forces. So what are the plans

was the Soviet high military command for 1941? Defense against the strongest enemy? However, it makes no

sense to consider the Soviet military plan for the summer of 1941 and its implementation in more detail here, there are many examples in the books of Viktor Suvorov. I can give only one "stroke" related to the directive of Headquarters No. 1. In the list of its measures that were proposed to be carried out by the headquarters of the fronts, there is a requirement to strengthen air defense: "d) put air defense on alert

without additional rise in assigned personnel; prepare all measures for darkening cities and objects;" And this is in the directive, allegedly transmitted in the presence of irrefutable data about

the beginning of the war on June 22-23, i.e. in a matter of hours! And how long can it take to strengthen air defense? Under normal conditions - not one day. The Germans, for example, have been working on these issues since May. Here is how this is stated in the already mentioned intelligence report of the ZapOVO dated June 5, 1941: From May 12, air defense exercises were conducted in the Danzig area with the participation of

aircraft, coastal artillery and ships ...

The preparation of all civilian facilities for the measures of P[rotivo] V[air] O[harrow] and P[opto] chemical [chemical] O[harrow] (darkening, measures, degassing chambers, etc.) is coming to an end...

Since May 5, Lukov has been blackouting the city. In homes and institutions, windows are draped, and lighting is done only in blue ...

On May 14, a German general arrived in Byala Podlaska. On May 15, he left for Terespol, from where he again returned to Byala Podlaska. According to the same data, gas and bomb shelters are being organized in Byala Podlaska. The inhabitants of the city were ordered to clean and adapt cellars for shelters and to purchase opaque paper for windows. An air defense commandant is assigned to each street, who checks the readiness of shelters and the gathering of the population for meetings held by German air defense officers. Along Drisher Street, most of the residents were evicted to the city center. On the doors of the vacated buildings there are inscriptions:

"Gases-truenz" (poisonous substances). The same event was carried out along Varshavskaya Street and is expected to be held along Brestskaya

Street. On the one hand, this proves that it takes a long time to carry out air defense measures in the frontline zone, and not just a few hours before the start of the war. On the other hand, this shows the fears of the German leadership about the possibility of the Soviet side to take retaliatory measures at a time when the Germans were not yet fully prepared for the attack. But the top leadership of the Soviet side put such messages in a folder with the inscription "DISINFORMATION" and did not even try to adequately react. And on the night of June 22, for some reason, it decided to do something similar on its part, but it was already too

late. Only one question remains unclear, repeatedly posed by historians over the past many decades: why did Stalin flatly refuse to believe in a large-scale German attack? But there is still no clear answer to it. What's the matter? What's stopping you? Is the answer impossible? I can present my opinion. To begin with, it is useful to

know that leaders, especially those in the highest echelons of power, form their opinions on the basis of various kinds of documents. Stalin personally did not go to the warehouses and parks of military units and did not count the amount of equipment. He should have been given REFERENCES! But what if we try to simulate such a certificate on the number of troops and military equipment available to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army as of 06/21/1941. And it also takes into account the well-known rule that the attacking side must have at least 1.5-fold superiority in total numbers (and 3 or 4-fold superiority in the main strike directions). Such reference may take the form of a table with notes: Tab. 4. INFORMATION on the presence of troops and main military equipment on 06/21/1941 Red Army (rounded numbers)
Germans with satellites on the western

border of the USSR Total % to
the Red Army Quantity required. at 1.5 p. more
than
the Red Army %
availability to the required for the offensive

People

1) 5

million

110%

7,500

tons

73%

10

million

5,500

thousand

55%

15

million

37%

Tanks 2)

19,000 17% 28,500 12% 10,150 3,300 33% 15,225 22% Aircraft

3) 10,000 3 500 35% 15,000 23% Notes: 1) As of January 1941, there

were 4,207,000 people in the Red Army. In the spring of the same 1941, about 800,000 more people were called up under the pretext of military training. On average, the staffing of divisions was 50%, i.e. after the deployment of mobilization (a week or two after its announcement), the size of the

Red Army was supposed to approximately double. By mid-1941, the German land army had 208 divisions. In its active part, there were 3.8 million people, of which 3.3 million were deployed against the Soviet Union (Sou

magazine "SOVIET ARCHIVES", No 4, 1991, article "RKKA ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, NEW DOCUMENTS"). 2) On

06/21/1941, the Red Army had only 22,600 tanks. Of these, 19,000 were serviceable, and 10,150 were near the western borders. Of the total of 7,800 tanks, there were BT models of all series. And at the western borders, they accounted for about half of the entire group.

The BT gun had a caliber of 45 mm. In terms of its combat qualities, this tank was more powerful than the German tanks T-I, T-II and can be compared with T III and T-IV. In addition, near the western borders, the Red Army had 1,475 of the most modern tanks (T-34 and KV-1) in general, as well as a still secret number of slightly outdated real heavy tanks T-35.

(Source: I. P. Shmelev "BT TANKS", M., 1993; as well as a collection of documents "HIDDEN TRUTH OF WAR: 1941, UNKNOWN DOCUMENTS", M., 1992). According to the American

classification, tanks are divided into three types according to weight supported by railway bridges: Light - up to 20

tons; Medium -

up to 40 tons;

Heavy - up to 60

tons. All German tanks, except for the latest modifications of the T-IV, weighed up to 20 tons and were outdated in all

respects: 1) engine -

gasoline; 2) drive sprocket - in front (cardan shaft under the turret, resulting in excessive height and excess

weight); 3) narrow

tracks; 4) thin

armor; 5) weak

gun. Of the tank models assembled by the Nazis near the western borders of

the USSR, there

were: 1404 - T-III and T-IV; 1698 - T-I and T-II, as well as light tanks of Czechoslovak production 35 (t) and 38 (t), "35" and "38"

- the year of their creation. The T-I did not

have a gun, but only a machine

gun. The T-II has a 20 mm cannon. Czech tanks were not bad, but the 38(t) had a weak engine, in winter it could not tear off the tracks frozen to the ground. The caliber of the gun at 35 (t) and at 38 (t) is 37 mm. In 1941, the Germans

offensives were no longer used, but were used for reconnaissance, security and communications. In fact, they can be attributed to tracked armored cars, and not to

tanks. In other words, the Germans had only 1,404 of their tanks (and a certain number of Czech ones) to directly break through the enemy's defenses, but they were also outdated and, in terms of their weight, also fell into the light category. In fact, medium, and even more so heavy tanks at that time were not in service with the Wehrmacht!

3) Aircraft of new types (MiG-1, MiG-3, etc.) from the side of the Red Army near the western borders were 1317, which was about 18% of the total number collected there. The Germans also had obsolete types of aircraft, for example, the Ju-87 attack aircraft, whose landing gear did not retract in the air (they were later nicknamed "bast shoes" by Soviet soldiers). Tab. 5 The number of aircraft on both sides by type:

Types Soviet

German

Bombers

3888 945 Dive

bombers and attack aircraft 317 340 (+60)

Fighters

4989 1036

(+93)

Others

723

996

Total

9917 3470 (Source: Kiev magazine "Aviation and Time", No. 3, 1996 d. Article by Moscow author D. Khazanov "INVASION").

Conclusion: the Germans have not much more light and obsolete tanks than only the latest types available in the Red Army. But there is some advantage in the latest aircraft

(about 2 times). And in terms of the total number of troops and equipment, Germany (together with its allies) has from 20% to 40% of the troops required for an offensive against the

USSR. Conclusion: it cannot attack the Soviet Union in

1941! So who was Stalin supposed to believe? Generals who prepared such certificates? Or those who expressed concern about the concentration of these very 20% to 40% of the required forces near the western borders

of the USSR? History shows that he trusted the authors of the references. And at the same time, he acted somehow in such a way that he forced the Nazis to commit a suicidal attack. And this already falls under the definition of provocation of the 1st

class (however, unplanned). A major step in pushing Hitler to such a decision can be considered the results of the Soviet-German negotiations on November 12-14, 1940 in Berlin. The objectives of the parties to them were revealed in his memoirs by Marshal Vasilevsky, who traveled there. It turns out that "Hitler tried to involve the Soviet delegation in a dirty game by proposing to discuss a provocative plan to "divide the world" between Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. Rejecting political insinuations, Molotov demanded [?] specific answers to our questions about Berlin's policy in the Central and South -Eastern Europe and Germany's goals in Finland and Romania". But it was not possible to agree either at a meeting with Hitler or with Ribbentrop. On November 14, the Soviet delegation left Berlin ("there was no trace of the pomp and ostentatious friendliness of the hosts! A cold send-off, a dry exchange of official phrases" - Vasilevsky's recollection). On December 5, 1940, Hitler approved the plan of attack on the USSR (Plan "OTTO"), and on December 18, he signed the plan "BARBAROSSA" with the readiness to start a war against the Soviet Union on May 18, 1941.

The fact that Hitler was preparing a war with the USSR in 1940 is true. But it turns out that until the last moment he tried to negotiate with Moscow on the division of spheres of influence. However, Stalin was not going to share with anyone. But in this case, it turns out that he wanted to get EVERYTHING! And any agreements in this case can only be temporary. So who provoked whom?

Summarizing the above, one more rule can be deduced: there are no peaceful provocations! Or in other words: the authors

provocations in foreign policy are very eager for military action on a local or global scale. This is as true as the impossibility of, for example, useful computer viruses. Computer viruses are ALWAYS harmful, even if they have only one of their harmless copying functions. And if they do not copy themselves, then these are no longer viruses. If both interested parties really want peace, then they sit down at the

negotiating table and, using compromises, come to an agreement. Provocations, in principle, ignore the rights of the opposite side and are actions without

warning and agreement. And this always presupposes a complication of relations with the threat of the use of military force. So, let us briefly list some important foreign policy actions, the development and implementation of which Stalin led in the

decade leading up to the Korean War:

August 1939 - staged a 1st class provocation to the Germans. November 1939 - The Soviet-Finnish War, started with the use of class 3 provocation.

1940 - summer 1941 - provoking the Germans in 1st class with an attempt to implement his plan (failed).

Autumn 1941 - possible involvement in the Japanese complication American relations (the famous Operation Snow) - (success).

Spring 1942 - possible military provocation of the Germans in order to make their actions under control (succeeded). Since

the beginning of 1943 - the fate of Germany is practically a foregone conclusion. Time can be spent planning for the future international situation after the end of the war.

From the beginning of 1945 - provoking Turkey with territorial claims and the problem of the straits. Simultaneous provocation of the United States to the deterioration of Soviet-American relations (including in relation to the events in Greece). Since

1946 - provoking Central Chinese government to expand the civil war. 1946 - Provoking

Great Britain with claims against Iran. Since 1947 - provoking the former Western allies to split between Germany and Korea.

June-July 1950 - provoking Americans in Korea in 1st class (succeeded). In

addition, in May - July 1950, a discussion on linguistics was started in the newspaper "PRAVDA", in which Stalin spoke several times. His speeches then amounted to the pamphlet "MARXISM AND QUESTIONS OF LINGUISTICS", immediately declared brilliant. But from the mid-1950s, they began to forget about it, and for a long time historians could not understand the reasons for Stalin's appeal to this topic, from which he had previously been far away. And if you read some of his ideas more carefully? For example, the following: 1) Stalin's formula in his

pamphlet, in the part concerning the crossing of languages, has in mind the era BEFORE THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM on a world scale. 2) As for the other formula of

Stalin, taken from the speech at the 16th Party Congress, regarding the merging of languages into one common language, here we mean a different era, namely, the era AFTER THE VICTORY OF SOCIALISM on a world scale, when world imperialism will no longer exist.

Note that these lines were published in the summer of 1950, when the second program of the CPSU(b) had already been completed, and the new one had not yet been adopted. At the same time, Stalin envisaged serious changes in the international situation. Under these conditions, some kind of programmatic statement is requested, but in such a way that the main goals are said softly and non-aggressively. The shell of linguistics was quite suitable for this. But if Soviet readers did not quite understand the essence of the matter, especially linguists (where the persecuted and the persecutors switched places), then how should those same "imperialists" react? Quietly wait until they are eliminated? Or somehow answer? Strengthening the arms race and international tension? But this plays into the hands of Stalin! Conclusion: the Stalinist discussion of languages is another

provocation of the imperialists in the first class! But it can be seen that this is the duty of state leaders - to defend the interests of the country. This is right. But not at the expense of the fate of millions of citizens. And as a result of many years of Stalin's policy of provocations, people died, and in the millions. And I don't think that this is a completely normal me

for peace, for defending the interests of all other people (death at the front - is this the meaning

of life?). It must also be added to what has been said that all domestic policy was subordinated to Stalin's foreign policy measures. This, too, did not go unnoticed for the interests of individual citizens. We are still facing this. And in the next chapter, I propose to continue our acquaintance with the Stalinist struggle for peace in the Far East. The war in Korea could not start without the preparation of China, during which there were also some provocations. And Japan is not left out.

7. OTHER "PEACEFUL" STEPS OF THE USSR IN THE FAR

EAST In 1951, another event took place in the Far East, which "worked" to exacerbate international tension. Stalin refused to sign a peace treaty with Japan, thereby maintaining the formal state of war with her. N. S. Khrushchev writes in his memoirs (OGONEK magazine, N: 16, April, 1991, p. 4-5): "The Americans, to give them their due, kept their word. When the draft peace treaty with Japan was drawn up, then we also had our own place for signing there. Our interests were fully provided for, as stipulated by the protocol signed by Roosevelt. We had to sign ... [But Stalin refused to sign it] ... Absolutely incomprehensible. Then it was incomprehensible to me and now incomprehensible. Stalin did not consult and did not consider others, he was too self-confident. Especially after the defeat of Nazi Germany ... When, after the signing of the peace treaty, our representative was, in fact, expelled from Japan, there was absolutely no contact with her until Stalin's death was. Who was it beneficial? And it happened through our fault. If we had signed the contract, we would have opened our own embassy there ... "Naive Nikita Sergeevich! Stalin played such a game, the stakes in which were a million times greater than the Soviet embassy

in independent capitalist Japan! And it's one thing just not to understand, and another thing - to try to understand, to put together a big picture from different details. The signing ceremony of the peace treaty with Japan was scheduled for September 8, 1951 in San Francisco (USA). By this

time, the Americans had been fighting in Korea for almost a year. For the war they needed bases in Japan. But since all the fullness of power with